Opinion
No. 1-584 / 01-0524.
Filed February 20, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Carroll County, RONALD H. SCHECHTMAN, Judge.
Shirley Trulsen appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Clair Otto, her landlord, and dismissing her personal injury case. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
Patrick W. O'Bryan of O'Bryan Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Timothy A. Scherle of Klass, Stoik, Mugan, Villone, Phillips, Orzechowski, Clausen Lapierre, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellee.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Shirley Trulsen appeals from the district court order granting summary judgment and dismissing her negligence lawsuit against her landlord, Clair Otto, for personal injuries. Trulsen contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment because "there were several material disputed facts concerning the relative faults of the parties" and thus the case should have been submitted to a jury. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
Shirley Trulsen (hereinafter "Trulsen") and her husband, Bruce, rented and lived in one unit of a home owned by Clair Otto which had been divided into three rental units. The parties' lease was oral, no terms being reduced to writing. The Trulsens' unit had only one accessible entrance. The Trulsens alone used it, as the other two units had their own separate entrance or entrances. The Trulsens had rented and lived in the same unit about seven years as of January 1998. They had previously rented from Otto at other locations, including another unit in the same home. Otto had owned the home for twenty years or more as of January 1998.
Outside the Trulsens' entrance door were three steps down to a sidewalk. By longstanding practice and apparent implicit agreement the Trulsens normally removed snow from the steps and otherwise kept them clear and Otto assumed the same responsibilities for the sidewalks, although the Trulsens sometimes cleared the sidewalks as well as the steps and Otto sometimes cleared the steps as well as the sidewalks. There was no rain gutter on the roof on the side of the home where the Trulsens' entrance was located. The entrance had a handrail made of pipe. It was adjacent to but not on the steps. The handrail had been in the same location since before the Trulsens occupied the unit.
According to the Trulsens' deposition testimony, on January 16, 1998 there was substantial snowfall but no freezing rain, freezing drizzle, or sleet or other forms of precipitation, and in the late afternoon they shoveled the steps, sidewalk and driveway. On January 17 Trulsen was leaving home at about 4:45 a.m. to go to work. According to her deposition testimony she put one foot on the top entrance step, attempted to reach the handrail, but then slipped and fell down the three steps incurring personal injuries.
Trulsen subsequently filed this lawsuit against Otto. Her petition contained a general allegation that Otto's negligence caused her fall and injuries, but no specifications of acts or omissions constituting the alleged negligence.
Following certain discovery, including depositions, Otto moved for summary judgment. Trulsen resisted. In an affidavit in support of her resistance she stated that in her opinion Otto should have installed a proper rain gutter above the entrance and should have moved the handrail closer to the door so it could be reached without taking any steps outside door. She further stated she believed the accident would not have happened if Otto had maintained a proper rain gutter above the steps, and she had previously alerted him to that problem and asked it be fixed but he would not do so. Trulsen stated in her deposition that one had to get completely on the top step and then take about two steps over in order to be able to reach the handrail. She also stated she had complained to Otto that the handrail was loose where it attached to the house and the steps got slick when the snow melted.
Weather records for Carroll, Iowa, where the residence is located, showed the high temperature for January 16 was twenty-three degrees and the low was thirteen degrees and for January 17 the high was thirty-one degrees and the low was seventeen degrees.
The district court granted Otto's motion for summary judgment. It found the record was void of any evidence that placement of a gutter would have prevented the accident. It also concluded that because Trulsen fell on the first step and "[s]he was in no position to grab the handrail, whether loose or not," there was "no showing that an inadequate handrail was the proximate cause of her injuries, nor did Otto breach any legal duty to Trulsen in not providing a handrail."
Trulsen appeals from the court's grant of summary judgment. She argues the court erred because several material facts remain in dispute concerning the relative faults of the parties which should have been submitted to a jury. She claims questions concerning whether the lack of a gutter, the condition of the handrail, or the location of the handrail were the proximate cause of her injuries were questions for a jury, and not the district court, to decide.
II. MERITS
We review a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 4; Phillips v. Covenant Clinic, 625N.W.2d 714, 717 (Iowa 2001).
A district court properly grants summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A factual issue is "material" only if "the dispute is over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit." The burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to prove the facts are undisputed.
