Opinion
F082539
10-12-2021
Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Jennifer M. Flores, County Counsel, and Amy-Marie Costa, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County No. JJV073236C. Hugo J. Loza, Judge.
Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Jennifer M. Flores, County Counsel, and Amy-Marie Costa, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT[*]
Twelve-year-old Michael M. is the subject of this appeal. In March 2021, the juvenile court deemed Brandy M., Michael's stepmother, his presumed mother and found it would be detrimental under Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c) not to recognize her as a third parent. The court placed Michael in Brandy's custody with family maintenance services. Teresa C., Michael's mother (mother), appeals. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise noted.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
In December 2020, then 11-year-old Michael was taken into protective custody along with his 17-year-old brother and 12-year-old sister by the Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency (agency) after mother and the children's stepfather engaged in domestic violence. Michael witnessed mother hit the stepfather in the face with a can of spray paint and his stepfather choke mother until her face “turn[ed] red.” The children each have a different father. Michael's father, Daniel M., is deceased.
The juvenile court detained the children, finding they were minors described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) because of the domestic violence, mother's methamphetamine use, and her failure to protect them from the stepfather's untreated mental illness (schizophrenia) and physical abuse. The court also adjudged Michael's half siblings as dependents under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (g) because the whereabouts of their fathers were unknown. The agency placed the children with a relative.
Shortly after the children were detained Brandy contacted the social worker asking to be considered as a parent for Michael and for placement of him. She had known Michael since 2011 when she began dating Daniel. In 2011, mother left all her children with the maternal grandmother (grandmother). Daniel was in prison at that time. When Michael was two, the grandmother asked Brandy if she could help care for Michael because she could not care for all three children. Brandy agreed and began taking care of Michael three to four days at a time. In August 2012, Brandy became Michael's primary caregiver at the grandmother's request. In March 2014, Daniel was released from custody and he and Brandy got married. Mother went to prison in 2014 around the time Daniel was released. She was incarcerated for 18 months. When Michael saw mother, he asked Brandy who she was. He considered Brandy his mother. Over time, Michael's visitation with mother increased until June 2017 when mother and Brandy began a 50/50 custody arrangement. The children complained to Brandy about their stepfather's behavior, but mother defended him. Brandy tried to keep the children with her as often as possible to keep Michael safe.
After mother was released from custody, she went to Brandy's home to help out with Michael. She cleaned Brandy's home and spent time with him. She always arranged for the children to be with family when she used drugs. She, the grandmother, and Brandy raised the children together.
Michael was happy in his placement. He loved mother very much but did not feel safe with his stepfather because of the fighting. If the fighting stopped, he would like to return to their custody. He considered Brandy his mother and called her “Mama B.” He loved her like he loved mother. If he could not reunify with mother, he wanted to be permanently placed with Brandy.
In January 2021, the juvenile court exercised its dependency jurisdiction over the children and ordered mother to participate in reunification services. The court appointed counsel for Brandy, ordered visitation for her and Michael and set a six-month review hearing for June 11, 2021, for Michael and his sister but not for their oldest sibling, whose 18th birthday was the following week.
In February 2021, Brandy filed a motion through her attorney for third party status under section 7612, subdivision (c). Mother objected.
On March 17, 2021, the juvenile court found Brandy was a presumed parent for Michael and it would be detrimental to Michael not to recognize her as a third parent. The court ordered him placed with Brandy under a plan of family maintenance and confirmed the six-month review hearing.
DISCUSSION
The Applicable Statutory Framework and Standard of Review
“ ‘The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (§ 7600 et seq.) “provides the framework by which California courts make [parentage] determinations. (§ 7610, subd. (b).)”' [Citation.] A person qualifies as a natural parent either by giving birth or by meeting one of the applicable statutory methods for being adjudged a natural parent. [Citation.] Section 7611 sets forth several rebuttable presumptions through which a person may be presumed to be a natural parent (i.e., ‘a presumed parent' or ‘presumed father').” (M.M. v. D.V. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 733, 740-741, fns. omitted.) “A [presumed parent] presumption under section 7611 generally ‘is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.' ” (In re L.L. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1302, 1310 (L.L.).) “A person who claims entitlement to presumed parent status has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the facts supporting the entitlement.” (R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 774.)
“On appeal, we independently interpret statutes and apply the substantial evidence standard in reviewing a juvenile court's finding whether a person is a presumed parent. [Citations.] In so doing, we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the court's finding and do not reweigh the evidence or credibility of witnesses.” (L.L., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1310.) If there is substantial evidence to support the decision it will not be disturbed on appeal, even if there is other evidence to support a different ruling. (In re Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475, 492.)
