Opinion
No. NBSP 045132
January 26, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
SUMMARY PROCESS ACTION
The plaintiff, Michael Truax, hereinafter ("Landlord"), seeks a judgment of immediate possession based on nonpayment of rent by the defendant, Daniel Casey, hereinafter ("Tenant"). In his answer filed on November 28, 2005, the Tenant alleges as special defenses: conditions of the premises and retaliatory eviction. He also alleges that the Landlord breached the lease by lockout on numerous occasions. The case was tried to the court on January 19, 2006. The Tenant appeared pro se.
Facts
"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony . . . It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact]." Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123, 438 A.2d 842 (1981).
"[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to their testimony." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530, 378 A.2d 580 (1977). "The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party." Smith v. Smith, supra, 183 Conn. 123. "That determination of credibility is a function of the trial court." Heritage Square, LLC v. Eoanou, CT Page 17707 61 Conn.App. 329, 333, 763 A.2d 199 (2001). The trial court's function as the fact finder "[s to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 508 A.2d 769 (1986).
The standard of proof in summary process actions, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is "properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394, 440 A.2d 952 (1981).
The phrase a "fair preponderance of the evidence" "simply means that evidence which outweighs that which is offered to oppose it . . ." Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1983).
The following facts and procedural history are proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
The Landlord is the owner of the premises at 1150 Shuttlemeadow Road, Southington, Connecticut. On or about April 6, 2005, the premises were advertised for rent in the local paper under "Rooms For Rent." The advertisement described the premises as: "IN 2700 SF HOUSE, Hot tub, pool. $600 + Sec. Avail. Immediately." The parties entered into a written lease agreement in April 2005; the Tenant moved in sometime thereafter.
At trial, the lease was not offered into evidence by either party. The Landlord claims that the lease mysteriously disappeared from his home office across from the Tenant's room. He suspects the Tenant stole the lease from the office. The Tenant denies this accusation and accuses the Landlord of refusing to provide him a copy of the lease. However, one of the parties did provide a copy of the lease to the police on August 13, 2005.
The parties agree the lease provides for a rental payment of $750 for two occupants, the Tenant and his girlfriend, Alexandra Bolovis, hereinafter ("Bolovis"), and a rental payment of $600 for the Tenant as the sole occupant. The Tenant paid up front two month's rent (first and last) and the security deposit.
The evidence clearly indicates that the landlord-tenant relationship soon ran into numerous difficulties. On nine separate occasions between July 2005 and October 2005, the police had to investigate landlord/tenant disputes involving the parties. The court has reviewed all of the police reports offered into evidence by the Tenant. These reports contain numerous admissions by both parties. The court has summarized these incidents and highlighted the most relevant aspects.
On July 1, 2005, the Southington Police Department, hereinafter ("Police"), was called to the residence to investigate a landlord-tenant dispute. The Landlord complained that he came home to find all of the windows open in the house and did not like the way the dishwasher was filled. The Landlord began to yell at the Tenant telling him to leave. The Tenant yelled back, and the Landlord called the police. The Police advised the Landlord that if he wanted the Tenant out, the Tenant would have to leave voluntarily or the Landlord would have to go through the eviction process. No arrests were made.
On July 21, 2005 at approximately 8:12 p.m. the Police received a person in need of assistance call. The Landlord reported that he wanted the Tenant to move out because of nonpayment of rent. The Tenant told the Landlord to use the last month deposit toward the rent payment. The Landlord raised the issue of the Tenant establishing a mailing address at the premises. The Landlord also reported that items in the home were damaged or missing, including the cord to his personal computer. The Tenant had stated to the Landlord that he would leave on or about August 12, 2005. The Police advised the Landlord to pursue the eviction process if the Tenant did not leave. No arrests were made.
