Opinion
1 CA-CV 22-0308
02-28-2023
ANANT KUMAR TRIPATI, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. RACHEL H. MITCHELL, Defendant, Appellee.
Anant Kumar Tripati, San Luis Plaintiff/Appellant Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix By Joseph J. Branco, Joseph I. Vigil, Jack L. O'Connor III Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2021-094473 The Honorable Randall H. Warner, Judge
Anant Kumar Tripati, San Luis Plaintiff/Appellant
Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix By Joseph J. Branco, Joseph I. Vigil, Jack L. O'Connor III Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the court, in which Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
WILLIAMS, JUDGE
¶1 Anant Kumar Tripati appeals the superior court's dismissal of his complaint. For the following reasons, we accept special action jurisdiction, but deny relief.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In 1997, Tripati, an inmate at the Arizona Department of Corrections, was designated a vexatious litigant. In 2003, the superior court issued an administrative order requiring Tripati to include two documents with any new cause of action he wished to file: (1) the court's 2003 administrative order, and (2) a proposed form of order for the court's signature. Only then would the court consider "approval for filing [a] new action."
¶3 In 2021, Tripati attempted to file a complaint with the clerk of the court requesting certain things of the Maricopa County Attorney's Office ("MCAO"), including public records. The civil presiding judge wrote to Tripati that, "[b]ecause your document did not include a filing fee or proper request for deferral, the document was not accepted by the Clerk of Court." The judge made no mention of Tripati's vexatious litigant status and stated, "I am returning your original pleading with a signed application for deferral of filing fees, which you may then send to the Clerk of Court for filing." Tripati then re-filed his complaint along with the court-endorsed order deferring his filing fee.
¶4 The MCAO moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Tripati failed to first obtain permission to file the lawsuit. The MCAO then emailed a member of the civil presiding judge's staff asking whether the court meant to give Tripati permission to file the lawsuit when it approved Tripati's deferral of filing fees. The next day, the civil presiding judge issued an order stating that" [t]he letter was not permission by the court under [the administrative order] for Mr. Tripati to file the lawsuit."
¶5 Tripati requested an extension of time to respond to the MCAO's motion to dismiss and filed his response one week later.
¶6 The superior court then issued a second order stating that Tripati's request for an extension of time "is not necessary because [Tripati] has been deemed a vexatious litigant, and did not obtain permission from the Civil Presiding Judge to file this lawsuit before filing it." The court granted the MCAO's motion to dismiss. Tripati appealed.
¶7 Because the superior court's dismissal order was not issued with prejudice, it is not a final judgment that bars Tripati from refiling his claim and is therefore not appealable. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A); cf. Workman v. Verde Wellness Ctr., Inc., 240 Ariz. 597, 600, ¶ 7 (App. 2016) (explaining a dismissal without prejudice is not appealable because "plaintiff can refile the action"). In the exercise of our discretion, we treat Tripati's appeal as a petition for special action and accept special action jurisdiction. State v. Perez, 172 Ariz. 290, 292-93 (App. 1992).
DISCUSSION
¶8 We review the dismissal of a complaint de novo, BLK III, LLC v. Skelton, 252 Ariz. 583, 586, ¶ 6 (App. 2022), and the superior court's findings of fact for clear error, Ariz. Bd. of Regents v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 167 Ariz. 254, 257 (1991).
¶9 "Arizona courts possess inherent authority to curtail a vexatious litigant's ability to initiate additional lawsuits." Madison v. Groseth, 230 Ariz. 8, 14, ¶ 17 (App. 2012). Courts typically exercise that authority through administrative orders declaring someone a vexatious litigant and placing conditions on future filings. Id. at 13, ¶ 16 n.8.
¶10 Tripati contends the superior court erred by dismissing his case. We disagree. First, though the court deferred Tripati's filing fees, it never expressly gave him permission to bring a new cause of action, nor did it recognize his status as a vexatious litigant when it deferred filing fees. Second, as stated, supra ¶ 2, with any new filing, Tripati was required to include both (1) the 2003 administrative order, and (2) a proposed form of order for the court's signature authorizing Tripati to file a new cause of action. Tripati did neither. Third, the court issued an order stating that the court's fee deferral letter was not permission for Tripati to file his complaint. On this record, Tripati has failed to show he obtained permission to file his new cause of action. See Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 167 Ariz. at 257 (1991). The court had authority to dismiss Tripati's case for lack of permission to file it. See Madison, 230 Ariz. at 14, ¶ 17.
¶ 11 Tripati also contends that the court's order was improper because it was issued "by and through ex parte contact," after the MCAO emailed the civil presiding judge's staff directly. See Canon 2, Ariz. Code of Jud. Conduct, Rule 2.9. Tripati goes no further in developing his argument, nor does he provide controlling legal authority for his argued remedy. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A) (requiring arguments on appeal to contain "supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities . . . on which appellant relies"); In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64-65, ¶ 6 (2013) (holding that arguments on appeal are waived if they are not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or legal authority). Under Tripati's reasoning, the court's letter and pre-endorsed order deferring filing fees for his benefit must also have been ex parte communication and, thus, an improper order. We reject Tripati's argument.
¶ 12 Finally, Tripati argues that the superior court erred by not granting his motion to extend time to file his response to the MCAO's motion to dismiss. But the court dismissed Tripati's complaint solely on the basis of his failure to first obtain permission to file it, an exercise of the court's inherent authority. See Madison, 230 Ariz. at 14, ¶ 17. The court was not obligated to consider Tripati's untimely response.
CONCLUSION
¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we accept special action jurisdiction, but deny relief.