Opinion
F080206
09-08-2020
Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of T.B. TULARE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, as Conservator, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. T.B., Objector and Appellant.
Conness A. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant. Deanne H. Peterson, County Counsel, John A. Rozum and Carol E. Helding, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. VPR049543)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Melinda Reed, Judge. Conness A. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant. Deanne H. Peterson, County Counsel, John A. Rozum and Carol E. Helding, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
Before Franson, Acting P.J., Smith, J. and Meehan, J.
-ooOoo-
Respondent, Tulare County Mental Health, sought the appointment of a conservator of the person and estate of appellant, T.B., under the provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (the LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.). A petition was filed in the Tulare County Superior Court alleging that appellant was "gravely disabled" due to a mental disorder which made her unable to care for herself or seek treatment for her condition. Appellant requested a trial on the issue of whether she was gravely disabled. At the trial, the only evidence presented by respondent regarding appellant's mental health was a "psychodiagnostic" report prepared by an expert. The report stated the expert's conclusion that appellant was gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder. However, that conclusion was largely based on the expert's assertion in the report of case-specific facts derived from appellant's psychiatric, hospital and related records. Those records were not introduced as evidence to the court and the expert had no personal knowledge of the matters described or stated therein. Appellant, through her counsel, objected to the admission of the expert's report on hearsay grounds, but the trial court denied the objection.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The trial court found that appellant is gravely disabled as defined under the LPS Act, and, accordingly, the petition for conservatorship was granted and letters of conservatorship issued. Appellant appeals, contending the trial court prejudicially erred under the principles set forth in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez) relating to expert testimony and case-specific hearsay. We agree that Sanchez error occurred here, and that it was prejudicial. Therefore, the order of the trial court is reversed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 24, 2019, a petition for a temporary and permanent conservatorship of the person and estate of appellant was made to the trial court under the supporting allegations of M. Cohen, Ph.D., a conservatorship investigative officer for Tulare County. The petition was on the ground that appellant had a mental disorder causing her to be "gravely disabled" as defined in section 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(A). That section defines "gravely disabled" as "[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter." (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) The petition was verified and was further supported by an "investigation report" prepared by M. Cohen, Ph.D., and additional recommendations from a second doctor, G. Sandhu, M.D./Ph.D. Allegedly, appellant's mental disorder was such that appellant did not have the capacity to give informed consent to receive necessary treatment for her condition.
Following an initial hearing at which appellant was not present, the trial court granted a temporary conservatorship, appointing the Tulare County Public Guardian to serve as appellant's temporary conservator. Under the temporary conservator's powers, appellant was to be placed in a mental health treatment facility. A subsequent hearing was set for September 24, 2019, at which time the trial court would consider the question of whether to grant a permanent (i.e., one-year) conservatorship of the person and estate of appellant.
Appellant, through her counsel, notified the trial court that she was asserting her right to a contested trial. Specifically, she requested a court trial. We note that when, as here, a proposed conservatee requests a trial on the issue of whether he or she is gravely disabled (see § 5350, subd. (d)(1)), the usual rules of evidence apply at the trial, including the rules concerning hearsay. This distinguishes a "trial" from a "hearing" under the LPS Act since, in the latter process, the trial court will read and consider the initial investigation report submitted in conjunction with the petition even though said investigation report may contain hearsay. (Conservatorship of Manton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 645, 650-653.) However, in a contested trial, hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it comes within an exception under the hearsay rules. Thus, in Conservatorship of Manton, the Supreme Court held an investigation report was not admissible at a contested trial of the grave disability issue, since it was replete with inadmissible hearsay. (Id. at pp. 652-653; accord, Conservatorship of Jesse G. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 453, 465, fn. 7.)
Here, a court trial on the issue of whether appellant was gravely disabled as defined under the LPS Act was held on September 24, 2019.
