Opinion
LLICV146011019S
12-22-2016
Don Truskauskas v. Town of Harwinton Zoning Board of Appeals
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON INTERVENORS' MOTION FOR CONTEMPT
Hon. John D. Moore, J.
The intervenors, Mr. and Ms. Genovese (the intervenors, the Genoveses or the movants), filed this motion for contempt against the plaintiff, Don Truskauskas, on June 15, 2016, in each of these two companion cases. Each case is encaptioned Truskauskas v. Town of Harwinton Zoning Board of Appeals . One bears docket number LLI-CV-14-6011019-S (019), and the other docket number LLI-CV-14-6011527-S (527). The motion for contempt is #135 in 019 and #123 in 527. In each motion, the movants argued that the plaintiff has failed to comply with obligations he assumed under the parties' joint stipulation for judgment (judgment). This stipulation was entered as the judgment of this court, Danaher, J., on March 30, 2016. The court conducted a hearing on this motion on September 28, 2016, and October 6, 2016. For the reasons stated below, the court finds that the movants proved wilful violations of two clear provisions of the judgment. Therefore, the court finds the plaintiff to be in civil contempt. Additionally, although the court finds that the movants did not prove wilful violations of other aspects of the judgment, the court orders the plaintiff to perform further compliance with his obligations under the judgment pursuant to the court's remedial authority. Finally, the court awards the intervenors' counsel attorneys fees.
This identical memorandum will be filed in case 019 and case 527. When, in this memorandum, the court refers to the companion case, the court is referring to case 527 in the 019 filing and case 019 in the 527 filing.
The court begins by reviewing the axiomatic principles at issue in a motion for civil contempt.
At the hearing on a motion for civil contempt, the offended party bears the burden of establishing both the existence of a court order and its willful violation by the alleged contemnee. The court order moved upon must be clear and unambiguous. Specifically, " [a]n order of the court must be obeyed until it has been modified or successfully challenged. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 530, 710 A.2d 757 (1998). " Courts have inherent power to coerce compliance with their orders through appropriate sanctions for contemptuous disobedience of them." Blaydes v. Blaydes, 187 Conn. 464, 467, 446 A.2d 825 (1982). " A finding of contempt is a question of fact . . . To constitute contempt, a party's conduct must be wilful . . . Noncompliance alone will not support a judgment of contempt . . . [T]he credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact and the drawing of inferences are all within the province of the trier of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Quaranta v. Cooley, 130 Conn.App. 835, 840-41, 26 A.3d 643 (2011). " Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which has power to punish for such an offense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 841. " Because the inability of [a party] to obey an order of the court, without fault on his part, is a good defense to a charge of contempt . . . the [party has] the right to demonstrate that his failure to comply with the order of the trial court was excusable." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bryant v. Bryant, 228 Conn. 630, 637, 637 A.2d 1111 (1994).
" [C]ivil contempt is conduct directed against the rights of the opposing party. A contempt is considered civil when the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public . . . Sanctions for civil contempt may be either a fine or imprisonment; the fine may be remedial or it may be the means of coercing compliance with the court's order and compensating the complainant for losses sustained." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Quaranta v. Cooley, supra, 130 Conn.App. at 841-42.
The movant has the burden of proving indirect civil contempt, contempt that takes place outside of the court's presence, by clear and convincing evidence. See, Brody v. Brody, 315 Conn. 300, 319, 105 A.3d 887 (2015). Additionally, the order must be " clear and unambiguous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. " Whether an order is sufficiently clear and unambiguous is a necessary prerequisite for a finding of contempt because [t]he contempt remedy is particularly harsh . . . and may be founded solely upon some clear and express direction of the court . . . One cannot be placed in contempt for failure to read the court's mind . . . This is a longstanding tenet of the law of contempt . . . It is also logically sound that a person must not be found in contempt of a court order when ambiguity either renders compliance with the order impossible, because it is not clear enough to put a reasonable person on notice of what is required for compliance, or makes the order susceptible to a court's arbitrary interpretation of whether a party is in compliance with the order." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 695, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007). Nevertheless, " where there is an ambiguous term in a judgment, a party must seek a clarification upon motion rather than resort to self-help. The appropriate remedy for doubt about the meaning of a judgment is to seek a judicial resolution of any ambiguity; it is not to resort to self-help." Sablosky v. Sablosky, 258 Conn. 713, 720, 784 A.2d 890 (2001). In sum, a party moving for civil contempt must prove a willful violation of a clear court order.