Sufficient Evidence Supported the Finding Brandy is Michael's Presumed Mother
Under subdivision (d) of section 7611, a person may qualify as a presumed parent if he or she “receives the child into their home and openly holds out the child as their natural child.” In determining whether a person has met the statutory requirement of section 7611, “the court may consider a wide variety of factors, including the person's provision of physical and/or financial support for the child, efforts to place the person's name on the birth certificate, efforts to seek legal custody, and the breadth and unequivocal nature of the person's acknowledgement of the child as his or her own.… No single factor is determinative; rather, the court may consider all the circumstances when deciding whether the person demonstrated a parental relationship by holding out the child as his or her own and assuming responsibility for the child by receiving the child into his or her home.” (R.M. v. T.A., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.)
Presumed parent status confers significant parental rights. It “entitles the presumed parent to appointed counsel, custody absent a finding of detriment and a reunification plan ([Welf. and Inst. Code, ] §§ 317, subd. (a), 361.2, subd. (a), 361.5, subd. (a)).… Though most of the decisional law has focused on the definition of the presumed father, the legal principles concerning the presumed father apply equally to a woman seeking presumed mother status.” (In re Salvador M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1357.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that Brandy is Michael's presumed mother under section 7611, subdivision (d). Brandy formed a relationship with Michael when he was approximately one year old. By the age of two, she had taken him into her home and became his primary caregiver. Michael came to view Brandy as his mother, and mother as a stranger until she and Brandy began to share custody and care of him. They established an informal custody arrangement, each having equal time, as if they were his parents. Michael loved both women as his mothers and was willing to be placed with either of them. Mother acknowledged that she, the grandmother, and Brandy raised Michael.
Having properly deemed Brandy Michael's presumed mother, the juvenile court had no choice but to grant her request for custody since there was no evidence that doing so would place him at risk of detriment. (Welf. and Inst. Code, § 361.2, subd. (a).) The court was also well within its authority to maintain supervision by providing Brandy family maintenance services. (Welf. and Inst. Code, § 361.2, subd. (b)(3).)
Mother acknowledges the evidence could support a presumption of parentage for Brandy under section 7611, subdivision (d) but maintains the juvenile court erred in finding that it would be detrimental to Michael not to recognize Brandy as a presumed parent under section 7612, subdivision (c). We conclude the statute does not apply.
Section 7612, subdivision (c) Does Not Apply
Section 7612, subdivision (c) pertains where more than two people claim parentage to a child. The statute provides: “In an appropriate action, a court may find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child. In determining detriment to the child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the harm of removing the child from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the child's physical needs and the child's psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time. A finding of detriment to the child does not require a finding of unfitness of any of the parents or persons with a claim to parentage.”
Prior to the enactment of the statute, the family court was prohibited from recognizing more than two people with a claim to parentage, regardless of the situation. (In re M.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 197, 214.) In cases involving competing presumptions under section 7611, the family court was required to identify “ ‘the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.' ” (Id.) In 2014, the Legislature responded by enacting subdivision (c) of section 7612, to recognize more than two people with a claim to parentage if it would otherwise be detrimental to the child. (C.A. v. C.P. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 27, 35.)
In enacting section 7612, subdivision (c), the Legislature expressed its intent that it “only apply in the rare case where a child truly has more than two parents, and a finding that a child has more than two parents is necessary to protect the child from the detriment of being separated from one of his or her parents.” (L.L., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1315-1316.)
Section 7612, subdivision (c) does not apply in this case because there are only two people asserting parentage-mother and Brandy. Consequently, we need not determine whether the court erred in finding it would be detrimental not to acknowledge Brandy's parentage. However, if called to do so, we would have no difficulty finding the detriment in not recognizing Brandy as Michael's parent. In assessing detriment to the child, the court must consider all relevant factors, including “the harm of removing the child from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the child's physical needs and the child's psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time.” (M.M. v. D.V., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th 733, 742.) Brandy has occupied a parental role as Michael's mother for a significant portion of his life all the while providing for him, caring for him and protecting him. Undoubtedly, she has provided the stability he greatly needed during the upheaval in his life and separation from his biological parents. To deny her parentage places him at risk of being separated from her, the consequences of which would be very detrimental to him.
Further, as a policy matter, there is value in having two parents, rather than one, as both a source of emotional and financial support. (Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108, 123; see also Librers v. Black (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 114, 123 [“[W]henever possible, a child should have the benefit of two parents to support and nurture him or her.”].)
We find no error.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order is affirmed.
[*] Before Levy, Acting P. J., Poochigian, J. and Snauffer, J.