Opinion
No. C 02-00343 CRB
August 15, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding in pro per, alleges defendants terminated his employment because of his race, African-American, and because of complaints he made about the propriety of his employer's practices concerning patients' rights to confidentiality, improper approaches to disciplining clients, submitting false claims for government benefits, and providing substandard quality of treatment to clients. Now before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment After carefully considering defendants' motion and plaintiffs disclosure, the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary, see Local Rule 7-1(b), and grants defendants summary judgment on plaintiffs Tide VII claim, and remands the remaining state law claims to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Alameda
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant C.U.R.A., Inc. ("CURA") terminated plaintiffs employment in February 2000.
A. Plaintiffs Administrative Complaint
On March 21, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH"). Plaintiff's complaint alleged that CURA terminated his employment because of his race and in retaliation for his complaints about CURA's violation of state and federal regulations. Declaration of Joseph Locaria, Exh. N. On March 27, 2000, the DFEH concluded that an accusation of discrimination would not be issued and that further investigation was not warranted. Id. That same day the DFEH issued plaintiff a "Notice of Case Closure," advising plaintiff that if he wanted to file suit against CURA under the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") he had to do so within one year of the date of the Notice. The Notice also advised plaintiff that if he wanted to pursue federal claims against defendant, he had to visit the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to file a complaint within 30 days of the date of the Notice of Case Closure. Id. Plaintiff included a copy of the DFEH Notice of Case Closure in his "disclosures" filed with the Court on April 24, 2002.
B. Plaintiffs State Court Complaint
On March 27, 2001—one year after the issuance of the DFEH Notice of Case Closure-plaintiff, proceeding in pro per-filed a complaint in state court Plaintiff's complaint included five state causes of action: (1) violation of California Labor Code Section 1102.5, (2) violation of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, (3) violation of California Labor Code Section 2856, (4) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and (5) race discrimination in violation of the FEHA. The complaint also included one federal cause of action for employment discrimination in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff did not serve the complaint on defendants until December 2001.
C. The Federal Court Proceedings
Defendants removed the complaint to this Court in January 2002 based on the Title VII federal cause of action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On June 7, 2002, defendants moved for summary judgment on the merits of all of plaintiffs claims. They allege that no reasonable trier of fact could find that defendants terminated plaintiff's employment because of his race or in retaliation for his complaints. Plaintiff responded by advising that he was about to retain counsel and on that basis sought continuance of the motion. The Court continued the hearing on the summary judgment motion to August 23, 2002. The Court advised plaintiff that his response to the summary judgment motion was due on August 2, 2002, and the Court issued plaintiff a written pro se plaintiff summary judgment warning. As of the date of this Order plaintiff has not filed an opposition and has not otherwise communicated with the Court.
DISCUSSION
A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction of Plaintiff's Title VII Claim
To state a Title VII claim a plaintiff must allege that he has properly exhausted his administrative remedies before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In particular, a plaintiff has 180 days from the date of the alleged discrimination to file a complaint with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C.S. 2000e-5(e)(1)(1998). If a plaintiff initiates state administrative proceedings, the plaintiff then has 300 days from the date of the alleged discrimination or 30 days from the date of termination of the state proceedings, whichever is earlier, to file a charge with the EEOC. Id.
Here, plaintiff initiated state proceedings so he had 300 days from the date of the alleged discrimination (February 2000), or 30 days from the termination of state proceedings (March 27, 2000), to file a complaint with the EEOC. There is no evidence in the record, however, that he ever filed a charge with the EEOC. Plaintiff's complaint alleges he filed a charge with the DKEH, but makes no similar allegation with respect to the EEOC. Plaintiff's disclosures included a DKEH Notice of Case Closure, but did not include a similar letter from the EEOC. Defendants' motion for summary judgment similarly notes the DFEH filing, but makes no mention of a filing with the EEOC. Plaintiff's Right-To-Sue letter from the DFEH does not satisfy the requirement that he exhaust his administrative remedies with the EEOC. See Roman v. County of Los Angeles, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 13, 25 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., 2000).
Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his Title VII claim deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction of such claim. See E.E.O.C. v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Galt v. G/S Hapag-Lloyd AG, 60 F.3d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1995). This defect cannot be cured since more than 30 days has elapsed since plaintiff received his DFEH Notice of Case Closure and more than 300 days has elapsed since defendant's alleged discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1998). Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of defendants must be granted on plaintiff's Title VII claim, his only federal cause of action.
B. The State Law Claims Must Be Remanded
Having granted defendants judgment on plaintiff's Title II claim, the only claims remaining in this lawsuit are brought pursuant to state law. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of these state law claims and instead will remand them to the Superior Court for the County of Alameda. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988) ("in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairess, and comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to plaintiff's Title VII claim. The remaining claims are hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court for the County of Alameda.