Later that evening, at approximately 10:55 p.m., the Police were again called to the premises to investigate a landlord/tenant dispute. The Tenant complained that the Landlord had taken his room air conditioner out of the window, and the Tenant was unable to find it. The Landlord admitted to the police that he took the Tenants air conditioner out, claiming that the window was not suited for a large air conditioner. The Landlord complained that the Tenant was running up the electric bill, and the Tenant would not leave the door open to allow the central air to work. The Tenant and Bolovis stated that the central air did not work in their room because of a broken vent; they also wanted some privacy and did not want to have to keep their door open. They complained that the Landlord never turned on the central air because he is too cheap. At some point, the Tenant agreed to pay $75 more a month to use the window air conditioner. The Landlord stated that he was putting the house on the market. No arrests were made.
On July 25, 2005, the Police were called to the premises to investigate a landlord/tenant dispute. The Landlord reported that the Tenant had entered his locked bedroom office and used his computer. The Landlord indicated that he had been having problems with the Tenant and was going to start the eviction process. No arrests were made.
On August 13, 2005, the Police were dispatched to the residence to investigate a landlord/tenant dispute. The Tenant, who said he was renting a room from the Landlord, stated that the Landlord was preventing him from using the refrigerator because the Landlord was cleaning out the residence to sell the house. After reviewing a copy of the lease, the Police advised the parties that this was a civil matter and the lease did not specify use of appliances. The parties agreed that the Tenant could store his food in the refrigerator until the morning and then he would have to get his own refrigerator. No arrests were made.
On August 19, 2005, the Tenant and Bolovis came to the police headquarters to complain about the situation at the premises. The Tenant complained that the Landlord wanted them to move out and is trying to make living there uncomfortable, so they will leave. He claimed that the Landlord was threatening to cut off the electricity to their room. The Police contacted the Landlord. The Landlord stated that he was going through a divorce and wanted to sell the house. The Police informed him that he needed to go through the eviction process to get them to leave, and he could not shut off the electricity to their room. The Landlord stated that he understood and would not shut off the electricity. No arrests were made.
On September 2, 2005, the Police were dispatched to the premises to investigate a landlord/tenant dispute. The Tenant complained that when he returned home he found ants in his room. He also complained that his window air conditioner unit had a foul smell when running. The Police observed two black ants in a paper bag in the room but did not smell any foul odor coming from the air conditioner. The Landlord stated that he had not been in the Tenant's room and had no knowledge of the two problems. The Landlord stated that the air conditioner belonged to the Tenant, and the ants are most likely from food being left on the floor. No arrests were made.
On October 9, 2005 the Police were dispatched to the premises to investigate a landlord/tenant complaint. The Landlord stated that in April he had rented a room in his home to the Tenant. The Tenant paid the rent for the first two months and then stopped paying rent. The Landlord made other complaints regarding the Tenant's behavior including running up the utility bills. No arrests were made.
On October 12, 2005, the Police were called to the residence to investigate a landlord/tenant dispute. The Landlord complained that the Tenant had damaged the utility room door. Before he went to work that day, the Landlord had removed the washer/dryer circuit breaker to prevent the Tenant from using those appliances because the Tenant had not paid his rent. The Landlord claimed that he did not have a copy of the lease because it had mysteriously disappeared; he accused the Tenant of stealing the lease. The Landlord admitted that the utilities and phone service were included in the rent. The Landlord complained that the Tenant was using the phone and electricity excessively. He admitted disconnecting the phone service due to the Tenant's nonpayment of rent. The Landlord was advised that this was a civil matter, and he could be in violation of the criminal lockout laws if he failed to provide the utilities/services included in the lease. The Police observed damage to the door. The Tenant explained what happened when he tried to do his laundry and denied damaging the door. The parties also disagreed about the removal of the Tenant's trash. No arrests were made.
On November 1, 2005, the Tenant was served with a Notice to Quit Possession for nonpayment of rent with a termination date of November 9, 2005.
On January 12, 2006, the Tenant made a complaint to the Southington Health Department regarding the condition of the premises.