Appellant, who was represented by the deputy public defender, took the stand to testify on her own behalf. After first waiving her right to a jury trial in favor of having a court trial, appellant testified that she was able to take care of herself and has been doing so while living alone for most of her adult life. She testified that her father had made financial provision for a place to stay, rent free, as well as providing a monthly income for her expenses. She explained that she cooks for herself, and shops at stores for groceries or clothing without difficulty. She expressed a willingness to continue to see mental health professionals, and she was willing to continue to take her medications if the court asked her to do so. After appellant testified, respondent's counsel was given an opportunity to cross-examine appellant, but declined to ask any questions.
At that point, appellant's counsel made something like a closing argument to the court, stating as follows: "I would indicate to the Court that [appellant] presents well today. She is very well spoken. She is groomed, proper attire. She answered the questions very well indicating that she can provide for herself, that she has access to income. She has a place to stay. She does have shelter, a roof over her head. She knows how to cook, [and] where to get clothing. And she's indicated that she is not gravely disabled. I agree with [appellant]. [¶] I would submit to the Court and ask the Court to find that she's no longer in need of the conservatorship at this time."
Respondent's counsel responded that, according to "the psycho-diagnostic report" completed shortly before trial, "things have not gone so well" for appellant in her more recent history, including several serious episodes of mental illness where she was found by law enforcement "in various states of duress out in public." The psychodiagnostic report referred to by respondent's counsel was filed on September 19, 2019, prepared by a mental health professional and/or expert, namely Dr. Rees-Jones, Psy.D., and entitled "Conservatorship Psychodiagnostic Evaluation" (hereafter, the psychodiagnostic report or the report).
For purposes of the present appeal, it is necessary to briefly summarize the nature of what was set forth in the psychodiagnostic report. The report stated that beginning in November 2017, which was shortly after the death of her father, appellant had been the subject of at least six involuntarily psychiatric hospitalizations. The purported facts relating to each psychiatric hospitalization were set forth in detail by Dr. Rees-Jones in the report, which facts were derived primarily from hospital or psychiatric records. As asserted in the report, one episode resulting in appellant's psychiatric hospitalization involved appellant being found in a parking lot, without her shirt on, in a confused, disoriented and delusional state. On another occasion, she was brought in by law enforcement after being found in the middle of traffic, where she was removing her clothes while talking to herself and hearing voices. The several other episodes requiring appellant's psychiatric hospitalizations, as presented in the report by Dr. Rees-Jones, involved similarly disturbing situations and behavior. In connection with the psychiatric hospitalizations, appellant was allegedly uncooperative and resistant to taking medications, and she denied that she had a mental illness or needed treatment. In the course of appellant's hospitalizations, the mental health professionals who treated appellant diagnosed her with Schizophrenia and Brief Psychotic Disorder, which statements and observations were reiterated in Dr. Rees-Jones's report. All of the above facts were presented in the report as a basis or foundation for Dr. Rees-Jones's opinion and were assumed to be true.
In addition to the above facts derived from hospital and psychiatric records, the psychodiagnostic report indicated that Dr. Rees-Jones had interviewed appellant personally to evaluate her mental status. The results of that interview were stated by Dr. Rees-Jones in the report, along with Dr. Rees-Jones's discussion with a family friend of appellant, E.C., who was the one who had arranged for appellant's housing and paid rent and utilities for appellant after appellant's father died. Based on all the information reviewed by her, Dr. Rees-Jones concluded that appellant suffers from Schizophrenia as well as Alcohol Use Disorder, lacks insight into her condition, is gravely disabled as defined under the LPS Act and continues to need the LPS conservatorship.
It is not entirely clear whether E.C. provided such assistance from his own resources, or as part of appellant's father's estate plan.
Having described the nature of the psychodiagnostic report, we return to our summary of the trial proceedings. When respondent's counsel mentioned the report and referred to some of its contents, appellant's counsel promptly objected to the admission of the report into evidence on the ground that it contained hearsay. Appellant's counsel expressed the objection as follows: "I would object to the psychodiagnostic report being taken into evidence. There's been no testimony regarding it and I believe that it contains hearsay."
Respondent's counsel replied that since appellant's counsel had not made a request to have Dr. Rees-Jones personally appear at the trial for cross-examination, it was the understanding of respondent's counsel that the psychodiagnostic report itself could be used to provide the necessary expert opinion in this case. Respondent's counsel did not challenge the hearsay objection as such, but noted that since the report had been prepared, "the idea that it can't be considered by the Court just does not make sense."
