Troupe v. Cintas Corporation

Full title: DONALD W. TROUPE, Plaintiff, v. CINTAS CORPORATION, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Date published: Jul 31, 2000

Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-0193-M (N.D. Tex. Jul. 31, 2000)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-0193-M.

July 31, 2000.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BARBARA M.G. LYNN, U.S. District Judge

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant, Cintas Corporation ("Cintas"). For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is a disability discrimination case, brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq., and the Texas Labor Code, § 21.001 et seq. The Plaintiff, Donald W. Troupe ("Troupe"), claims that Cintas violated his constitutional rights by discriminating against him due to his disability. Troupe was terminated by Cintas on December 4, 1997. Troupe filed a charge of discrimination on April 2, 1998, and subsequently initiated this lawsuit. Presently before the Court is Cintas' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 25, 2000, properly supported by evidence. Troupe has failed to respond.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Cintas is not automatically entited to summary judgment as a result of Troupe's failure to respond. John v. State of Louisiana (Board of Trustees for State Colleges Universities), 757 F.2d 698, 707-08 (5^th Cir. 1985). If Cintas fails to discharge its initial burden, Troupe has no obligation to respond at all. Id. at 708. However, if Cintas meets its burden under FED. R. Civ. P. 56, Troupe cannot survive the motion by resting on mere allegations in his pleadings. Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 199 (5^th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988). Although the Court is not permitted to enter a default summary judgment by virtue of Troupe's failure to respond, it may accept as undisputed the facts described in support of Cintas' Motion. Everslay v. Mbank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5^th Cir. 1988). Once Cintas meets its Rule 56 burden, summary judgment is appropriate if Troupe (as the non-movant) fails to set forth specific facts, by affidavits or otherwise, showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Topalian v. Everman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5^th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992); see also Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5^th Cir. 1994) ( en banc) (once movant for summary judgment meets burden imposed by Rule 56, non-movant must go beyond pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial).

On the basis of the submissions from Cintas, and Troupe's failure to designate specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial, the Court is persuaded that Cintas is entitled to summary judgment and that Troupe should take nothing from Cintas on the claims in this case.

III. UNDISPUTED FACTS

The following is an abbreviated version of the undisputed facts before the Court. Cintas hired Troupe on March 20, 1997, as a salaried Maintenance Engineer for its facility in Dallas, Texas. During his first few months with Cintas, Troupe was absent several times, causing his supervisors concern. Although they were satisfied with the quality of his work, his supervisors counseled Troupe about his excessive absences, explaining Cintas' expectations concerning attendance and the consequences of Troupe's failure to meet those expectations.

On August 2, 1997, while working on a neighbor's automobile as a "side job" during his spare time, Troupe accidentally stuck a pair of needlenose pliers in his eye. He was hospitalized, underwent surgery and was unable to work until October 13, 1997. During Troupe's 10-week medical leave, Cintas paid him short-term disability benefits.

On October 9, 1997, Troupe's doctors released him to return to work with no restrictions. Upon his return to Cintas, Troupe told no one that he had any restrictions precluding him from working a full 40-hour work week. In fact, he told his supervisors that he could perform his job just as he had before his eye injury and that, although he had limited vision, it would not affect his work.¹

1 Troupe has an implanted contact lens which has improved his vision, and he wears corrective glasses when reading (although he can read without them). Even though his vision is blurry in his left eye at certain distances, he can drive a car, and continues to fix cars and do other side jobs.

Since Troupe needed follow up treatments for his injury, Cintas offered him a flexible work schedule. Specifically, Troupe was given Mondays off, although he would still be required to work 40 hours per week, performed in 10-hour days four times per week. Cintas informed Troupe that if for some reason he could not see his doctor on a Monday, he could take another day off, as long as he made up the time on Saturday or Monday. Troupe not only accepted this modified schedule, but he expressed delight that such a schedule would permit him to schedule odd jobs on Mondays.

However, the record shows that Troupe failed to follow the agreed schedule. In fact, between October 13 (his first day back) and December 4, 1997 (his day of termination), Troupe completely missed nine days of work, and repeatedly failed to work a 40 hour week, as he had agreed to do. On December 4, 1997, after Troupe missed the previous two days, Cintas terminated him for excessive absenteeism.

