Opinion
C/A 9:23-06102-MGL-MHC
05-17-2024
Larry James Tyler, Plaintiff, v. Waddell Coe, Medical Dept. Supervisor, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge Charleston, South Carolina
Plaintiff Larry James Tyler, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action against Defendants alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
In an Order entered March 27, 2024, Plaintiff was advised of material deficiencies in his Complaint and given the opportunity to file an amended Complaint. ECF No. 5. Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is involuntarily detained at the Darlington County Detention Center (DCDC), held on contempt charges and awaiting sexually violent predator (SVP) proceedings. See Tyler v. Dir. of Darlington Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 922CV01623MGLMHC, 2023 WL 3587889, at *3 (D.S.C. May 2, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3587212 (D.S.C. May 22, 2023). Defendants are DCDC Director Wadell Coe (Coe) and the unidentified Medical Supervisor. Plaintiff alleges that on November 23, 2023, Defendant Medical Supervisor took Plaintiff off his migraine medication (Excedrin) because Plaintiff was required to have no aspirin for seven days prior to a scheduled thumb surgery. He claims he was given no medication as a replacement and he experienced pain and suffering from chronic migraines. See ECF No. 1 at 6-7, 9.
Plaintiff asserts that he brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 1 at 4. He requests declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Id. at 8-10.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se Complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
It is recommended that this action be summarily dismissed because Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable federal claim against the Defendants. Although Plaintiff lists Defendants' names in the caption of his Complaint, he has alleged no facts indicating what Coe did or did not do that allegedly violated his federal constitutional or statutory rights and merely claims that an unidentified Medical Supervisor allegedly took him off Excedrin to prepare him for surgery (ECF No. 1 at 6-7). See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (requiring, in order to avoid dismissal, “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). Although the “liberal pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a) only require a “short and plain” statement of the claim, a plaintiff must “offer more detail ... than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (district court did not abuse discretion by dismissing plaintiff's complaint which “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”).
To the extent that Plaintiff may be attempting to bring claims against Defendants based on a theory of supervisory liability, such claims are subject to summary dismissal. To state a § 1983 claim for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that [his or her] subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to establish supervisory liability as to Defendants.
Because Plaintiff's status at the time of the alleged incident appears to be most similar to that of a pre-trial detainee, the Fourteenth Amendment (rather than the Eighth Amendment applicable to convicted prisoners) applies to any claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 2021); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). The Fourth Circuit recently found that to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a medical need, a pretrial detainee must plead that:
(1) [he] had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have known (a) that the detainee had that condition and (b) that the defendant's action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee was harmed.Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023).
The Court noted that this “objective test is not the sole means of showing a Fourteenth Amendment violation” and that a pretrial detainee can still state a claim if he can meet the more demanding Eighth Amendment standard. Short, 87 F.4th at 612. Under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must allege that he had a serious medical need, and that officials knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017).
Until recently, a claim for deliberate indifference by a pretrial detainee also included a subjective component requiring that the official actually knew of the excessive risk to the individual's safety, because the standards for evaluating deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth Amendment for a convicted prisoner and under the Fourteenth Amendment for a pre-trial detainee were treated the same. See Short, 87 F.4th at 607. However, in Short, the Fourth Circuit considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), which held that, to state a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim for excessive use of force, a pretrial detainee need only allege that the officer used objectively unreasonable force. Short, 87 F.4th at 608 (discussing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398). Based on the application of Kingsley, the Fourth Circuit in Short concluded that the subjective element does not apply to Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims by pretrial detainees. Therefore, under Short a pretrial detainee need not show that the defendant actually knew of the serious medical condition, but must show that the defendant acted or failed to act “in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.” Id. at 611 (internal quotation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff merely makes general allegations and has not alleged that each of the Defendants allegedly was responsible for the medical care he was provided or not provided, other than supervising others, at the time of the alleged incidents. He has not alleged that Defendants, including Defendant Coe, acted or failed to act “in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm” that was known or so obvious it should have been known. See Short, 87 F.4th at 611.
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to indicate that Coe is a medical professional or that Coe is responsible for medical care decisions.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' actions are “unprofessional neglect[.]” ECF No. 1 at 6. However, it is well settled that negligence, in general does not support a claim for deprivation of Constitutional rights pursuant to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793-94 (4th Cir. 1987); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 345-48 (1986); see also Short, 87 F.4th at 611-612 (“To be clear, it is still not enough for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant negligently or accidentally failed to do right by the detainee.”). Further, allegations that might be sufficient to support negligence and medical malpractice claims do not, without more, rise to the level of a cognizable § 1983 claim. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff argues that medical staff did not follow his preferred course of treatment and did not administer his preferred medications, such action does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Brown v. Thompson, 868 F.Supp. 326, 331 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (finding that although the provision of medical care by prison officials is not discretionary, the type and amount of medical care is discretionary); Thomas v. Anderson City Jail, C/A No. 6:10-3270-RMG-KFM, 2011 WL 442053, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 19, 2011) (finding the Constitution requires prisoners be provided with a certain minimum level of medical treatment, but it does not guarantee to a prisoner the treatment of his choice). Nor does a disagreement between Plaintiff and one or more of the Defendants about his medical care rise to the level of deliberate indifference under § 1983. See Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014) (Noting that an inmate “does not enjoy a constitutional right to the treatment of his or choice,” and a mere “[d]isagreement[ ] between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care ... fall[s] short of showing deliberate indifference.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sharpe v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 621 Fed.Appx. 732, 733 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that “mere disagreement between an inmate and medical staff regarding the proper course of treatment provides no basis for relief” under § 1983) (citing Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975)).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process.
See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend ... the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page..
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).