Even assuming the parties' understanding was that a report might be used in lieu of the personal appearance in court of the expert, that does not mean that evidentiary objections could not be raised.
The trial court overruled the hearsay objection and admitted the psychodiagnostic report into evidence. According to the trial court, it was admitting the report to consider the doctor's expert opinions. In doing so, the trial court indicated the out-of-court statements presented in the report regarding whether appellant is gravely disabled would not necessarily be accepted for their truth, but simply as "a basis for the doctor's opinion."
Other than appellant's testimony and the psychodiagnostic report, no other evidence was received or admitted by the trial court at the contested trial.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court determined that appellant is gravely disabled and in need of the LPS conservatorship. The petition to establish the conservatorship was granted. On September 24, 2019, letters of conservatorship of the person and estate of appellant were issued by the trial court, the temporary conservatorship was ended, and the trial court ordered the Tulare County Public Guardian to serve as permanent conservator of appellant's person and estate.
Appellant timely filed her notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. The LPS Act and the Standard of Review
The LPS Act governs the involuntary treatment of the mentally ill in California. (Michelle K. v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 409, 424.) The LPS Act "authorizes the appointment of a conservator for up to one year for a person determined to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder and unwilling or unable to accept voluntary treatment." (Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1009; see § 5361 [one-year expiration].) Because of the personal liberties at stake, the party seeking to impose the conservatorship must prove grave disability beyond a reasonable doubt. (Conservatorship of Susan T., supra, at p. 1009.) If a jury trial is requested, the verdict must be unanimous. (Ibid.) As noted, "gravely disabled" is defined as, inter alia, "[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter." (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) Under section 5350, subdivision (e)(1), a person is not gravely disabled if that person can "survive safely without involuntary detention with the help of responsible family, friends, or others who are both willing and able to help provide for the person's basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter." As the LPS Act and cases interpreting it reflect, " '[t]he clear import of the LPS Act is to use the involuntary commitment power of the state sparingly and only for those truly necessary cases where a "gravely disabled" person is incapable of providing for his basic needs either alone or with help from others.' [Citation.]" (Conservatorship of K.W. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1274, 1280.) "The benefits of conservatorship can never be considered without also taking into account the magnitude of the deprivation of liberty it imposes." (Conservatorship of Jesse G., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th 453, 466.)
In the present appeal, appellant claims the trial court, as the finder of fact, improperly relied on the case-specific hearsay contained in the psychodiagnostic report to determine that appellant is gravely disabled. Moreover, appellant argues that apart from the inadmissible case-specific hearsay, there was insufficient evidence to support the expert's opinion or trial court's determination that appellant is gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt.
What is meant by case-specific hearsay will be explained in our discussion of Sanchez, below.
" '[T]o establish that a person is gravely disabled, the evidence must support an objective finding that the person, due to mental disorder, is incapacitated or rendered unable to carry out the transactions necessary for survival or otherwise provide for his or her basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter,' and the public guardian must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the proposed conservatee is gravely disabled. [Citation.] On appeal, we apply the substantial evidence test to determine whether the record supports the court's finding of grave disability. The testimony of one witness may be sufficient to support such a finding." (Conservatorship of Jesse G., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th 453, 460-461.) Further, we review a claim that hearsay evidence was improperly admitted for whether there was prejudicial error. (Conservatorship of K.W., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286; People v. Yates (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 474, 484-485.) II. The Trial Court Erred under Sanchez
In Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665, the California Supreme Court considered, among other issues, the propriety of an expert witness relating case-specific hearsay to the jury under the rules of evidence. Sanchez held that an expert witness may not "relate as true case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by competent evidence or covered by a hearsay exception." (Sanchez, supra, at p. 686.) Case-specific facts are "those relating to the particular events and participants alleged to have been involved in the case being tried." (Id. at p. 676.) The court's decision in Sanchez sought to restore the traditional rule that an expert generally may not supply case-specific facts about which he has no personal knowledge, unless independently proven or properly admitted under a hearsay exception. (Id. at pp. 676, 685-686.) At the same time, Sanchez recognized that "[a]ny expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion, and may tell the jury in general terms that he did so." (Id. at p. 685; see Evid. Code, §§ 801, 802.) However, the court emphasized "there is a distinction to be made between allowing an expert to describe the type or source of the matter relied upon as opposed to presenting, as fact, case-specific hearsay that does not otherwise fall under a statutory exception." (Sanchez, supra, at p. 686.) "What an expert cannot do is relate as true case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception." (Ibid.)