This case, and its companion, arose as an appeal from orders issued against the plaintiff by the Harwinton Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA). On appeal, the ZBA confirmed that the plaintiff was using his residential property for commercial use in violation of the Harwinton Zoning Regulations. To resolve this case, and its companion, the parties entered into a joint stipulation. After Judge Danaher conducted a canvass of, inter alia, the plaintiff, the joint stipulation was entered as the judgment of the court on March 30, 2016.
The joint stipulation, now the judgment, provided, in pertinent part, that:
1. The plaintiff could not conduct any commercial activities at his residential property, including activities related to his contracting business, Autumn Contracting, LLC. This provision, however, did not " apply to . . . other activities as permitted by the Harwinton Zoning Regulations." (Para. 2.)
2. The plaintiff's 2000 Mack Dump Truck could be parked overnight at his residence in accordance with a previous ZBA decision, and could be used for farm or personal use, but this dump truck could not be used for the plaintiff's contracting business or other commercial purposes. (Para. 5.)
3. The plaintiff was required permanently to remove from his residential property all " equipment, tools, and/or materials used for plaintiff's contracting business or any other commercial activity . . . within seven (7) calendar days after this Stipulated Judgment is fully executed, and shall be maintained by plaintiff off the subject premises." This provision did not apply " to tools kept in the plaintiff's pickup truck that are used for his contracting business or other tools or equipment as allowed by the Harwinton Zoning Regulations." (Para. 3.)
4. The plaintiff shall be able to use his residential property as he wishes as long as he complies with the stipulated judgment, " the Harwinton Zoning Regulations, and other applicable law." (Para. 8.)
The judgment also permitted the plaintiff to conduct farming operations on, and to maintain the farm equipment specified in Exhibit A at, his residential property. This farm equipment was further depicted in photographs appended to the stipulated judgment.
The Genoveses moved for an order of contempt arguing that the plaintiff has violated several aspects of the judgment. Specifically, they claimed that the plaintiff has violated (1) paragraph 2 by continuing to conduct commercial activities at his residence, (2) paragraph 3 by failing to remove commercial, non-exempted equipment from the residential property, and (3) paragraphs 2 and 5 by regularly moving heavy equipment in and out of his residential property.
The plaintiff denied that he had conducted, after the judgment, commercial activities at his residence. Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that he maintained certain heavy equipment at his residence so that he could conduct permitted activities, namely, building a large storage barn and a pool there. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he, after the date of judgment, used heavy equipment to bring fill to his residential property and to smooth the fill to level the ground so that he could construct the storage barn. Finally, the plaintiff argued that some of the allegedly contemptuous activity was otherwise allowed by the Town (1) by means of prior zoning rulings, or (2) because he undertook such activity for his personal use.
The court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the plaintiff has willfully violated the judgment by continuing to conduct his commercial enterprise out of his residential property and by using his Mack Dump Truck for commercial purposes. The court finds that the intervenors did not meet their burden to prove that the claimed violations of paragraph 3 were violations of a clear court order and, as a result, does not find the plaintiff in contempt in regard to those claims.
Nothing in the contempt motion is directed against the defendant Town of Harwinton.
The plaintiff was Chair of the Harwinton Zoning Commission during the pendency of this case. Exhibit 2 demonstrated that the plaintiff was Chair of the Zoning Commission on June 27, 2015. In response to a question from the court that contained a necessary inference that the plaintiff was Chair on the date of the stipulated judgment, the plaintiff did not correct this inference. The plaintiff was quite familiar with Harwinton's zoning regulations during the relevant time period of this case. The plaintiff knew, during all relevant times, that permitted uses under Harwinton's zoning regulations are listed as such and that non-listed uses are not permitted. The plaintiff knew that, under the regulations, he could not store his business's heavy equipment, including, during the time period after this judgment, two excavators (one owned by the plaintiff and one belonging to his brother), a bulldozer, a rubber-tired backhoe and a skid steer, on his property unless he was using them on his property for personal use or for a permitted use. The plaintiff received a permit from the town prior to the judgment to construct a large storage barn and a pool. The plaintiff used all of his commercial heavy equipment, with the exception of his large excavator, for both, on one hand, personal or permitted use and, on the other hand, for business use after the judgment. The permitted or personal uses of this heavy equipment after the judgment were extremely limited. For example, the plaintiff trucked in only approximately six to seven loads of fill to level off the land on which he is building the storage shed after judgment and used the bulldozer to smooth this dirt out.