IV. ANALYSIS

The ADA provides that "no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a). A qualified individual with a disability" is defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." In order to prove a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, Troupe must show the following: (1) he has a disability, (2) he is qualified for the job, and (3) the decision to terminate him was made solely because of his disability. Still v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 120 F.3d 50, 51 (5^th Cir. 1997). Troupe's claim under the Texas Labor Code, §§ 21.001-21.262 (Vernon 1996) is based upon essentially the same standards and methods of proof as the ADA, and thus may be analyzed according to the same principles. Austin State Hosp. v. Kitchen, 903 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ).

The Court concludes that Troupe does not have a "disability" as that term is defined under the ADA. His eye injury does not substantially limit a major life activity, contrary to the claims in his Original Petition.² Major life activities include "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (i). The record before the Court is undisputed that Troupe can care for himself, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, learn and work. In fact, by his own admission, Troupe acknowledged that his injury did not in any way restrict, limit or impede his ability to work. As was recently noted in this district, "an impairment without any evidence that it substantially limits a major life activity is insufficient to bring an employee within the protection of the ADA." Avina v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 1999 WL 288673, at *4 (N.D. Tex. April 30, 1999). Eye problems or dysfunctions that do not limit normal daily activities do not constitute substantial limitations under the ADA. Beaver v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 43 F. Supp.2d 685, 692 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Still, 120 F.3d 50, 51-52 (5^th Cir. 1997) (blindness in one eye). There is absolutely no evidence before the Court that Troupe's injury substantially limited his major life activities. The undisputed evidence is that upon his return to work, Troupe could perform his job functions without any restrictions whatsoever and thus had no disability. Therefore, the Court finds that Troupe has no actionable disability discrimination claim under the ADA or the Texas Labor Code, and that Cintas' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.

2 This case was removed from state court on January 28, 1999.

However, even if the Court were to assume that sufficient evidence presented a fact issue as to whether or not Troupe was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not a "qualified individual" under the ADA. In other words, Plaintiff's prima facie case fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff is not a "qualified individual with a disability" who can, with or without reasonable accommodation, perform the "essential functions" of his employment position. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 (8).

Regular attendance is the most basic element of an employee's duties and is an essential element of most jobs. Amato v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 987 F. Supp. 523, 529 (S.D. Tex. 1997). An employee with a history of unpredictable absences is not otherwise qualified. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 142 F.3d 999, 1003 (7^th Cir. 1998). In other words, an employee who does not come to work cannot perform the essential functions of his job. Creswell v. Deere Co., 1997 WL 667928, at *7 (N.D. Tex. October 21, 1997). It is undisputed that regular attendance is an essential function of Troupe's job as Maintenance Engineer, and that Troupe was unable to perform that essential function. Specifically, no dispute has been raised that of the twenty-six days Troupe was scheduled to work after returning from leave, he missed nine days, and that during that time he worked a full forty-hour week, as required, only twice. During the other weeks, he worked 18.28 hours, 38.09 hours, 0 hours, 18.77 hours (during a shortened Thanksgiving week), and 0 hours. Based on this attendance record, Troupe was not a "qualified individual" who could perform the "essential functions" of his job, with or without accommodation; therefore, his prima facie case fails as a matter of law. Summary judgment is thus appropriate on this issue as well.

Furthermore, even if Troupe were a qualified individual with a disability, Cintas was in full compliance with the ADA by granting Troupe a reasonable accommodation. Troupe never requested such an accommodation, so Cintas was not even under an obligation to provide one. Amato at 532. Nevertheless, the record establishes that, on its own initiative, Cintas accommodated Troupe by modifying his schedule to provide flexibility so he could schedule necessary medical appointments. For this additional reason, summary judgment on the ADA and Texas Labor Code claims is appropriate.

Finally, even assuming that Troupe had established his prima facie case, summary judgment would still be warranted because of the absence of evidence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Cintas' proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination. Cintas has presented evidence that it terminated Plaintiff's employment because of unsatisfactory job performance; specifically, that Troupe failed to show up for work. Under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis, Plaintiff is then required to show that Cintas' nondiscriminatory reason for termination was a pretext, and that the real reason for termination was because of his disability. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Daigle v. Liberty Life Insur. Co., 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5^th Cir. 1995) (applying McDonnell Douglas to ADA claims). Plaintiff wholly failed to present any evidence showing that the real reason for his termination was because of his presumed disability, rather than his consistent failure to work. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate for this reason as well.

The Court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to Plaintiff's claims. Therefore, Cintas is entitled to summary judgment.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment will be entered by separate document.

SO ORDERED.