In so holding, the Supreme Court in Sanchez rejected the notion that case-specific facts supplied by an expert from hearsay sources as a basis for his or her opinion are not being offered for their truth: "When any expert relates to the jury case-specific out-of-court statements, and treats the content of those statements as true and accurate to support the expert's opinion, the statements are hearsay. It cannot logically be maintained that the statements are not being admitted for their truth." (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686; accord, People v. Superior Court (Couthren) (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1020 ["Sanchez jettisoned the not-for-the-truth-of-the-matter rationale that had previously allowed for the admission of expert testimony involving otherwise inadmissible case-specific facts"].)
Sanchez is not limited to criminal cases, and it is applicable to conservatorship proceedings. (Conservatorship of S.A. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 438, 448; Conservatorship of K.W., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1284; see also People v. Burroughs (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 378, 405, fn. 6.) The rule of Sanchez has been held to apply not only to in-person expert testimony, but also to situations where an expert's opinion is permitted to be offered in a written report or evaluation. (People v. Superior Court (Couthren), supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 1020.) Sanchez has also been followed where the trier of fact was a court, rather than a jury. (See, e.g., People v. Jeffrey G. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 501, 505-506.)
Here, the psychodiagnostic report prepared by Dr. Rees-Jones clearly contained extensive case-specific hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 674; Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a)), and it is inadmissible unless it falls within an exception. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b).) The out-of-court statements detailed by Dr. Rees-Jones in the report were primarily taken from appellant's hospital or psychiatric records. Moreover, most of the facts related in the report from such hearsay sources were case-specific facts; that is, facts relevant to whether appellant was gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, including statements describing appellant's recent episodes leading to her several hospitalizations, statements regarding the history of her psychiatric treatment in connection with the hospitalizations, and the diagnoses or observations indicated by the doctors that had treated her. These and similar case-specific facts clearly were presented by Dr. Rees-Jones for their truth, as a basis for her expert opinion, and therefore constituted hearsay.
Respondent contends that appellant's hearsay objection in the trial court was too general and should be disregarded because it did not specifically reference the precise portions of the report that contained inadmissible case-specific hearsay. (See People v. Harris (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 954, 957 [where only a portion of a document is inadmissible hearsay, but the remainder is admissible, a general objection to the entire document is ordinarily inadequate].) We disagree. Here, the case-specific hearsay was prominent and conspicuous in the expert's report, and comprised a substantial part of it. In context, the nature of what would be considered objectionable material—i.e., the case-specific hearsay under Sanchez—reasonably would have been understood when the objection was made. "What is important is that the objection fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling." (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435.) Under the circumstances, we conclude appellant's objection was effective in this case to raise the Sanchez hearsay issue.
Did the underlying hearsay records, relied upon and summarized in detail by Dr. Rees-Jones in the psychodiagnostic report, come within a hearsay exception? Medical, hospital, or psychiatric records may be admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1271; People v. Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th 474, 486 ["[h]ospital records and similar documents are often admissible as business records, assuming a custodian of records or other duly qualified witness provides proper authentication to meet the foundational requirements of the hearsay exception"].) Here, however, the hospital or psychiatric records referenced by Dr. Rees-Jones were not presented to the trial court, nor was any attempt made by respondent to provide an adequate foundation for admissibility thereof under the business records exception. "Sanchez does not permit an expert to 'relate as true case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently proven by competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.' [Citation.]" (Conservatorship of K.W., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1285 [italics in original]; cf. Conservatorship of S.A., supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at pp. 447-448 [no hearsay violation where business records exception shown].) Since no exception to the hearsay rule was argued or shown at the trial, the case-specific facts set forth in the psychodiagnostic report, presented as true, and relied upon by Dr. Rees-Jones as a basis for her opinion, constituted inadmissible hearsay. Therefore, the admission of such evidence constituted error. (See Conservatorship of K.W., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1285 [so holding].)