Intervenors' exhibit 1 demonstrates clearly and emphatically that the plaintiff has been, after judgment, using his residential property for commercial purposes. Intervenors' exhibit 1 is a log maintained by Ms. Genovese. This log credibly documents that the plaintiff has entered and exited his residential property on more than three dozen occasions with the Mack Dump truck and other heavy equipment since the entry of judgment. The intervenors' diary entries were corroborated by intervenors' exhibit 4, a series of videos that displayed several of the plaintiff's trips set forth in intervenors' exhibit 1.
The log entries also evidence that the plaintiff was not, on virtually all of these occasions, bringing in fill or, for that matter, any load upon his return and that Ms. Genovese did not observe the plaintiff or anyone else conducting personal or residential work on or at the plaintiff's property on these occasions. The number of times that the plaintiff exited and entered his residential property with such heavy equipment far surpasses the amount of times that the plaintiff testified that he used any such equipment for personal use. As mentioned above, prior to the entry of judgment, the plaintiff had applied for and received town permits to build a large storage barn and a pool. During the hearing, the plaintiff presented no credible evidence that he had performed any work on the pool after the judgment. The only evidence presented as to personal use of the heavy equipment post-judgment was testimony documenting that the plaintiff had imported, placed and smoothed out six to seven loads of fill in conjunction with building the storage barn.
The court also finds that the amount of times that the plaintiff used such equipment for farming purposes after the judgment was minimal when compared to the three dozen documented examples of his entering and exiting his property with his heavy equipment.
In reviewing the intervenors' allegations that the plaintiff was, postjudgment, using his property for commercial purposes, the town zoning enforcement officer (ZEO), Mr. Perkins, conducted an investigation. On April 25, 2016, after inspecting the property, the ZEO, as set forth in intervenors' exhibit 2, found that the plaintiff was " in violation of the stipulation." The court finds this conclusion to be credible.
There was a great deal of testimony elicited from Mr. Perkins by the plaintiff's counsel indicating that Mr. Perkins did not observe or find a zoning violation postjudgment. While this may be true, the court notes the following. First, since the stipulated judgment contained some prohibitions that were broader than the zoning regulations, it was not inconsistent for Mr. Perkins to testify that a violation of the stipulation may not constitute a zoning violation. Second, Mr. Perkins' personal observations were limited to his two visits after judgment. By Mr. Perkins' own admission, he did not continuously surveil the plaintiff's property after the judgment. Third, the questions posed by the plaintiff's counsel in regard to potential zoning violations revolved around the topic of whether maintaining heavy equipment on residential property in and of itself violated zoning regulations. The plaintiff's counsel strategically avoided questions that pertained to business use of a residential property. The plaintiff's counsel also strategically phrased these questions to inquire as to as whether Mr. Perkins had observed zoning violations, knowing full well that Mr. Perkins had only viewed the plaintiff's property twice postjudgment and that Mr. Perkins was relying heavily on facts presented to him by the intervenors. When the intervenors' counsel asked Mr. Perkins, however, whether the business use of a residential property constituted a zoning violation, Mr. Perkins testified that it did. The court, sitting as the trier of fact and of a witness's credibility, also finds that Mr. Perkins, the town ZEO, was very nervous while being asked questions pertaining to possible zoning violations of the plaintiff, the town Zoning Commission Chair. Mr. Perkins often asked counsel to rephrase any such questions, and, when he answered these questions, he did so in an extremely cautious and guarded manner. Mr. Perkins' understandable self-interest in keeping his job when being asked questions about the potential zoning violations of the Chair of the Zoning Commission blunted Mr. Perkins' enthusiasm to answer such questions in a sweeping manner.
Most damning to the plaintiff's defense to this motion is one of his own admissions. The plaintiff testified that, since March 30, 2016, he had used his Mack Dump Truck to haul his trailer to carry his white pickup truck to various job sites. The plaintiff confirmed that, after driving the dump truck hauling the pickup truck to a job site, he would leave the dump truck and the trailer at the job site and then drive the pickup truck home. This admission reveals that the plaintiff was using the Mack Dump Truck for commercial purposes and not simply storing it at his residence or employing it for personal use. The plaintiff's admission in this regard is also corroborated by footage in the video in intervenors' exhibit 4, which shows the Mack Dump Truck hauling the trailer carrying the white pickup truck leaving the plaintiff's residence.