At trial, the Tenant admitted that he failed to pay rent of $600 for the months of October 2005, November 2005, December 2005, and January 2006. The full arrearage is at least $2,400. The Landlord testified that the Tenant ran up all the utility bills including a phone bill for over $400. The Landlord admitted to trying to restrict the Tenant's use of the home because of his nonpayment of rent.
The court will provide additional facts, as needed that are found by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
Landlord's Case
In a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent, the Landlord must prove all the elements of the case by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The essential elements are: (1) On or about a certain date, the landlord and the tenant entered into an oral or written, lease/rental agreement for a weekly/monthly/yearly term for use and occupancy of a certain premises; (2) The tenant agreed to pay an agreed upon rent by a certain date; (3) The tenant took possession of the premises pursuant to the lease; (4) The tenant failed to pay the rent due under the lease by a certain date; (5) The landlord caused a proper Notice to Quit Possession to be served on the tenant to vacate the premises on or before a certain termination date; and (6) Although the time given in the Notice to Quit Possession of the premises has passed, the tenant still continues in possession of the premises. Failure of the landlord to establish any of the necessary elements, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, results in judgment for the tenant.
The Landlord is the owner of the property at 1150 Shuttlemeadow Road, Southington, Connecticut. In April 2005, the parties entered into a written lease agreement that called for monthly rent in the amount of $750 for two occupants (Tenant and Bolovis) and $600 for the Tenant as the sole occupant. The Tenant admits that he stopped paying rent in July 2005 but argues that he should receive credit for his initial payment of the last month's rent and the security deposit. He did not actually pay the Landlord rent for August 2005, September 2005, October 2005, November 2005, December 2005, and January 2006. The notice to quit served on the Tenant on or about November 1, 2005, meets all the statutory requirements including C.G.S. Sec. 47a-23 (a)(3), and was timely and properly served. Although the time designated in the notice to quit has passed, the Tenant still continues in possession of the premises.
Based on the evidence presented, the court finds that the Landlord has sustained his burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence a termination of the lease for nonpayment of rent.
Tenant's Defense
In his answer, the Tenant alleges as special defenses: conditions of the premises and retaliatory eviction. He also alleges that the Landlord breached the lease by lockout on numerous occasions.
Conditions of the Premises
The Tenant alleges that his room was infested with ants and mice, and the trash was not maintained. These conditions allegedly rendered the premises uninhabitable within the meaning of C.G.S. § 47a-7, and thereby relieved him of the obligation to pay rent.
"3. No rent is due, under Connecticut Law (C.G.S. Sec. 47a-4a) because there are housing or health code violations in violation of Connecticut Law (C.G.S. Sec. 47a-7(a)). LIST VIOLATIONS BELOW.
4. I notified X my landlord, Housing Code, the Health Department, or the Building Department of the violations listed in No. 3 above on (date):
General Statutes Sec. 47a-7(a) provides that "A landlord shall (1) Comply with the requirements of . . . all applicable building and housing codes materially affecting health and safety of both the state or any political subdivision thereof; (2) make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition, except where the premises are intentionally rendered unfit or uninhabitable by the tenant . . . in which case such duty shall be the responsibility of the tenant." General Statutes Sec. 47a-4a prohibits a landlord from collecting rent for any period in which it has failed to comply with its responsibilities under C.G.S. § 47a-7.
"Courts which have considered the relationship between General Statutes Sec. 47a-7 and 47a-4 have uniformly concluded that where the premises have been rendered uninhabitable by virtue of rodent and roach infestation, the tenant is relieved from the obligation to pay rent and may raise the uninhabitability of the apartment as a defense to a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent. Steinegger v. Rosario, 35 Conn.Sup. 151 (1979); Tucker v. Lopez, 38 Conn.Sup. 67 (1982). Whether the premises is uninhabitable to the extent that the tenant is relieved of the obligation to pay rent depends on the facts of each individual case and whether the uninhabitability is caused by the tenant. Hayes v. Capitol Buick, 119 Conn. 372 (1935)." Housing Authority v. Williams, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 92006-65824 (Holzberg, J.; October 8, 1992) ( 1992 Ct.Sup. 9310).