Finally, although not mentioned by the parties, we note the LPS Act contemplates that the court or jury, as the trier of fact, shall consider a proposed conservatee's relevant psychiatric history, including hospital or psychiatric records, when such evidence has a direct bearing on the determination of whether the person is gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder. (§ 5008.2, subd. (a).) However, this provision of the LPS Act expressly requires that such records are to be "presented to the court" (ibid., italics added), presumably with an adequate foundation for admissibility. As we have discussed, it does not appear that such steps were taken here.
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we conclude under the hearsay rules announced in Sanchez that the trial court erred in admitting, as a material part of the expert's psychodiagnostic report and basis for her opinion, case-specific facts premised on hearsay records, where such hearsay records were not introduced or presented to the court with an adequate foundation and no hearsay exception was argued or shown. (See Bennett v. Superior Court (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 862, 879, quoting People v. Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 485 [noting it is error to allow experts to relate case-specific facts "from documents 'that were neither introduced or admitted into evidence, nor shown to fall within a hearsay exception' "].)
III. The Error Was Prejudicial
Respondent argues that any Sanchez error was not prejudicial and therefore does not warrant reversal. The standard for prejudice where the trial court erred in admitting case-specific hearsay evidence is "whether it is reasonably probable the appellant would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error." (Conservatorship of K.W., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286; accord, People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 36.) In Conservatorship of K.W., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th 1274, the appellate court held the Sanchez error was nonprejudicial in that case because not all of the matters presented by the expert as a basis for his opinion constituted inadmissible case-specific hearsay. Instead, the expert there had also relied on considerable personal knowledge of K.W.'s psychiatric condition from the expert's service as a consulting member of K.W.'s treatment team, his conducting three personal interviews and evaluations of K.W., and observing K.W. when K.W. was a patient at the psychiatric emergency facilities. (Id. at p. 1286.) No other testimony of a qualified expert had been presented in that case, and the only contrary testimony was by K.W., which the jury could reasonably have discredited or rejected. On that record, the Court of Appeal held the erroneously admitted hearsay was not prejudicial. (Ibid.)
Respondent claims a lack of prejudice on the ground that the circumstances in the present case were analogous to those in Conservatorship of K.W. That is, respondent argues Dr. Rees-Jones's expert opinion on grave disability was sufficiently well founded to support the trial court's ruling, notwithstanding the inclusion of case-specific hearsay, because the expert opinion was supported by other competent evidence recited in the psychodiagnostic report. Respondent points, in particular, to the personal interview that Dr. Rees-Jones had with appellant concerning appellant's mental status, which was summarized in the report. Among other things, this interview revealed that appellant could not recall the details of the incidents leading up to her conservatorship, and she denied any serious mental health problems, past or present, and even denied that she needed mental health support. Appellant further indicated in the interview that she did not think the medications were doing anything. As to her willingness to continue mental health treatment, appellant did not think she needed it, but would do so if the court told her to. Based on this interview, it was clear to Dr. Rees-Jones that appellant's judgment was impaired and appellant lacked insight into her true condition. The opinion by Dr. Rees-Jones that appellant is gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder was, in part, based on this in-person interview.
We disagree with respondent's claim there was no prejudice. Here, unlike the situation in Conservatorship of K.W., the expert's opinion fundamentally depended on the truth of the case-specific hearsay. Without the case-specific facts providing a factual basis for appellant's recent psychiatric hospitalizations and mental disorder, the conclusions stated in the report had little or no foundation. Additionally, Dr. Rees-Jones's interview with appellant appears to have presupposed the truth of the case-specific facts reported in appellant's hospital and psychiatric records, and thus the significance of appellant's statements at the interview (e.g., denying her true mental health condition) largely depended on the truth of those case-specific facts. Thus, rather than demonstrating an independent factual basis for Dr. Rees-Jones's expert opinion, the account of the interview set forth in the report merely confirmed the overriding importance and materiality of the case-specific hearsay.
