Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 99-152 SECTION: "R" (5)
May 22, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of investigations and hearings conducted by the Houma Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board into the activities of plaintiff, Daniel Turner, during his service as acting fire chief for the Houma Fire Department. Turner was hired by the Houma Fire Department as a firefighter on May 1, 1968. An African-American, Turner alleges that when he became the leading candidate for permanent fire chief in July 1997, defendants participated and/or acquiesced in an effort by a number of Caucasian firefighters to discredit him solely because of his race.
On January 19, 1999, plaintiff filed suit in this Court against the Houma Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board, as well as Board members Patricia McKey, Timothy Wallace, Johnny Lopez, Joe Roy, David Falgoust, and Craig Landry, in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against him and denying him his constitutional right to a fair hearing solely because of his race. Plaintiff further alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. In addition to compensatory and punitive damages, plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.
On October 8, 1999, the Court found that the claims against the Board members in their individual capacities were barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The Court also found that the Board and its members did not enjoy immunity in their official capacities. See Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire and Police Civil Serv. Ed., 1999 WL 816499 (E.D. La. 1999). On October 18, 2000, the Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision. See Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire and Police Civil Serv. Ed., 229 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2000). Defendants now move to dismiss or for summary judgment on the basis that the Board and its members are not juridical entities capable of being sued.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
The Court will treat defendants' motion as one for summary judgment because matters outside of the pleadings have been presented to and not excluded by the Court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5tb Cir. 1990) ( citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; see also Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1996).
B. Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Boards
The Houma Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board was created in the municipal government by Louisiana statute. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2476(A). The Board consists of five members who serve without compensation. See id. One member is appointed by the local governing body upon its own nomination. LA. Rsv. STAT. 33:2476(C)(1). Two members are appointed from a list of four nominees furnished by Nichols State University, while the remaining members are elected by the regular members of the Fire Department and Police Department, respectively. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2476(C)(2)(3)
The Board's duties are outlined in LA. REV. STAT. 33:2477. The Board is responsible for representing the public interest in matters of personnel administration in the fire and police services of the municipality. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2477(1). The Board advises and assists the governing body, the mayor, the commissioner of public safety, the fire and police chiefs, and employees in fire and police services with maintaining, improving, and administrating personnel matters. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2477(2)(3). The Board may, upon its own motion, or at the direction of the mayor, the commissioner of public safety, chief of either the fire or the police department, or upon petition of any citizen for just cause, investigate fire and police personnel administration or compliance with the Civil Service statutes. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2477(4). The Board conducts investigations and hears complaints by or against any officer or employee of the fire and police departments for the purposes of demotion, suspension, or dismissal of the officer or employee. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2477(5). The Board adopts a plan for classification of fire and police employees. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2477(8). The Board also has rulemaking authority. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2477(7).
The Board establishes and maintains employment lists of persons eligible for appointment for various positions within the fire and police departments and provides eligibility of applicants for entry upon the promotional and competitive employment lists of the fire and police departments. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2491 2492. If an employee feels that he has been discharged or subjected to disciplinary action without just cause, he may appeal to the Board and request a hearing to determine if the action was reasonable. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2501(A). The Board may also investigate the conduct and performance of employees, render judgment, and order that disciplinary action be taken. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2500(C). An employee may appeal any decision or action of the Board that is prejudicial to the employee to the district court of the parish where the Board is located. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2501(E). Lastly, if any person fails or refuses to comply with the orders or directions of the Board or if the Board's enforcement of the Civil Service statutes is questioned in a judicial proceeding, the Board may employ the attorney general, the chief legal officer of the municipality, or independent counsel to represent it in sustaining and enforcing the Civil Service statutes. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2506. The statute also states: "[n]othing contained herein shall prevent any municipal officer, employee, or private citizens from taking legal action in the courts to enforce the provisions of this Part or any rule, order, or other lawful action of the board." See id.
C. Suability of the Houma Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board and its Members
Defendants argue that the Civil Service Board is not a juridical person capable of being sued. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) provides in relevant part:
The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the individual's domicile. . . . In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held.
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b). This Court will look to Louisiana law in order to determine the suability of the Civil Service Board. Article 24 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides in relevant part: "A juridical person is an entity to which the law attributes personality, such as a corporation or partnership." LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 24 (West 1999).