In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must look at the facts in a light most favorable to the party resisting the motion. The court must also consider on behalf of the nonmoving party every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the record. An inference is legitimate if it is "rational, reasonable, and otherwise permissible under the governing substantive law." On the other hand, an inference is not legitimate if it is "based upon speculation or conjecture." If reasonable minds may differ on the resolution of an issue, a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Phillips, 625N.W.2d at 717-18 (citations omitted).
The party resisting the motion, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings" but "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(e).
The resistance must set forth specific facts which constitute competent evidence showing a prima facie claim. By requiring the resister to go beyond generalities, the basic purpose of summary judgment procedure is achieved: to weed out "[p]aper cases and defenses" in order "to make way for litigation which does have something to it."
Thompson v. City of Des Moines, 564 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446 N.W.2d 451, 454 (Iowa 1989)).
It is well established that in order to prove a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed him or her a duty of care, the defendant breached that duty, defendant's breach was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, and the plaintiff suffered damages. Kolbe v. State, 625 N.w.2d 721, 725 (Iowa 2001); Walls v. Jacob North Printing Co., Inc., 618 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Iowa 2000). Negligence cases, which are customarily fact driven, are seldom capable of summary adjudication. Walls, 618 N.W.2d at 284. The threshold determination in any tort case is whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. Rieger v. Jacque, 584 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Iowa 1998). This question as to the existence of a duty is a question of law for the court and therefore may appropriately be adjudicated on a motion for summary judgment. Kolbe, 625 N.W.2d at 725. Questions of negligence and proximate cause, however, are ordinarily for the jury to decide and may only be decided as a matter of law in exceptional cases. Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(10); Rieger, 584 N.W.2d 250-51.
A. Rain gutter.
Nothing in the record supports the existence of a duty on Otto's part to provide a rain gutter on the roof of his house. This is not a case such as Montgomery v. Engel, 179 N.W.2d 478 (Iowa 1970) in which a duty was created by a housing code contained in a municipal ordinance. The summary judgment record in this case contains no claim or evidence that any statute, ordinance or rule required Otto to have a rain gutter on his house. Although we have serious doubt that the duty claimed by Trulsen exists, we pass the question and resolve the issue on the ground of proximate cause, agreeing with the trial court's analysis.
As noted by the trial court, there is no evidence of any moisture on the front steps from snow melting from above and the temperatures give no credence to any thawing. There was no sunlight at the time of Trulsen's accident or shortly before, as it happened on January 17 at about 4:45 a.m. We note further that there is no evidence of precipitation in any form other than snow, and as shown by undisputed evidence in the form of Otto's deposition testimony a rain gutter would not prevent snow from getting on the steps. As the trial court concluded, the record is void of any evidence or reasonable inference that a rain gutter would have prevented the accident. We conclude this is a case in which, as is implicit in the trial court's ruling, the issue of proximate cause can be decided as a matter of law. Assuming a duty on Otto's part to construct a rain gutter, and assuming further his negligence in failing to do so, there is nevertheless no substantial evidence which would support a finding that the absence of a rain gutter was a proximate cause of Trulsen's accident and injuries. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on that part of Trulsens' lawsuit based on a failure to have a rain gutter on the house.
B. Condition of the handrail.
Evidence in the summary judgment record indicates the pipe handrail's attachment to the house was loose and Otto tightened it after Trulsen's accident. Trulsen urges that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there "was a jury question whether the hand rail should have been made better. . . ." We disagree. As noted by the trial court, Trulsen slipped and fell while on the first step and before she was in a position to grab the handrail. The undisputed evidence shows she had not taken hold of or reached the handrail when she slipped and fell. Any looseness of the handrail thus could not have been a cause of her accident. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on that part of Trulsen's lawsuit based on the looseness of the handrail.
C. Location of the handrail.
The summary judgment record contains evidence that a person leaving the Trulsens' residence could not reach the handrail without getting completely on the top step and then taking about two steps "over." The record also contains evidence that Trulsen had complained to Otto about the location of the handrail, and Otto had not moved it to a more accessible location prior to Trulsen's accident. In her affidavit Trulsen asserted that Otto should have moved the handrail closer to the door so that it could be reached without taking any steps outside the front door.
Trulsen's claim is that Otto was negligent in failing to move the handrail to a more accessible location, thus causing the steps to be dangerous to those leaving the Trulsens' premises. The trial court ruled in part that there was no showing an inadequate handrail was the proximate cause of Trulsen's injuries, and that Otto did not breach any duty to Trulsen in not providing a handrail.
