Opinion
Submitted November 29, 2000.
December 19, 2000.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rappaport, J.), dated June 24, 1999, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d).
Morris, Duffy, Alonso Faley, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Yolanda L. Himmelberger and Matthew J. Vitucci of counsel), for appellants.
John Spiridakis, Long Island City, N.Y. (Gus J. Constantinidis of counsel), for respondent.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN, HOWARD MILLER, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted reports from the plaintiff's treating chiropractors and physician which indicated that the plaintiff suffers from a "permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member" (Insurance Law § 5102[d]; see, Lopez v. Senatore, 65 N.Y.2d 1017; Spezia v. De Marco, 173 A.D.2d 462, 463). The various medical opinions expressed by the plaintiff's treating doctors were supported by their respective physical examinations of the plaintiff and the objective physical tests which they each performed on the plaintiff (see, Grossman v. Wright, 268 A.D.2d 79, 84). Accordingly, the defendants' motion papers failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see, Thomas v. Joyner, 237 A.D.2d 347; Mendola v. Demetres, 212 A.D.2d 515).
In light of our determination we need not reach the appellants' remaining contention.