The Louisiana Supreme Court has set forth a framework within which to determine the suability of an entity. See Roberts v. Sewerage and Water Board, 634 So.2d 341 (La. 1994) (Sewerage and Water Board Commission was third party capable of being sued under state workers compensation law). The court in Roberts stated:
The determination that must be made in each case is whether the entity can appropriately be regarded as an additional or separate government unit for the particular purpose at issue. In the absence of positive law to the contrary, a local government unit may be deemed to be a juridical person separate and distinct from other government entities, when the organic law grants it the legal capacity to function independently and not just as the agency or division of another governmental entity.Id. at 346-47 (emphasis added). In concluding that the Sewerage and Water Board was a "third person" capable of being sued, the Roberts court focused its analysis on the independent management, financing, and operations of the board. See Id. at 352. By contrast, in City Council of Lafayette v. Bowen, 649 So.2d 611, 616 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1994), the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that under the Roberts analysis, the City Council of Lafayette, organized pursuant to a home rule charter, had no capacity to sue or be sued. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court, which found "no authority, Constitutional, Statutory, or via Home Rule Charter that authorizes the Lafayette City Council to institute, of its own motion, a lawsuit[.]" Bowen, 649 So.2d at 613, internal quotations omitted.
The Louisiana Civil Service statutes establish the fire and police civil service boards and give them the power to function independently of local governments. Indeed, all of the boards' powers are established by state, not local, law. These boards implement and enforce civil service laws as they apply to fire and police personnel. See LA. REV. STAT. 33:2477. For example, the board may initiate disciplinary action on its own and order action to be taken by the local appointing authority. LA. REV. STAT. 33:2500(C). The boards hold hearings, have rulemaking powers and their decisions are subject to judicial review. See LA. REV. STAT. 33:2501(E)(1). In fact in several cases, private citizens have named civil service boards as defendants when suing to enforce state laws applicable to fire and police civil service. See, e.g., Pearson v. Mun. Fire and Police Civil Service Ed. for City of Shreveport, 609 So.2d 1038 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1992); Laborde v. Alexandria Mun. Fire and Police Civil Service Bd., 566 So.2d 426 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1990); Trosclair v. Houma Mun. Fire and Police Civil Service Ed., 209 So.2d 1 (La. 1968).
Further, Louisiana Revised Statute 33:2506 allows the Board to retain counsel to represent itself. Relying on this language, Louisiana courts have found that civil service boards have standing to seek judicial enforcement of their rulings. See City of Kenner v. Lawrence, 365 So.2d 1301, 1303 (La. 1979). In City of Kenner, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that a civil service board could maintain a suit independent of an aggrieved employee's right to appeal. See id. In this case, a police officer appealed his dismissal to the Kenner Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Commission, which reinstated the officer to his position. See id. at 1302. The district court set aside the reinstatement, and the officer and board appealed the district court's decision. See id. Because the officer failed to file his appeal bond in a timely manner, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit of Appeals dismissed his appeal. The appellate court also dismissed the board's appeal, finding that the board had acted in its quasi-judicial capacity and had no right to appeal. See Id.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, finding that the board had its own standing to sue. The court found that LA. REV. STAT. 33:2506 granted the board an independent right to seek judicial enforcement of its actions in order to maintain a cohesive personnel policy and the ability to oversee the hiring and firing of employees in the best interest of the public. See Id. at 1303. Because civil service boards may sue to enforce their decisions regarding the firing and hiring of personnel, they are juridical entities with respect to these decisions. For this and the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Board is a juridical entity capable of being sued.
D. Claims Against the Board Members
The Court has dismissed claims against the Board members in their individual capacities; therefore, plaintiff's remaining claims against the Board members are against them only in their official capacities as Board members. "[I]n an official capacity action, the Board and its members are analytically the same entity because liability attaches to the municipality or like governmental entity." Turner, 229 F.3d at 482 n. 7. Thus, the claims are in essence claims against the Board. Because the Court has found that the Board can be sued, the Board members in their official capacities are also proper defendants. In light of this holding, the Court denies plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint as moot.
E. Sanctions
Plaintiff moves for sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 against defendants for filing numerous motions that resulted in the multiplication of litigation. Section 1927 provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
The decision to impose sanctions under § 1927 falls within the district court's sound discretion, reviewed on appeal only for abuse of that discretion. See Travelers Ins. Co. V. St. Jude Hosp. of Kenner, La., Inc., 38 F.3d 1414, 1417 (5th Cir. 1994). Before imposing sanctions under section 1927, the Court must determine that the offending attorney's multiplication of the proceedings was both "unreasonable" and "vexatious." See Id. at 1416 ( citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1384 (5th Cir. 1994)). The latter requirement is met by evidence of recklessness, bad faith, or improper motive. See Id. (citing Hogue v. Royse City, Tex., 939 F.2d 1249, 1256 (5th Cir. 1991)). The Court cannot state there has been a showing of "recklessness, bad faith, or improper motive." Accordingly, the Court denies the request for sanctions.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied.