Opinion
FA064022949
05-16-2016
Travis Tucker v. Lori Tucker
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION IN RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT (#181 & 182)
Kenneth L. Shluger, J.
The record reveals that this matter was returned to court on Oct. 31, 2006 and went to judgment on May 2, 2008. The parties are the parents of two minor children who are presently 16 and 14 years old. The original parenting plan called for joint legal custody with primary residence in the mother with the father having every Wednesday overnight, alternating weekends and one evening per week.
On Sept. 9, 2014, the parties agreed that the father would enjoy parenting time with the older child, Heston, every Monday and Tuesday while the mother would have him every Wednesday and Thursday and then the parties would alternate the weekends starting on Friday and ending on Monday. This provided the parents with equal amount of time with Heston. The older child, Heather, would spend four overnights per month with the father on alternating weekends and the rest of the time with the mother.
The parties returned to court on July 9, 2015 and entered into an agreement whereby Heston would spend an additional 4 evening per month with his father so that instead of Heston spending 14 overnights with his father and 14 overnights with his mother per month he would spend 18 overnights per month with his father and 10 overnights per month with his mother.
Now comes the plaintiff father alleging that this modification of visitation constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of child support. There was no evidence introduced demonstrating or even suggesting that the July 9, 2015 change in visitation had any financial impact on either parent.
The question presented is whether the modification of visitation of July 9, 2015 justifies a modification of support.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
" As to the substantial change of circumstances provision of § 46b-86(a), [w]hen presented with a motion for modification, a court must first determine whether there has been a substantial change in the financial circumstances of one or both of the parties . . . Second, if the court finds a substantial change in circumstances, it may properly consider the motion and . . . make an order for modification . . . A party moving for a modification of a child support order must clearly and definitely establish the occurrence of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party that makes the continuation of the prior order unfair and improper . . . [t]he court has the authority to issue a modification only if it conforms the order to the distinct and definite changes in the circumstances of the parties . . . The inquiry, then, is limited to a comparison between the current conditions and the last court order . . . The party seeking modification bears the burden of showing the existence of a substantial change in the circumstances." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Budrawich v. Budrawich, 132 Conn.App. 291, 296-97, 32 A.3d 328 (2011); Weinstein v. Weinstein, 104 Conn.App. 482, 491-93, 934 A.2d 306 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 911, 943 A.2d 472 (2008).
" As to the substantial change of circumstances provision of § 46b-86(a), [w]hen presented with a motion for modification, a court must first determine whether there has been a substantial change in the financial circumstances of one or both of the parties . . . Second, if the court finds a substantial change in circumstances, it may properly consider the motion and . . . make an order for modification . . . A party moving for a modification of a child support order must clearly and definitely establish the occurrence of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party that makes the continuation of the prior order unfair and improper . . . The party seeking modification bears the burden of showing the existence of a substantial change in the circumstances." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McKeon v. Lennon, 131 Conn.App. 585, 598, 27 A.3d 436, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 901, 31 A.3d 1178 (2011).
The plaintiff's motion for modification fails for several reasons. First and foremost, the only change, as a result of the July 9, 2015 order was that the number of the father's evenings per month with the younger child went from 14 to 18 while the access schedule for the older child remained unchanged. Moreover, there was no evidence whatsoever proving or even suggesting that these additional four evenings per month had any financial impact. Even, assuming arguendo, that the court was convinced that these additional four evenings per month constituted a substantial change in circumstances, the plaintiff's claim would fail because there was no evidence that the change " makes the continuation of the prior order unfair and improper." Since neither prong of the test has been satisfied, the plaintiff's motion for modification must be denied.