The plaintiff also testified that he used his home address as the address of his business in tax and secretary of state filings. The plaintiff additionally stated that he did not own any other real property on which to store his business equipment, although he had, on occasion, been allowed by his brother or others to store equipment at their property. Further, the plaintiff has not permanently removed from his residential property various items of heavy equipment, including a commercial trailer.
The facts cited above prove that the plaintiff violated two provisions of the judgment, paragraphs 2 and 5. Paragraph 2 of the judgment provided that the plaintiff " will not conduct any commercial activities at [his residential premises], including, but without limitation, and specifically any and all activities related to the Plaintiff's contracting business known as Autumn Contracting, LLC . . . [and] will not conduct, or allow to be conducted, any commercial activities whatsoever, especially those related to his contracting business, on the [residential premises.] This provision shall not apply to the Plaintiff's commercial farming activities or other activities as permitted by the Harwinton Zoning Regulations." Paragraph 5 of the judgment, while allowing the plaintiff to park the 2000 Mack Dump Truck overnight, prohibited him from using it " for the Plaintiff's contracting business or other commercial purposes, " with an exception for " farm or personal use on the [residential premises] or elsewhere." The court shall discuss each of these provisions seriatim.
The facts found above clearly support the conclusion that the plaintiff was willfully conducting commercial activities at his residential property, in violation of paragraph 2. The plaintiff argues that he is using the dump truck, the trailer, the white pickup truck and the other equipment associated with his business only for farm or permitted use under the exception set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 2 and under the catchall exception set forth in paragraph 8. Paragraph 8, as mentioned above, states that the plaintiff " shall be able to use the Subject Premises as he sees fit so long as such use is in accordance with the Stipulated Judgment, the Harwinton Zoning Regulations and other applicable law." The court is not persuaded.
As mentioned above, the number of times that the intervenors witnessed the plaintiff using his commercial equipment postjudgment for obviously commercial use far outstrips the number of times that the plaintiff testified that he was using such equipment for farming or personal use. The court took a great amount of evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff was not using this commercial equipment for farming use, for personal use or for permitted use, e.g., to help erect his storage barn and pool. Therefore, the exception to the prohibitions of paragraph 2 cannot excuse this violation.
Moreover, the Harwinton Zoning Regulations do not provide a safe harbor for such use. The Zoning Regulations were contained in the court file as an exhibit to the underlying appeal in this and the companion file. Section 6.19 of the regulations states that nothing in the regulations shall restrict the " use of a private home for personal business by the owner or occupant where [among other things] a reasonable neighbor would not know that such an operation is taking place." In this case, the court finds that a reasonable or objective neighbor would know that such an operation was " taking place" when he or she witnessed the exiting and returning of heavy commercial equipment on the numerous occasions specified on intervenors' exhibit 1, further corroborated by the video in intervenors' exhibit 4. Moreover, as mentioned above, the plaintiff himself admitted that he drove the Mack Dump Truck from his residence towing the trailer to carry the white pickup truck to job sites.
Despite the plaintiff's contentions to the contrary, paragraph 8 of the judgment does not insulate the plaintiff from the duties he assumed in the judgment. The plaintiff and his counsel maintained that the plaintiff did not violate a clear order of the court because he engaged, from time to time, in permitted activity under the zoning regulations. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was using heavy equipment to build his storage barn and pool pursuant to town permits and that he used his heavy equipment, from time to time, for personal uses. The court disagrees for several reasons.
First, it would be irrational for the court to construe paragraph 8 as a boa constrictor capable of swallowing an adult stag, e.g., all of the other relevant provisions of the stipulated judgment. Second, the court cannot construe paragraph 8 as the functional equivalent of diplomatic immunity absolving the plaintiff from complying with all of the other obligations he assumed in the stipulated judgment simply because he was, at certain limited times, partially in compliance with the zoning regulations. This is especially true because, as mentioned above the plaintiff was in stark violation of the zoning regulation disallowing business use of a residential property.
