Opinion
No. 74-485
Decided May 13, 1975.
In action to foreclose mechanic's lien, which lien was premised on the alleged failure of contractor to pay certain "fringe benefits" of construction workers to trustees of union trust funds, trial court dismissed complaint, and plaintiffs appealed.
Reversed
1. MECHANIC'S LIENS — "Fringe Benefits" — Construction Workers — Allegations — Payable to Union Trustees — Dismissal of Complaint — Error. Where, in action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, the complaint alleged that certain "fringe benefits" of construction workers represented a portion of the value of the services of those workers, and that those benefits were to be paid to plaintiffs as trustees of certain union trust funds, the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to state a claim under mechanic's lien statute, and thus, dismissal of the complaint was error.
Appeal from the District Court of the County of La Plata, Honorable William S. Eakes, Judge.
Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker Grover, Pamela M. Martin, for plaintiffs-appellants.
L. W. McDaniel, for defendants-appellees.
Roy O. Goldin, Craig A. Murdock, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Painters' Industry Health Benefit Fund.
This is an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien on a property owner by defendant Angel-Haus Condominium, Ltd. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We reverse.
Plaintiffs are the trustees of certain labor union trust funds. Defendant Godwin-Bevers Co., Inc., was the general contractor for the construction of the improvements on the property owned by Angel-Haus, and the construction lender was defendant First of Denver Mortgage Investors.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that Godwin-Bevers had entered into collective bargaining agreements with certain unions providing for the payment of "contributions for fringe benefits" by Godwin-Bevers to plaintiffs based on the hours worked by employees on labor described in the agreements. It was further alleged that Godwin-Bevers failed to make payments for those benefits for labor performed improving the property owned by Angel-Haus, and that there is due and owing to plaintiffs the amount of $13,137.36. Plaintiffs sought money judgments against the defendants Angel-Haus and Godwin-Bevers and for foreclosure of the lien.
Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, a motion to dismiss was filed by defendants Angel-Haus, First of Denver Mortgage Investors, and the public trustee, which asserted that plaintiffs are not within the class of persons entitled to a lien under the mechanic's lien statute. Section 38-22-101, C.R.S. 1973. In its order granting this motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled as a matter of law that unpaid fringe benefit claims against a general contractor by a union trust fund are not separately lienable by the trust fund trustees.
The issues argued by counsel are matters of first impression in Colorado. Both parties seek a determination of whether "fringe benefits" payable under a union contract are part of the "value of such . . . labor done" so as to give rise to a lien on the improved property pursuant to § 38-22-101, C.R.S. 1973. They also seek a determination whether the trustees of the trust funds into which these "fringe benefits" are to be paid are the proper parties to assert such a lien. However, there is nothing in the record which permits us to determine the nature of the "fringe benefits" alleged to be outstanding. Nor do we know anything of the nature of the trusts which plaintiffs claim to represent. The trial court dismissed this case on the bare allegations of the complaint. No evidence has yet been introduced regarding the contents of the collective bargaining agreement between the contractor and the unions, nor regarding any contractual relationship between the employer, the individual employees, the union, and the trustees. In the absence of such information there is insufficient evidence before this court and the trial court to make a determination on the merits of these issues.
The real question presented by this case, in its present posture, is whether the complaint was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must accept the allegations of the complaint to be true. Bell v. Arnold, 175 Colo. 277, 487 P.2d 545; Denver Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Wood, 28 Colo. App. 534, 476 P.2d 299. This complaint alleges, among other things, that Godwin-Bevers "was signatory to collective bargaining agreements" with certain labor unions and that under said agreements Godwin-Bevers was to make monthly reports and payments to plaintiffs for contributions for "fringe benefits" based upon the number of hours worked by employees performing labor described in the agreements. The complaint further alleges that the "fringe benefit" contributions comprise a portion of the value of the labor of these employees on the property in question. The complaint also alleges that plaintiffs are trustees of certain trust funds, and as such are authorized to claim and collect payments due to the trust fund on behalf of the beneficiaries who performed the labor.
[1] Under the provisions of our statutes governing liens, "all persons of every class performing labor" are entitled to a lien, § 38-22-101, C.R.S. 1973, and any person claiming a lien may assign that claim and lien to any other person, either before or after the filing of the statement of the lien. Section 38-22-117, C.R.S. 1973. The claim of plaintiffs is, in essence, that they have been authorized to collect an amount due and owing for labor performed by employees on certain improvements. In light of the provisions of the lien statute, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief.
Our ruling here does not mean that as a general principle unpaid fringe benefit claims are separately lienable by trust fund trustees. As previously indicated, issues relevant to such a proposition can be determined only after consideration of the evidence presented in support of the allegations stated in the complaint.
It was also error for the trial court to have dismissed the complaint as against Godwin-Bevers. The claim against the general contractor is based on an alleged contract and is unrelated to the mechanic's lien issue. Furthermore, Godwin-Bevers did not join in the motion to dismiss.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the complaint.
JUDGE SMITH and JUDGE KELLY concur.