Opinion
No. 04-16-00179-CR
03-08-2017
Jason TURNER, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2014CR9801
Honorable Ray Olivarri, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice AFFIRMED
A jury found appellant, Jason Turner, guilty of murder in the shooting death of his father, Samuel Dean. The trial court assessed punishment at sixty-eight years' confinement. On appeal, appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding on the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, he asserts the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's rejection of his claim that he acted in self-defense. We affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
To prevail on a claim of self-defense with the use of deadly force, a defendant must prove: (1) he would have been justified in using force against the other person; and (2) it was reasonable to believe that "deadly force [was] immediately necessary [for protection] against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)(1), (2)(A) (West 2011). "[A] person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force." Id. at § 9.31(a).
Once a defendant produces some evidence raising the issue of self-defense, the State bears the burden of persuasion to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions were not justified. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). To meet its burden of persuasion, the State is not required to produce additional evidence. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. If the jury finds the defendant guilty, it has made an implicit finding against any defensive theory raised by the defendant. Id. at 914.
When a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's implicit rejection of his self-defense claim, we do not look to whether the State presented evidence that refuted defendant's self-defense evidence. Id. Instead, we determine whether after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and would have found against defendant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we defer to the jury's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to their testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
DISCUSSION
The jury was charged that appellant committed the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly caused Dean's death by shooting Dean with a deadly weapon (a firearm) or if appellant, with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to Dean, committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused Dean's death by shooting Dean with a deadly weapon (a firearm). The evidence is undisputed that appellant shot Dean, which was an act clearly dangerous to human life, and Dean died as a result. Accordingly, the evidence establishes every essential element of the offense of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. We next examine whether the jury also could have found against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Although Dean's girlfriend, Tangela Lattimore, initially told police she did not witness what happened on the night of the shooting, at trial she testified she saw what happened. Lattimore testified that on the day of the shooting, she and Dean were having "a good day," shopping and visiting family, including appellant. Lattimore said the demeanor between Dean and appellant "was okay," and there were no problems. At some point in the evening, Lattimore, Dean, and appellant all gathered at the apartment they shared. Another man—later identified as the landlord—who lived in the same apartment building later accused Lattimore of stealing a cell phone. Lattimore and the man got into an argument in the parking lot, and appellant then got involved in the argument. Appellant told Lattimore to get her belongings and leave, which she did. As she was leaving, Dean arrived and saw Lattimore still arguing with the other man. Lattimore testified she told Dean that appellant had "disrespected" her, but everything was fine and she and Dean should both leave. Appellant and Dean then began to argue. In describing the argument between appellant and Dean, Lattimore said, "it just felt like it was — it was going to be death." She said there was no physical confrontation, but both men were "up in each other's faces." She could not remember what either man said to the other. Lattimore finally stepped between the two men, at which point, appellant went up the stairs to his apartment and Dean "went charging up the stairs after" appellant.
The apartment belonged to appellant and his brother, and each had their own bedroom. Dean and Lattimore were guests and slept in the living room.
Lattimore said Dean told her to gather their belongings and leave, but she told him they should just leave and wait for things to calm down. However, Dean did not listen to her and he refused to leave. By this time, Lattimore was hiding behind a door and Dean was on the other side of the door on the landing outside the apartment. Lattimore testified appellant walked out of his bedroom, holding a gun, and he shot Dean six times. According to Lattimore, appellant stood over Dean as he shot him and said, "Bitch, I told you."
On cross-examination, Lattimore admitted she and Dean smoked crake cocaine. First, she stated they had taken a three-day "break" from smoking by the night of the shooting; however, she later admitted she and Dean smoked cocaine all day the day of the shooting and they were both "pretty messed up." She admitted Dean's excessive use of the drug made him violent, "crazy and aggressive." Lattimore also admitted she and Dean had caused other problems at the apartment complex, and been asked to leave by appellant's landlord. Lattimore also contradicted her earlier testimony that appellant and Dean did not engage in physical fighting when she admitted she told the police they had been fighting and she stepped in to separate the men. She said the fighting began when Dean became "outrageous."
Lattimore admitted she had bipolar and schizophrenia disorders and she had violent mood swings when she did not take her medication. She could not remember the last time she took her medication before the night of the shooting, except that it had been "a while."
Dr. Samantha Evans, a forensic pathologist with the Bexar County Medical Examiner's Office, testified about the autopsy she performed on Dean. Evans testified Dean suffered six gunshot wounds, and he had unburnt powder grains over his left shoulder. Dean sustained three gunshot wounds to his face, one gunshot wound in his shoulder, a fifth wound in his upper chest, and a sixth wound near his armpit. Evans believed some of the bullets were fired from a distance of three to five feet, and at least three from a distance of half an inch to three to five feet.
Police officers testified appellant was not at the scene of the shooting, and he was later apprehended following a car chase. Officers found the murder weapon inside appellant's vehicle.
Appellant called two witnesses during his case-in-chief, one of whom testified about Dean's violent history. Sara Sancho, who dated appellant's brother, testified she knew Dean and Lattimore, and she was present in the apartment on the evening of the shooting. Sancho said she knew Dean to carry either a gun or a knife with him, although she did not see any weapon in Dean's hands the night of the shooting. Although Sancho did not witness the shooting, she said Dean was "very high" on crack cocaine and Dean was aggressive toward appellant. Sancho heard Dean and appellant arguing, and she heard Dean tell appellant "he would cut [appellant's] throat and burn the place down." She said appellant responded, "You're out of your mind. Why don't you just leave?" On cross-examination, Sancho admitted she left after the shooting, did not speak to the police, and told defense counsel about Dean's threat for the first time approximately a week before trial—one year and five months after the shooting.
On appeal, appellant points to the evidence that Dean was high on crack cocaine, Dean was acting aggressively toward appellant, Dean was known to carry weapons, Dean "charged" up the stairs after appellant, and Dean threatened to cut appellant's throat and "burn the place down." Appellant also relies on forensic evidence that he and Dean were in close proximity to each other at the time of the shooting. Appellant argues this evidence was sufficient for the jury to have found in his favor on his claim of self-defense.
In our review, we defer to the jury's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, and the jury in this case could have rejected some or all of Sancho's testimony regarding the threat Dean allegedly made to appellant. Although Lattimore's answers on direct and cross-examination often amounted to her saying she did not remember what happened and her testimony was often inconsistent, the jury was free to resolve any inconsistencies. Finally, the jury was entitled to consider appellant's actions in leaving the scene of the shooting. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting, "factfinder may draw an inference of guilt from the circumstance of flight"); Kirk v. State, 421 S.W.3d 772, 781 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref'd) (referencing flight from scene as evidence jury could consider in rejecting self-defense claim).
Having reviewed all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude the jury rationally could have found each element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and rationally could have rejected appellant's self-defense claim.
CONCLUSION
We overrule appellant's issue on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Do not publish