Trull v. Dayco Products

Full title: JERRY TRULL; DON HENSON; FLOYD SUTTON; EARL JOHNSON; RODERICK ROGERS; and…

Court: United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division

Date published: Jun 22, 2004

CIVIL NO. 1:02CV243 (W.D.N.C. Jun. 22, 2004)

Opinion

CIVIL NO. 1:02CV243.

June 22, 2004

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LACY THORNBURG, District Judge

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants' motion to strike the jury demand and request for the use of a juror questionnaire. Both the motion and the request are denied.

I. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Four of the claims stated in the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint are raised pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. (ERISA). As to those claims which are raised in Counts II, IV, VI, and VII, the Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, an order of restitution for medical insurance premiums and/or prescription co-payments paid in violation of the collective bargaining agreements, an injunction against the future charging of premiums and/or assessment of co-payments, and retroactive reinstatement of medical insurance for any retiree whose insurance was terminated for nonpayment. The Plaintiffs do not seek a jury trial as to the ERISA claims.

Counts I, III and V, however, allege violations of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (LMRA). As to those claims which allege breaches of the collective bargaining agreements, declaratory relief, restitution, injunctive relief and reinstatement are also sought. Plaintiffs also seek additional relief in the form of monetary damages, pre-judgment interest, costs and attorneys' fees. In the "Prayer for Additional Relief," Plaintiffs "demand a jury trial for all claims triable by a jury."

II. DISCUSSION

Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on their LMRA claims is a question of law. Brown v. Sandimo Materials, 250 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001).

As the LMRA itself is silent on the issue [of the right to a jury trial], [the Court] must . . . consider whether a jury right inheres in the plaintiffs' claim by virtue of the Seventh Amendment. "The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute created legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law." . . . Plaintiffs' characterization of the remedy sought is not necessarily controlling on this point. Plaintiffs' claim under section 301 of the LMRA is, at base, a claim for breach of contract, which has historically been uniformly treated as a legal claim. Plaintiffs seek to establish, first, which parties are bound by the relevant CBAs [collective bargaining agreements], and second, that those parties violated the terms of the CBAs. . . . The gravamen of plaintiffs' claim is . . . defendants violated the terms of the [Agreements.] . . . To the extent that [the ERISA claims] afford legal relief in the form of damages for breach of the relevant CBAs, such relief will be coextensive with the relief available under the LMRA, and any issues common to both claims can be considered by the jury. To the extent that these sections provide only equitable relief, the existence of a parallel claim in equity will not impair the right to a jury on plaintiffs' legal claim[s]. Moreover, equitable relief is available only if plaintiffs' legal remedies are inadequate; if so, such relief may be awarded by the district court after the jury has had an opportunity to consider plaintiffs' legal claims and any factual determinations common to plaintiffs' legal and equitable claims.

Id., at 126-27 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974)) (other internal citations omitted). Such is the case here: both equitable claims pursuant to ERISA and legal claims for breach of contract have been stated. As to the legal claims, the Plaintiffs seek damages in the form of the recovery of the amounts paid in premiums or co-payments, regardless of whether this is characterized as damages or restitution. Id. ; accord, Stewart v. KHD Deutz of America Corp., 75 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11^th Cir. 1996) ("The only remedy the retirees seek under section 301 of LMRA is compensatory damages representing out-of-pocket expenditures incurred as a result of the decreased health benefits. An action for money damages was `the traditional form of relief offered in courts of law[,]'" (quoting Curtis, supra, at 196)). This is not a case in which the "request for monetary relief . . . is incidental and intertwined with the fundamental request for a declaration that [Plaintiffs] are entitled to fully-funded retiree benefits." Bittinger v. Tecumseh Products Co., 123 F.3d 877, 883 (6^th Cir. 1997); accord, Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648 (6^th Cir. 1996) (Monetary award sought by retired employees in action for breach of collective bargaining agreements' health insurance benefits provisions was incidental to and intertwined with their request for specific performance requiring employer to provide lifetime benefits as no cost so that action was equitable where the monetary award sought was to compensate them for the loss incurred during a three-month period between the breach and the issuance of a preliminary injunction). Instead, it is a case involving both equitable relief pursuant to ERISA and legal relief pursuant to the LMRA. Stewart, supra. In other factually similar cases, courts have either held or assumed that the LMRA claims based on breaches of collective bargaining agreements sound in breach of contract, thus entitling the claimant to a jury trial. Webb v. GAF Corp., 78 F.3d 53 (2^nd Cir. 1996); Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 v. Keystone Heating and Air Conditioning, 934 F.2d 35 (3^rd Cir. 1991); Gulf Resources Chemical Co. v. Gavine, 980 F.2d 737, 1992 WL 357132 (9^th Cir. 1991); Bugher v. Feightner, 722 F.2d 1356 (7^th Cir. 1983); Oregon Laborers-Employers Trust Funds v. Pacific Fence and Wire Company, 726 F.Supp. 786 (D.Ore. 1989); Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 675 F.Supp. 1263 (E.D.Wa. 1986); Smith v. ABS Industries, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 94 (N.D.Oh. 1986). And, in a case originating in the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court determined that when a declaratory judgment action required the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement and a determination of whether that agreement had been breached, the cause of action was essentially one for legal, not equitable, relief and a jury trial was available. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); accord, Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1007 (8^th Cir. 2004) (discussing Great-West Life Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), and noting the employee's health insurance plan contained a provision allowing the Plan to recover for medical expenses paid to beneficiary from any tort settlement and thus the Plan sued under ERISA to recover the same. "Great-West's claim, whether labeled as an injunction to compel the payment of money past due under a contract, specific performance of a past due monetary obligation, or restitution, did not constitute the type of relief that was typically available in equity."); Rego v. Westvaco Corp., 319 F.3d 140, 145 (4^th Cir. 2003); Local 109 Retirement Fund v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 57 Fed.Appx. 139 (4^th Cir. 2003). The undersigned therefore concludes that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial as to their LMRA claims.

III. ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants' request for a juror questionnaire is hereby DENIED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants' motion to strike the jury demand is hereby DENIED.