The Tenant testified that his room was infested by ants and mice, and the Landlord failed to maintain the trash. On or about September 2, 2005, the Tenant called the Police to complain about the ants. The Police spoke with the Tenant and viewed his room. The Police observed two black ants in a paper box in the room. At trial, the Tenant testified that when he called the Police there were ants all over his bed. He also testified that he was forced to live with ants crawling all over his beds. He also found mouse droppings in his drawers.
On January 17, 2005, when the Southington Health Department inspected the premises, the inspector found evidence of mouse droppings in the Tenant's room and in a small closet outside the bedroom in the hallway. Mouse droppings were not found in any other area of the home. The inspector noted that the house is otherwise clean and in good shape.
The evidence presented by the Tenant does not compel the conclusion that the room was infested with ants and mice. The Tenant stopped paying rent before he complained to the Police regarding the ants. The court concludes that any problems relating to ants or mice were more likely caused by the `Tenant having food in the room, than the Landlord purposefully creating the problems or allowing them to persist to cause the Tenant to vacate the premises.
The evidence fails to show that the premises were ever rendered uninhabitable. Although the Police were there at least nine times, the police reports fail to note any on-going, major problem with the trash. The housing inspector, while noting the problem with mouse droppings in the Tenant's room and the neighboring closet, reports that the house is otherwise clean and in good shape.
Based on the evidence presented, the court is not persuaded that the Landlord has failed to discharge its responsibility to "make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition." The court finds that the premises were never rendered uninhabitable. Therefore, the court finds that the Tenant has failed to meet his burden of proving this defense by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
Retaliatory Eviction
The Tenant alleges the defense of retaliatory eviction under C.G.S. § 47a-20 and 47a-33. The Tenant complained about the Landlord shutting off the utilities including the electricity and the hot water.
"5. This eviction is being brought because I contactedX my landlord or public officials or agencies with regard to complaints about my apartment (C.G.S. Sec. 47a-20 and 47a-33)."
General Statutes Sec. 47a-20 provides that "A landlord shall not maintain an action or proceeding against a tenant to recover possession of a dwelling unit, demand an increase in rent from the tenant, or decrease the services to which the tenant has been entitled within six months after: (1) The tenant has in good faith attempted to remedy by any lawful means, including contacting officials of the state or of any town, city or borough or public agency or filing a complaint with a fair rent commission, any condition constituting a violation of any provisions of chapter 368o, or of chapter 412, or of any other state statute or regulation, or of the housing and health ordinances of the municipality wherein the premises which are the subject of the complaint lie; (2) any municipal agency or official has filed a notice, complaint or order regarding such a violation; (3) the tenant has in good faith requested the landlord to make repairs; (4) the tenant has in good faith instituted an action under subsections (a) to (i), inclusive, of section 47a-14h; or (5) the tenant has organized or become a member of a tenants' union."
General Statutes Sec. 47a-33 provides that "In any action for summary process under this chapter or section 21-80 it shall be an affirmative defense that the plaintiff brought such action solely because the defendant attempted to remedy, by lawful means, including contacting officials of the state or of any town, city, borough or public agency or filing a complaint with a fair rent commission, any condition constituting a violation of any of the provisions of chapter 368o, or of chapter 412, or of any other state statute or regulation or of the housing or health ordinances of the municipality wherein the premises which are the subject of the complaint lie. The obligation on the part of the defendant to pay rent or the reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the premises which are the subject of any such action shall not be abrogated or diminished by any provision of this section."