Even if it were inclined to construe paragraph 8 in this way, however, the court cannot do so. Paragraph 8 is phrased in the conjunctive, not the disjunctive. The plaintiff is free to use his property as he " sees fit, " but only in accordance with the stipulated judgment, the zoning regulations " and, " not " or, " other applicable law (emphasis added). In other words, if the plaintiff violated either a provision of the stipulated judgment, the zoning regulations or other law, he was in violation of the judgment. The court finds that the plaintiff has violated both the stipulated judgment and the zoning violations by engaging in commercial activity at and from his residential property after the entry of the judgment.
The court also finds that the plaintiff has violated paragraph 5 of the judgment. Although this paragraph allowed the plaintiff to park the Mack Dump Truck overnight at his home and permitted its use for " farm or personal use" at his home or elsewhere, it prohibited him from using it for his " contracting business or other commercial purposes." The plaintiff's own testimony proves his violation. He admitted under oath that he would attach the trailer at his home to the Mack Dump Truck and place the white pickup truck on the trailer to drive to job sites and then drive the pickup truck home. Both intervenors' exhibit 1 and 4 confirm this fact. For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, paragraph 8 does not absolve this violation.
Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff has wilfully violated paragraph 5 by using his Mack Dump Truck for commercial purposes from his residential property.
As a result, the court orders the plaintiff to comply with paragraph 2 of the judgment and to cease and desist from conducting any commercial activity out of his residential property. Although the plaintiff may store the Mack Dump Truck at his home, he is prohibited from using it in any commercial capacity, as set forth in paragraph 5 of the judgment. By way of example, but not of limitation, the plaintiff may not use the Mack Dump Truck to haul other heavy equipment for commercial purposes, including, but not limited to, his pickup truck. The plaintiff may use the Mack Dump Truck for personal and farming uses. If the intervenors or the Town present the court with evidence that the plaintiff has violated this order, the court will consider all potentially applicable sanctions presented at a subsequent hearing, including monetary penalties.
The intervenors, however, did not sustain their burden of proving contempt in regard to paragraph 3 of the judgment. As mentioned above, paragraph 3 requires the plaintiff to remove " all equipment, tools, and/or materials used for Plaintiff's contracting business or any other commercial activity" permanently from his residential property. Paragraph 3, however, contains an exception for farming tools, the tools in the plaintiff's pickup truck, or other tools and equipment " allowed by the Harwinton Zoning Regulations." For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the intervenors did not sustain their burden to prove a violation of a clear court order in regard to the requirements of paragraph 3.
Since the judgment, the plaintiff has maintained at his residential property, except when deployed at a job site, many items of heavy equipment not covered by the farming exception or the pickup truck tools exception. These items include not only the Mack Dump Truck, which is allowed under paragraph 5 of the judgment, to be parked on site, although not allowed to be used for the plaintiff's commercial purposes, but also a commercial trailer, two excavators, a bulldozer, and a skid steer, all of which belonged to, or were used in, the plaintiff's business. The plaintiff, in fact, in responding to questions from the court, testified that, at the time he executed the stipulation for judgment, he never intended to remove any of these items from his property. According to the plaintiff, he believed that, since he intended to use some or all of these items to help him construct the storage barn and pool, uses for which he had, before judgment, received permits, the prohibition found in the first sentence of paragraph 3 did not apply to these items of heavy equipment. It is true, as claimed above, that the plaintiff has employed the Mack Dump Truck, the excavator and the bulldozer on a handful of occasions to dig out, bring in, and smooth over fill to help construct his storage barn. However, as mentioned above, the number of times the plaintiff used these items for personal use pales when compared to the number of times he used them for commercial use. Signing a stipulated judgment provision which a person never intends to obey is not behavior that the court condones. Under the facts presented in this hearing, however, it does not constitute contempt.
Because it has not been presented to the court for a determination, the court leaves for another day the issue of whether such evidence may constitute unilateral mistake, or when considered in conjunction with the understanding of the Town and the intervenors, mutual mistake.