The trial court's reference to an "inadequate handrail" appears to relate to the handrail's attachment to the house being loose. However, if the reference is intended to relate to the handrail's location we disagree with the conclusion that the location cannot be seen as a proximate cause of Trulsen's injuries. Trulsen generated a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the handrail's location, because it required getting completely on the first step and then moving about two steps over, was a proximate cause of Trulsen's injuries because reasonable minds could differ on resolution of the issue.
It is not clear whether the trial court held that Otto had no duty to provide a handrail, or whether it held that under the undisputed facts Otto did not breach such a duty. However, for the following reasons we conclude summary judgment was inappropriate on Trulsen's claim concerning location of the handrail.
Nothing in the record supports the existence of a duty on Otto's part to provide a handrail. Just as with Trulsen's claim concerning the rain gutter, the summary judgment record contains no claim or evidence that any statute, ordinance, or rule required Otto to have a handrail on or adjacent to the steps. However, the undisputed evidence shows he did provide a handrail. Having gratuitously provided a handrail he had a duty to exercise ordinary care in doing so. McCrady v. Sino, 254 Iowa 856, 865-66, 118 N.W.2d 592, 597 (1963); s ee also Case v. Sioux City, 246 Iowa 654, 660, 69 N.W.2d 27, 31 (1955) (holding that as a general rule a landlord is liable for negligence in making gratuitous repairs). There is evidence from which a finder of fact could find the placement of the handrail was unsafe because it required one leaving the Trulsens' residence to get completely on the top step and then take about two additional steps to reach the handrail.
We note that where there is no agreement to repair, a landlord is generally not liable for injuries arising from the unsafe condition of the premises arising after the landlord leases the property. Fouts ex rel. Jensen v. Mason, 592 N.W.2d 33, 38 (Iowa 1999). However, in this case the condition in question, the location of the handrail, arose before the lease. Further, the depositions submitted with the motion for summary judgment and resistance contain undisputed evidence that when the Trulsens would ask Otto to come out and check on something he would, and that the Trulsens did from time to time ask Otto to make any necessary repairs. There is also evidence in the depositions from which a fact finder could find that Otto would immediately make requested repairs in most cases. This constitutes substantial evidence that part of the lease was an agreement that Otto would make necessary repairs. Because the condition in question arose before the lease and because a fact finder could find there was an agreement that Otto would make necessary repairs, the rule for which Fouts is cited has no applicability in this case.
A landlord is liable for harm to persons on leased premises with the lessee's permission if the harm results from a condition of disrepair existing before the lessee has taken possession if the lessor has contracted to keep the property in repair. Long v. Jensen, 522 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Iowa 1994). Trulsen was obviously on the premises with the permission of the lessees, herself and her husband. The fact finder could reasonably find the premises to be unsafe and thus in a condition of disrepair as the result of the handrail being placed in a location where it was difficult and at times dangerous to reach. That condition arose before the Trulesens took possession. For reasons earlier stated the fact finder could find Otto had contracted to keep the property in repair.
We conclude that when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Trulsen and she is allowed every legitimate inference that can be deduced from the record, she has met her burden to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether Otto was negligent in failing to change the location of the handrail he provided with the premises and whether the location of the handrail was a proximate cause of Trulsen's injuries and damages. We conclude the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on that part of Trulsen's lawsuit which is based on the location of the handrail.
Trulsen also cites cases holding a landlord has a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain those portions of premises over which the landlord retains control, and those portions of premises over which the landlord and tenant have joint control including areas used in common by one or more tenants, and that such common areas may be either inside or outside. However, the summary judgment record establishes as undisputed fact that the steps and entrance in question were not premises over which Otto retained control or use, and were not premises used in common by other tenants. Therefore, to the extent the trial court's ruling may be seen as addressing retained or joint control as a basis for the existence of a duty on Otto's part, we find no error.
III. SUMMARY AND DISPOSITION
We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the portion of Trulsen's lawsuit based on the absence of a rain gutter and the portion of Trulsen's lawsuit based on the condition (looseness) of the handrail. We reverse the grant of summary judgment on that portion of Trulsen's lawsuit which is based on the location of the handrail, and remand for further proceedings on that part of the lawsuit.
Costs on appeal are taxed one-half to Trulsen and one-half to Otto.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.