However, General Statutes Sec. 47a-20a(a) provides that "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 47a-20, the landlord may maintain an action to recover possession of the dwelling unit if: (1) The tenant is using the dwelling unit for an illegal purpose or for a purpose which is in violation of the rental agreement or for nonpayment of rent; (2) the landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of the dwelling unit for immediate use as his own abode; (3) the condition complained of was caused by the wilful actions of the tenant or another person in his household or a person on the premises with his consent; or (4) the landlord seeks to recover possession on the basis of a notice to terminate a periodic tenancy, which notice was given to the tenant before the tenant's complaint."
This is a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent. Under General Statutes Sec. 47a-20a, "the landlord may maintain an action to recover possession of the dwelling unit if: (1) The tenant is using the dwelling unit for an illegal purpose or for a purpose which is in violation of the rental agreement or for nonpayment of rent . . ." (Emphasis added). In this summary process action based solely on nonpayment of rent, the Tenant is not entitled to raise retaliatory action as an affirmative defense. Furthermore, the Tenant did not contact the Southington Health Department until January 12, 2006, almost three months after the notice to quit was served (October 27, 2005). Accordingly the court finds that the Tenant has failed to prove this defense by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
Lockout (Entry and Detainer)
The Tenant alleges in his answer that "My landlord broke agreement on the lease and several off the shutout laws on numerous occasions." During the trial the Tenant contended that he was locked out and thereby relieved of the obligation to pay rent.
General Statute Sec. 47a-43 provides that "(a) When any person (1) makes forcible entry into any land, tenement or dwelling unit and with a strong hand detains the same, or (2) having made a peaceable entry, without the consent of the actual possessor, holds and detains the same with force and strong hand, or (3) enters into any land, tenement or dwelling unit and causes damage to the premises or damage to or removal of or detention of the personal property of the possessor, or (4) when the party put out of possession would be required to cause damage to the premises or commit a breach of the peace in order to regain possession, the party thus ejected, held out of possession, or suffering damage may exhibit his complaint to any judge of the Superior Court. (b) Such judge shall forthwith issue a summons to the party complained of, directed to some proper officer, to notify him to appear at a specified time and place, within eight days from the exhibition of such complaint, in the superior court for the judicial district wherein the injury complained of was done, to answer to the matters contained in the complaint. (c) Such summons shall be served upon the party complained of six days inclusive before the day appointed for trial. (d) If, after service of such summons, the party complained of does not appear and defend, the judge shall proceed in the same manner as if he were present."
General Statute Sec. 47a-43 provides for a separate procedure for a tenant to petition the court for relief from an illegal lockout. The Tenant never filed an Entry and Detainer action pursuant to General Statutes Sec. 47a-43. Moreover, the court is unable to find any legal authority for the Tenant's proposition that lockout is a defense to a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent. Accordingly, the court finds that the Tenant has failed to prove this defense by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
VERIFIED LOCKOUT COMPLAINT AND APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION JD-HM-24 Rev. 5-2000.
Equitable Doctrine against Forfeiture
The Tenant claims that he was mistreated by the Landlord because the Landlord was trying to make living there so unpleasant that the Tenant would leave.
"Equitable defenses and counterclaims implicating the right to possession are available in summary process actions . . . Fellows v. Martin, 217 Conn. 57, 64-67, 584 A.2d 458 (1991) . . . Equitable principles barring forfeitures may apply to summary process actions for nonpayment of rent if: (1) the tenant's breach was not wilful or grossly negligent; (2) upon eviction the tenant will suffer a loss wholly disproportionate to the injury to the landlord; and (3) the landlord's injury is reparable." Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 225 Conn. 771, 771-78, 627 A.2d 386 (1993); East Hartford Housing Authority v. Parker, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No, SPH 9111-63027 (Holzberg, J.; August 7, 1992) ( 1992 Ct.Sup. 8735) [ 7 Conn. L. Rptr. 422].
