Opinion
1:23-cv-01092-SAB (PC)
08-07-2023
MACEY E TURLEY, JR., Plaintiff, v. SGT. GARCIA, et al. Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
(ECF NO. 1)
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's complaint, filed July 20, 2023.
I.
SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
II.
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in his complaint as true only for the purpose of the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
On January 2, 2023, at approximately 12:00 p.m., inmate Gray had a letter of Plaintiff's from the State Bar of California from an investigator advising Plaintiff to contact him. Plaintiff asked sergeant Garcia how to set up a legal call, who told Plaintiff to give him the letter and he would send an email to the litigation department. Plaintiff advised Garcia that inmate Gray had his letter. The next day, Garcia went to get the letter from inmate Gray and sent an email for a legal telephone call. After a week passed, Plaintiff asked Garcia about the telephone call and asked for his letter back. Garcia stated that he gave the letter to De La Torre because they was an alarm that he had to respond to. It has been four months and Plaintiff has received his letter back.
Plaintiff believes officers are messing with his mental illness in order to torture him.
On April 27, 2023, an officer repeatedly kicked Plaintiff's cell door to get a reaction out of Plaintiff.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Mail
Prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Nevertheless, prison officials have a legitimate governmental interest in imposing certain restraints on inmate or detainee correspondence to maintain order and security. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overturned on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989).
Inmates also have a protected First Amendment interest in having properly marked civil legal mail opened only in their presence. Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2017). The Ninth Circuit “recognize[s] that prisoners have a protected First Amendment interest in having properly marked legal mail [including civil mail] opened only in their presence.” Id., 1211 (9th Cir. 2017). “[A] plaintiff need not allege a longstanding practice of violating his First Amendment rights in order to state a claim for relief on a direct liability theory.” Id. at 1212. Isolated incidents of interference without any evidence of improper motive or interference with the inmate's right to counsel or access to the courts fails to show a constitutional violation. Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990). “Two or three pieces of mail opened in an arbitrary or capricious way suffice to state a claim.” Id. at 1211 (quoting Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotations omitted).
The First Amendment does not prohibit opening mail from the courts outside the recipient's presence because it is not legal mail. Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1211; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[M]ail from the courts, as contrasted with mail from a prisoner's lawyer, is not legal mail.”). “[A]ll correspondence from a court to a litigant is a public document, which prison personnel could open if they want to inspect in the court's files.” Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1987)).
Confidential correspondence between a prisoner and his attorney is protected by the Sixth Amendment. See Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2014) (“What prison officials don't have the right to do is read a confidential letter from an inmate to his lawyer.”). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit “recognize[s] that prisoners have a protected First Amendment interest in having properly marked legal mail opened only in their presence.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017). This protection, however, does not extend to correspondence with government agencies. O'Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding prison policy including reviewing inmate correspondence with government officials, stating “Regulating correspondence between prisoners and government agencies can serve to prevent criminal activity and maintain prison security”); Hamilton v. Department of Corrections, 43 Fed.Appx. 107 (9th Cir. 2002) (unreported) (“Although Hamilton may have a right to correspond confidentially with an FBI agent under California law, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3141(a) & (c)(2) (inmates may correspond confidentially with federal officials appointed by the President of the United States, and their staff members), no such federal constitutional right exists”); Grigsby v. Horel, 2008 WL 11422633, at *2 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 28, 2008); aff'd 341 Fed.Appx. 314 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The cited incoming mail from the Commission on Judicial Performance, Del Norte County Superior Court and the State Bar of California is not material because it was not ‘legal mail.' ”); Williams v. Simon, 2018 WL 1585785, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 30, 2018) (“A prison need not treat all mail sent to government officials as legal mail.”).
Plaintiff's claim is premised on the confiscation of a letter from a bar organization, not mail from an attorney. Because First Amendment protections do not extend to letters from government agencies, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any of these defendants. See Mann v. Adams, 846 F.2d 589, 590-91 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (no constitutional violation when mail from public agencies, public officials, and news media was opened outside inmate's presence); Grigsby v. Horel, 341 Fed.Appx. 314, 314 (9th Cir. 2009) (mailings to and from public and state agencies are not legal mail and could be read by prison officials); Barstad v. Dep't of Corr., No. C14-0523RSL-MAT, 2015 WL 1867082, at *13 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 23, 2015) (prison officials were not required to open mail from state agency in inmate's presence); Blaisdell v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 14-00433 JMS/RLP, 2014 WL 5581032, at *4 (D. Haw. Oct. 31, 2014) (“[M]ail to and from state agencies is not ‘legal mail,' and may be opened and inspected outside an inmate's presence.”); Cripe v. Hininger, No. 6:12cv422, 2013 WL 1984379, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2013) (mail from “Child Protective Services” and “Family Services” was not legal mail and could be opened outside inmate's presence).
Similarly, the complaint contains no allegations from which it could be inferred that the mail from the State Bar concerned Plaintiffs representation in a pending matter and was legal mail. See Hayes v. Radford, No. 1:09-CV-00555-BLW, 2012 WL 4481213, at *8 (D. Idaho Sept. 28, 2012) (“Hayes I”) (mail to inmate from Idaho State Bar was not legal mail), aff'd, 584 Fed.Appx. 633 (9th Cir. 2014); Jenkins v. Huntley, 235 Fed.Appx. 374, 376 (7th Cir. 2007) (letter from Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission was not legal mail, particularly when inmate was not represented or seeking representation by Commission). The State Bar “does not provide legal advice or directly represent clients in legal matters.” Hayes I, 2012 WL 4481213, at *8. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.
B. Deprivation of Property
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects Plaintiff from being deprived of property without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and Plaintiff has a protected interest in his personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). Authorized, intentional deprivations of property are actionable under the Due Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), but the Due Process Clause is violated only when the agency “prescribes and enforces forfeitures of property without underlying statutory authority and competent procedural protections,” Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotations omitted).
The Due Process Clause is not violated by the random, unauthorized deprivation of property so long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 533; Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiffs claim that his legal letter was improperly confiscated from him fails to give rise to a cognizable claim for relief. Plaintiff's claim reflects a random and unauthorized deprivation of property, which is not cognizable under section 1983. Plaintiffs property claim may be actionable under state law, but such a claim must be brought in state court rather than in federal court. Indeed, Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation remedy under California law and therefore, he may not pursue a due process claim arising out of the unlawful confiscation of his personal property. Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-17 (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810-895). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable due process claim.
C. Retaliation
Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights may support a § 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). A retaliation claim requires “five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted); accord Watson v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).
To the extent Plaintiff contend that Defendants retaliated against him, he has failed to allege that any adverse action was taken because of the exercise of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.
IV.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons discussed, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief and shall be granted leave to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in this order, if she believes she can do so in good faith. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), but it must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Further, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George, 507 F.3d at 607 (no “buckshot” complaints).
Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff's amended complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.
Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;
2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint;
3. Plaintiff's amended complaint shall not exceed twenty-five (25) pages in length; and
4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the Court will recommend to a district judge that this action be dismissed consistent with the reasons stated in this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.