We conclude that without the case-specific hearsay from appellant's hospital and psychiatric records to provide an adequate factual basis for Dr. Rees-Jones's expert opinion, it is reasonably probable that the court would not have found appellant to be gravely disabled. Apart from such crucial foundational facts, in the words of another court addressing a similar situation, the expert opinion to a significant extent "goes up in smoke." (People v. Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 487.) California law has long recognized the need of an adequate foundation for an expert's opinion: "[A]n expert's opinion cannot rest on his or her qualifications alone: 'even when the witness qualifies as an expert, he or she does not possess a carte blanche to express any opinion within the area of expertise. [Citation.] For example, an expert's opinion based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support [citation], or on speculative or conjectural factors [citation], has no evidentiary value [citation] and may be excluded from evidence.' [Citation.] California courts have been particularly chary of expert testimony based on assumptions that are not supported by the evidentiary record: 'an expert's opinion that something could be true if certain assumed facts are true, without any foundation for concluding those assumed facts exist ..., does not provide assistance to the jury....' [Citation.]" (People v. Wright (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 537, 545.)
Although Dr. Rees-Jones's personal interview with appellant did constitute some evidence, nonetheless, we conclude for the reasons explained above that it does not overcome the prejudicial impact of the Sanchez hearsay error in this case. The case-specific facts related from the hospital and psychiatric records provided the essential foundation for Dr. Rees-Jones's opinion. Moreover, as appellant correctly argues, it does not appear that a reasonable trier of fact could have found, solely on the basis of the interview with appellant, that such evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was gravely disabled. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010 [holding that "when a heightened standard of proof applied before the trial court, an appropriate adjustment must be made to appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence"]; Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1577.)
Because the error was prejudicial, the order of the trial court finding appellant to be gravely disabled and establishing the permanent conservatorship is reversed.
IV. Legal or Civil Disabilities Imposed on Appellant
"If a person is found gravely disabled and a conservatorship is established, the conservatee does not forfeit legal rights or suffer legal disabilities merely by virtue of the disability." (Conservatorship of Christopher A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 604, 612; Conservatorship of Walker, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1578.) "A finding of grave disability alone is not sufficient to justify the imposition of the special disabilities enumerated in section 5357." (Conservatorship of D.C. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 487, 494.) Rather, the trial court must "separately determine" the duties and powers of the conservator, the legal or civil disabilities of the conservatee, and the level of placement appropriate for the conservatee. (Conservatorship of Christopher A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.) The party seeking to impose the conservatorship has the burden of establishing the disabilities sought, the placement, and the powers of the conservator. (Ibid.) The type of legal disabilities or restrictions that may be imposed on a conservatee are stated in section 5357, and include such matters as the privilege of driving a motor vehicle, the right to enter into contracts, the right to own a gun, the right to refuse or consent to treatment related specifically to the conservatee's being gravely disabled, and the right to refuse or consent to other medical treatment. In the present case, the trial court's order establishing the conservatorship for appellant imposed all of the above disabilities on her.
Appellant argues the admissible evidence presented at the trial was insufficient to support the imposition of the civil or legal disabilities. Similar evidentiary arguments are raised by appellant as were made by her concerning the issue of whether she is gravely disabled, along with an assertion that the expert, Dr. Rees-Jones, never addressed or explained a basis for imposing the disabilities. However, because the disabilities imposed on appellant by the trial court were premised upon the existence of the LPS Act conservatorship, and since we have reversed the order establishing the conservatorship, it is unnecessary to separately review the evidence or findings regarding the disabilities imposed in that same order. (Conservatorship of Jesse G., supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 465, fn. 6 [holding it was unnecessary to reach issue of propriety of imposing a disability where the conservatorship order was being reversed].)
DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court establishing an LPS Act conservatorship of the person and estate of appellant, based on the existence of grave disability, is reversed. Appellant is awarded costs on appeal.