In East Hartford Housing Authority v. Parker, the court set forth an analytic framework to evaluate equitable claims consisting of four elements: 1) In the absence of equitable relief, the defendant will suffer a loss wholly disproportionate to the landlord; 2) The injury to the plaintiff is reparable; 3) The reason for the nonpayment and the defendant's responsibility; 4) The extent to which the tenant has demonstrated good faith in its dealing with the plaintiff. East Hartford Housing Authority v. Parker, supra, 1992 Ct.Sup. 8739-40. "The first factor, as stated in Fellows, is whether the loss to be suffered by the tenant, if evicted, is disproportionate to the loss to the landlord if the tenant is not evicted. This requires, therefore, that the hardship to each party be identified and that one be balanced against the other. Only if the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the tenant should equitable relief be considered. The second factor is whether the injury to the other party is reparable. The Fellows court noted that this involves consideration of whether the landlord's injury can be remedied by money instead of forfeiture of the tenancy. The third factor, not always analytically distinct from the others, is the reason for the nonpayment and the extent to which the tenant is "culpable." Often expressed as the "clean hands doctrine," this factor evaluates whether the tenant's breach was willful or grossly negligent, on the one hand, or the product of mere neglect, on the other . . . Finally, the fourth factor identified by the courts is the extent to which the tenant has demonstrated good faith in curing the default. [T]he conduct of the plaintiff after he was informed of the non-payment is conclusive of the good faith of the plaintiff . . . and his desire to avoid a forfeiture." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) East Hartford Housing Authority v. Parker, supra, 1992 Ct.Sup. 8739-40.
In evaluating the issue of clean hands the court must consider "the equitable maxim that one who seeks to show that he is entitled to the benefit of equity must demonstrate that he comes to court with clean hands." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 193, 201, 438 A.2d 55 (1980). "[T]he clean hands doctrine . . . is a legal euphemism which expresses the principle that where a party comes into equity for relief he must show his conduct has been fair, equitable and honest as to the particular controversy in issue." (Citation omitted.) Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 491-92, 234 A.2d 825 (1967). "The trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether the promotion of public policy and the preservation of the courts' integrity dictate that the clean hands doctrine be invoked." (Citation omitted.) Polverari v. Peatt, 29 Conn.App. 191, 202, 614 A.2d 484 (1992). "Application of the doctrine of unclean hands rests within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . The doctrine generally should not be employed to insulate the party who asserts it from the consequences of his own wrongdoing." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) A B Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 189 Conn. 573, 578, 456 A.2d 1187 (1983). The party who seeks to invoke the clean hands doctrine to bar equitable relief must show that his opponent engaged in willful misconduct with regard to the matter in litigation. DeCecco v. Beach, 174 Conn. 29, 35, 381 A.2d 543 (1977).
The evidence paints a picture of a very troubled and volatile landlord-tenant relationship highlighted by the fact that the Police had to be dispatched to the premises nine times between July 2005 and October 2005 to investigate landlord/tenant disputes. Neither the Tenant or the Landlord comes to court with totally clean hands. Although the Landlord basically complied with his responsibilities under General Statutes Sec. 47a-7, the Landlord's behavior toward the Tenant was far from ideal. He failed to treat the Tenant with respect and did not appreciate the Tenant's desire for privacy. On the other hand, the Tenant's behavior came close to violating his responsibilities under General Statutes Sec. 47a-11. The Tenant failed to consider the Landlord's concerns regarding the Tenant's excessive use of the utilities.
In terms of the nonpayment of rent, the Tenant has not paid any rent for several months. There is a substantial arrearage. The Tenant has not expressed a willingness to pay the full arrearage. The court finds that the Tenant's breach is willful, the delay is not slight, and the loss to the Landlord is not all. Based on the evidence presented, the court finds the equitable considerations do not decidedly favor the Tenant. Under the circumstances of this case invocation of the equitable doctrine against forfeiture is not appropriate to bar the Landlord's request for immediate possession.
CONCLUSION
The court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence that the Landlord has proved all the elements of the summary process action, and the Tenant has failed to prove any defenses. Having considered the law and equity, judgment may enter for the Landlord.