Opinion
C. A. 5:21-2037-BHH-KDW
03-10-2022
William Eure Truett, Plaintiff, v. Horry County Jail, Conway, SC; Wayne Owens, Warden; Christopher Pack, Correctional Officer; Sgt Scheuer; and Lt of 6-2 Shift at Horry County, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West, United States Magistrate Judge.
William Eure Truett (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this Amended Complaint alleging a violation of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the Amended Complaint in this case.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On August 19, 2021, the court issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his Complaint was subject to summary dismissal because he failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim. ECF No. 17. The order further advised Plaintiff he had until September 2, 2021, to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the identified deficiencies in his pleadings. Id. The court granted Plaintiff three extensions to comply with the court's order, see ECF Nos. 24, 29, 32, and Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on January 7, 2022. ECF No. 37.
Plaintiff alleges he was in the mental health unit at the Horry County Jail on July 2, 2019, in an isolation cell alone. ECF No. 37 at 3. Plaintiff says officers came to his cell that evening and put another inmate, Justin Cooper (“Cooper”), in his cell. Id. Plaintiff says he told the officers he did not want Cooper in his cell. Id. Plaintiff alleges on July 8, 2019, an officer falsely wrote him up. Id. Plaintiff claims officer Pack planted false DNA around the room and committed perjury on the misconduct report he wrote. Id. Plaintiff says officers slandered his name and conspired with other people. Id. Plaintiff claims he was immediately moved to another room where officers put illegal cameras in his cell and tapped on his floor and watched him 24 hours a day. Id. Plaintiff also claims the officers were watching him naked and going to the bathroom. Id. Plaintiff says officers would not allow him to move to a different unit. Id. Plaintiff says officers did not allow him to walk around and talk to other people and he was shackled wherever he went. Id. Plaintiff claims sometimes he was only allowed to use the phone once a week for 15 minutes and officers were only eight feet away listening to his conversation. Id. Plaintiff claims “[t]hey did not give me a pencil or pen to write barely.” Id. Plaintiff alleges he suffered psychological damage. Id. at 4. Plaintiff claims the officers threatened him and gave him false misconducts for trying to call the FBI and police to complain about the staff members. Id. Plaintiff claims he was “in a cell all day pretty much” with a tiny window, and he could not see anyone. Id. Plaintiff contends “he was in the yard for only an hour for 24 hours.” Id. Plaintiff says they would not let him go to general population and he was kept in the maximum security or the restricted housing unit. Id.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiffs allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677‒78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678‒79. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint provides no factual allegations concerning Horry County Jail, Warden Wayne Owens, Sgt. Scheuer, and Lt. of 6-2 Shift, and therefore these Defendants should be summarily dismissed.
The undersigned finds Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims are subject to summary dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. The Fourteenth Amendment proscribes incarcerating a pretrial detainee in conditions that “amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Conditions constitute punishment when there is “an ‘expressed intent' to punish” or “a lack of a reasonable relationship ‘to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, from which a punitive intent may be inferred.'” Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)). Conditions that “are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 540; see also Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 369 (1st Cir. 1978) (“[A]s the maintenance of institutional security directly serves the state's interest in ensuring the detainee's presence [at trial], jail order and security has been accepted as a consideration entitled to great weight when balancing the state's interest against the liberty interest of detainees.”). To demonstrate that conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment, “[an inmate] must (1) establish that prison officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference' and (2) prove extreme deprivations of basic human needs or ‘serious or significant' pain or injury.” Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). To demonstrate that the conditions deprived him of a basic human need, a plaintiff must allege officials failed to provide him with humane conditions of confinement, such as “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and [taking] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Although Plaintiff complains about tapping on his cell, being housed with a cellmate, and limitations on phone, pencils, paper, and outside the cell opportunities, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that show being denied these privileges resulted in an extreme deprivation of basic human needs or a serious or significant pain or injury. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown a violation of his constitutional rights.
To the extent Plaintiff is challenging his placement in maximum segregation, he fails to show a constitutional violation. To determine whether an “atypical and significant hardship” has been imposed, the Supreme Court has outlined a fact intensive inquiry into “(1) the magnitude of confinement restrictions; (2) whether the administrative segregation is for an indefinite period; and (3) whether assignment to administrative segregation had any collateral consequences on the inmate's sentence.” Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 530 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214 (2005)). Plaintiff admits his cell had a window, and that he was given one hour of out-of-cell recreation and limited phone calls. Other than these limitations on privileges, Plaintiff has not alleged any other hardship associated with his segregation, nor can he allege any collateral consequences on any sentence as he was a pretrial detainee.
Further, Plaintiff's claim against Pack concerning false disciplinary charges fails to state a plausible constitutional claim as Plaintiff has not indicated he was disciplined as a result of these charges. It is settled that the act of filing false disciplinary charges does not itself violate a prisoner's constitutional rights. See McClary v. Fowlkes, No. 1:07CV1080 (LO/TCB), 2008 WL 3992637, *4, n.6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2008) (finding inmate has no constitutional right against being falsely accused of conduct that may result in deprivation of protected liberty interest).
Additionally, Plaintiff's allegations concerning officers placing him in shackles, threatening him, listening to his phone calls, or watching him on camera fail to establish any constitutional wrongdoing. See Morrison v. Martin, 755 F.Supp. 683, 687 (E.D. N.C. 1990) (holding that the subjection of a prisoner to verbal abuse and mere threatening language and gestures did not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 529-30 (1984) (finding prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their prison cell); Weems v. Lawrence, No. CV409-065, 2009 WL 2422795 at 2-3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2009) (holding shackling pre-trial detainee during exercise did not violate Fourteenth Amendment).
Further, Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants failed to follow the rules and procedures of Horry County Jail when they placed another inmate in his cell while he was suicidal are insufficient to state a due process violation. “The failure of prison officials to follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.” Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No. 06-2062, 2007 WL 904826, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007); Riccio v. Cnty. of Fairfax, Va., 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining if state law grants more procedural rights that the Constitution requires, a state's failure to abide by that law is not a federal due process issue).
The undersigned finds Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be summarily dismissed. If the district judge agrees Plaintiff's federal claims should be dismissed, the undersigned recommends the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
By order issued on August 19, 2021, the undersigned gave Plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects in his Complaint and further warned Plaintiff that if he failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed without leave for further amendment. As discussed herein, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to correct the deficiencies, and like the original Complaint, fails to state a claim that falls within the court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district court dismiss this action with prejudice. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc 'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).