Opinion
Decided October 14, 1993.
David Fuschman, Trotwood Prosecuting Attorney, for plaintiff.
Michael R. Sampson, pro se.
On August 17, 1993, in Trotwood, Montgomery County, Ohio, defendant Michael R. Sampson received a citation for allegedly violating R.C. 4513.05. If anything, this case emphasizes that while penalties may vary from statute to statute and be relatively minor when compared to another, there is no such thing as a small case or insignificant rights afforded to a defendant.
The relevant part of R.C. 4513.05 reads as follows:
"Either a tail light or a separate light shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate * * * and render it legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear."
The court finds from the evidence at the trial that the defendant separately wired a small purple neon light around his front and rear license plates. This light basked the plate in the glow of the purple neon and was in addition to the standard, factory-produced, white license plate light for the 1989 Pontiac Firebird. The parties agree and the court finds that the registration plate is as legible, if not more so, from a distance of fifty feet to the rear as it is when only illuminated by the white light.
The city argues that the statute requires that the rear registration plate be illuminated with a white light. As justification for such statute, if such justification were needed, the city argues that a purple neon light interferes with the officer's ability to discern the actual colors of the plate and therefore the ability to determine which state issued the plate. The defendant argues that the statute requires a white light illumination and legibility at fifty feet and that his vehicle still has the white light and the registration plate is legible at fifty feet.
The prosecution cites Ohio Adm. Code 4501-15-04(j)(3) and 4501-15-02. Unfortunately, these sections do not help much, since while they seem to require a white light, they do not specifically prohibit additional colors or address a combination of colors. R.C. 4511.01, while defining everything from "explosives" to "ride sharing arrangement," does not, understandably, define such words as "illuminate" or "legible"; neither does Black's Law Dictionary shed any light on these definitions; Webster's defines "illuminate" as "to supply or brighten with light * * * to make clear"; with similar clarity, Webster's defines "legible" as "capable of being read or deciphered." Therefore, substituting the definitions for the exact words, R.C. 4513.05 requires a light which supplies the registration plate with light or which brightens with light the registration plate in such a fashion as to render it readable from fifty feet.
In hearing the evidence and in viewing the plate from fifty feet (which all parties stipulate is the same as it was on the night of the violation), it is obvious that the plate is illuminated and brightened and that it is readable from fifty feet; again, it is in fact brighter and more readable than when the defendant turns off the neon light and the plate is illuminated only with the white light. The remaining question is, "has the license plate been brightened and made legible by the white light or the purple light or both?" While the purple light appears to predominate, it is impossible for this court to determine whether any of the illumination and legibility are caused by the white light as well. Therefore, since it is impossible for the court to say that the registration plate is not being illuminated with a white light, the defendant cannot be found to have violated a statute which requires that the plate be illuminated with a white light.
Another basic principle must be relied upon in this decision. The defendant must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of this traffic offense the same as he would have to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of any criminal offense. In fact, R.C. 4513.99(C) makes a violation of R.C. 4513.05 a minor misdemeanor on the first offense and on the second offense within a year, such a person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree punishable by up to thirty days in jail. According to R.C. 2901.05(D):
"`Reasonable doubt' * * * is a doubt based on reason and common sense. Reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs or depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. `Proof beyond a reasonable doubt' is proof of such character that an ordinary person would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs."
This court simply is not willing to rely and act upon the allegation that at fifty feet this particular license plate is only being illuminated with a non-white light, but rather the court is left with a reasonable doubt and is not "firmly convinced" that at fifty feet the registration plate is legible and illuminated exclusively with a non-white light.
This court is aware of State v. Dailey (July 16, 1993), Montgomery Cty. Court, Area Two, No. 93-TR-1844, unreported, in which the defendant was found guilty of violating R.C. 4513.05. While this court cannot imagine another court to which more deference is due, a violation of this statute may be particularly fact intensive and this court is not aware of the facts before the court in the Dailey decision ( e.g., was there a white light? was the plate legible at fifty feet?, etc.).
The court does not wish to downplay the concern of law enforcement concerning the ability to discern the color of the registration plate. However, controlling the court's discretion in this decision is not what is or is not good public safety policy, but what is required by the law. The statute requires that the plate be legible at fifty feet (which it clearly is) and that it be illuminated with a white light (and the court has found that it is impossible to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the white light is not illuminating the plate); therefore, the defendant is found not guilty.
Judgment for defendant.