There is an exception in paragraph 3 for " tools and equipment as allowed by the Harwinton Zoning Regulations." The plaintiff would not be in contempt if the items of heavy equipment referred to above were allowed under these regulations. Section 6.20 of these regulations, found in a court exhibit for the underlying appeal, prohibits " commercially operated or commercially registered vehicles having a gross vehicle weight in excess of 19, 500 pounds or greater than two axles" from being parked or stored on private property in a residential zone, such as the zone where the plaintiff lives, except when they are being used to provide a service related to the residential property, with further limitations. One of these limitations is that one such commercial vehicle shall be permitted on the property. The only evidence of weight adduced during this hearing was that of the Mack Dump Truck. The dump truck has been deemed to be a legal, nonconforming use. There was no testimony introduced as to the weight of any other piece of heavy equipment. Although the trailer in question appears to perhaps have more than two axles, the court cannot discern this fact from the pictures admitted into evidence. Moreover, the plaintiff introduced into evidence a ruling from the zoning commission; plaintiff's exhibit 2; that seems to allow the storage of one sort of commercial trailer, although the decision does not " allow the property owner the right to operate a business out of the home." Plaintiff's exhibit 2. Plaintiff's exhibit 2 raises some doubt as to whether the Town allows a resident to keep a trailer such as the plaintiff's on site. Finally, it is unclear to the court if the Mack Dump Truck would count as one such allowed vehicle under Section 6.20 because it was deemed to be a legal, preexisting, nonconforming use. For these reasons, the court finds that the Genoveses did not prove that the plaintiff was in violation of a clear provision of paragraph 3.
However, the court notes the following. Allowing the plaintiff to store his heavy equipment at his residence when he is using it for commercial purposes would ineluctably lead to the plaintiff conducting commercial activity out of his residential property. This would constitute a violation of paragraph 2 of the judgment. The court is cognizant that, even when it does not find contempt, it may order a remedy. " [E]ven in the absence of a finding of contempt, a trial court has broad discretion to make whole any party who has suffered as a result of another party's failure to comply with a court order." Nelson v. Nelson, 13 Conn.App. 355, 367, 536 A.2d 985 (1988) (court still required to hold evidentiary hearing to support such orders); see also, Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 16 Conn.App. 548, 553, 547 A.2d 1387, cert. denied, 210 Conn. 802, 553 A.2d 615 (1988) (though party's actions did not constitute contempt, court's remedial orders were well within court's general remedial discretion). Therefore, the court orders the plaintiff to remove all of his commercial heavy equipment from his residential property within forty five days of this memorandum. This equipment must be maintained at another site. This order does not apply to (1) the Mack Dump Truck, which may be stored at the plaintiff's residence, although may not be used for commercial purposes, or (2) the farm equipment listed on Exhibit A of the judgment. The plaintiff is also allowed to bring any piece or pieces of commercial heavy equipment back to his residence, but only during the limited time period in which the plaintiff is using them for permitted, personal use, such as the construction of the storage barn or the pool and for farming uses. These pieces, however, may not be left on site at the plaintiff's residence after they have been used for these purposes. Further, the plaintiff may maintain his pickup truck on site at his residence with the tools allowed under paragraph 3 of the judgment.
The intervenors have, as found above, proven that the plaintiff wilfully violated two provisions of the judgment. What underscores the wilfullness of these violations is the fact that the plaintiff demonstrated, during the hearing, that he was extremely conversant with both the town zoning regulations and the terms of the stipulated judgment. In fact, the plaintiff proved to be so familiar with both the zoning regulations and the judgment that he tried to manipulate the zoning regulations to confect a situation that would absolve him from all of his sins of non-compliance under the judgment. The plaintiff's attempt boomeranged, however; instead of insulating him from his obligations, the plaintiff's attempts in this regard actually emphasize his wilfull disregard of two provisions of the judgment.
Under General Statutes § 52-256b(a), the court may award the intervenors attorneys fees. Under the facts found in this motion, the court determines that it should award attorneys fees. The intervenors submitted an affidavit seeking attorneys fees and expenses in the amount of $3, 639.44. The court carefully reviewed the affidavit, which included Attorney Mott's billing records. The court finds that a reasonable attorneys fee for the work needed to be performed and that was performed in this case, is $2, 500. See, Shapero v. Mercede, 262 Conn. 1, 7, 808 A.2d 666 (2002); Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn. 58, 77, 689 A.2d 1097 (1997); Appliances, Inc. v. Yost, 186 Conn. 673, 681 n.5, 443 A.2d 486 (1982). Therefore, the court orders the plaintiff to pay the intervenors reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $2, 500. This amount is payable within ninety days of this memorandum.
Section 52-256b(a) provides in relevant part: " When any person is found in contempt of any order or judgment of the Superior Court, the court may award to the petitioner a reasonable attorneys fee . . ."
Counsel for the Town of Harwinton sought attorneys fees for attending the hearing. However the Town was not a petitioner, and, as such, § 52-256b does not authorize an award of attorneys fees to the Town.
SO ORDERED.