Opinion
3:21-cv-01112-CL
08-25-2021
AHMED G. TURAY, JR., Plaintiff, v. BEAVERTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
MARK D. CLARKE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Ahmed G. Turay, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), a self-represented litigant in custody at Snake River Correctional Institution, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and alleges that defendant Beaverton Police Department (“BPD”) subjected him to an unlawful traffic stop and search in violation of his constitutional rights. For the reasons set forth below, the district judge should dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, without leave to amend.
The Court must dismiss an action initiated by an individual in custody seeking redress from a governmental entity or official if the Court determines that the action: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim “is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to relief.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). The Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff “the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure” defects in the complaint, “a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.” Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
Plaintiff alleges that on September 6, 2017, BPD arrested him during an unlawful traffic stop, illegally searched his vehicle without his consent, and detained him for over four hours without reading him his Miranda rights. (Compl. (ECF No. 2), at 3-4.) Plaintiff seeks money damages and a court order requiring “this charge taken off of [his] record[.]” (Id. at 5.)
To state a claim under Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege that (1) a person acting under color of law (2) deprived him of a federal constitutional right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Stein v. Ryan, 662 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011). Although municipalities are considered “persons” who may be sued under Section 1983, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), municipal subdivisions are not “persons” subject to suit as separate entities. See United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “municipal police departments and bureaus are generally not considered ‘persons' within the meaning of Section 1983”); see also Rodriguez v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 2013, No. C 13-02516 SBA, 2013 WL 5946112, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (noting that “[a]lthough municipalities, such as cities and counties, are amenable to suit under Monell, sub-departments or bureaus of municipalities, such as police departments, are not generally considered ‘persons' within the meaning of [Section] 1983)”) (citing Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995)).
BPD is a subdivision of the City of Beaverton and therefore is not a “person” capable of being sued under Section 1983. This defect arguably could be cured by amendment, but the complaint suffers from two additional fundamental and ultimately fatal defects to Plaintiff's ability to proceed or prevail in this action.
First, Plaintiff seeks to have “this charge” removed from his record, indicating that the traffic stop, vehicle search, and arrest at issue resulted in Plaintiff's conviction for an unspecified crime. A civil rights case may not be sustained under Section 1983 where “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the validity of his conviction.” See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (explaining that to recover damages for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a [Section] 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . [a] claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under [Section] 1983”). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to recover damages based on the unlawfulness of the traffic stop and initial police investigation underlying the state criminal charges against him, he may not do so without first demonstrating that his conviction has been invalidated, which, at this point, it appears he cannot.
The Court notes that to the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge the validity of his confinement, he may not do so in a civil rights action. See Carballo v. Barr, No. 2:20-cv-01315-APG-BNW, 2020 WL 5821001, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2020) (explaining that “[c]hallenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus[, ]” whereas “[c]laims involving the circumstances of the plaintiff's confinement may be presented in civil rights actions”) (citing Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)) (quotations omitted).
Second, even if Heck did not bar Plaintiff's claims, the incident at issue occurred on September 6, 2017. In Oregon, the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is two years. See Bonneau v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 28J, 666 F.3d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Oregon's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions to Section 1983 claims). The two-year limitations period began to run on Plaintiff's claims on September 6, 2017, when the underlying traffic stop, search, and arrest occurred. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “[a] claim accrues [and the statute of limitations begins to run] when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action”) (quotation and citation omitted). Plaintiff therefore had until September 6, 2019 to bring his claims against all responsible parties, but failed to do so. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 2) should be dismissed sua sponte on the ground that it fails to state a claim. Because the defect cannot be cured by amendment, the dismissal should be with prejudice, and all pending motions should be denied as moot.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the court. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.