Opinion
No. 1:97-CV-234-B-D
October 30, 1998
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause comes before the court upon the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Upon due consideration of the parties' memoranda and exhibits, the court is ready to rule.
FACTS
The plaintiff, a black female, served as director of the Okolona Vo-Tech Complex from 1995-1997 (two school years). She has a master's degree and holds AA certification from the State of Mississippi in the areas of Administration and as a Vo-Tech Director.
The defendant Gerald Hegan, a white male, holds a master's degree and AA certification, presumably in Administration. He was appointed superintendent of the Okolona School District in August of 1996 by a three-two vote of the school board. The board's vote was split along racial lines. The outgoing superintendent had recommended Larry Dantzler for the job of superintendent. Dantzler, a black male, was the assistant superintendent at the time. According to the plaintiff, Dantzler had more experience and was more qualified for the job than Hegan.
The plaintiff received her first evaluation from the defendant Hegan on February 5, 1997. On February 10, 1997, the defendant Hegan went to the school board and recommended that the plaintiff's contract of employment not be renewed. Pursuant to the School Employment Procedures Act ("SEPA"), the plaintiff requested a list of reasons for her non-renewal and a hearing. The hearing was held on April 10 and 14, 1997, before a local attorney, Michael Malski. The plaintiff was allowed to put on evidence and cross-examine the district's witnesses. Upon agreement of the parties, Malski kept the record open for 15 working days. The plaintiff thus asserts that the hearing was concluded on May 5, 1997. The defendants assert that the hearing concluded on May 30, 1997, the date Malski submitted a Report and Recommendation to the school board recommending that the non-renewal be upheld. After oral argument before the school board on June 23, 1997, the board voted to accept the Report and Recommendation. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit for racial discrimination, violation of her First Amendment right to free speech, violation of due process, violation of the School Employment Procedures Act, violation of the defendants' personnel appraisal process, and violation of established policies, practices, and procedures of the school district.
LAW
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 275 (1986) ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case"). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 91 L. Ed.2d at 274. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 91 L. Ed.2d at 273. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986).
To present a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff may show: (1) that she was a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the position held; (3) that she was subject to an adverse employment decision; and (4) that she was replaced by someone outside of the subject classification. Meinecke v. HR Block, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995); Marks v. Prattco, Inc., 607 F.2d 1153, 1155 (5th Cir. 1979). A plaintiff may always present a prima facie case by offering direct evidence of discrimination, in which case the four-part test developed for circumstantial evidence is unnecessary. Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (5th Cir. 1982). Once the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action.McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 802-805, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 677-679 (1973). If the defendant is able to do so, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the defendant's articulated reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.Id.
The court will assume, for purposes of this motion for summary judgment, that the plaintiff has made the initial prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas. The defendants have cited seven areas in which the plaintiff's job performance was deficient, each of which provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the defendants' failure to renew the plaintiff's employment contract. The burden thus shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendants' articulated reasons are merely a pretext for discrimination.
The plaintiff makes three arguments in her attempt to establish that the defendants' articulated reasons are merely a pretext for discrimination. First, the plaintiff asserts that Hegan's appointment to the position of superintendent was tainted with racial discrimination. However, the plaintiff was not a candidate for the position of superintendent. Any racial bias in the selection of Hegan has no application to the plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination in the non-renewal of her contract as director of the Okolona Vo-Tech Complex. Second, the plaintiff asserts that the "cleaning house" approach of Hegan had a disparate impact on black administrators. However, the court finds that the disparate impact analysis is inappropriate in this type of case involving alleged individual discrimination. The disparate impact analysis would be more appropriate in a situation where the school district's racially neutral employment requirements had a disparate impact on the number of blacks who were qualified for positions.
Apparently, all of the top administrators in the Okolona School District were let go after the 1997 school year, including the principals at Okolona High School and Okolona Elementary School and the director of the Okolona Vo-Tech Complex.
Finally, the plaintiff asserts that an incident involving a post card sent from Hegan to Jerome Smith, the principal of Okolona High School whose contract of employment was likewise not renewed, presents direct evidence of a discriminatory bias. A few months after Hegan had recommended that the plaintiff's contract not be renewed, Hegan received a post card with a picture of a smiling monkey, wearing a graduation cap, and the caption "WHAT? You've NEVER been to Harvard?" On the flip side of the card were the words "Ha. Ha. But we have." The defendant Hegan believed that the card had been sent from Smith and Dan Rupert, who were apparently in Boston at the time. Rupert, a white male, was the principal of Okolona Elementary School, and his contract, like that of the plaintiff and Smith, had not been renewed for the coming year. Hegan testified that he took the card as a joke, as did the office employees, who were laughing and teasing him about the card. In response, he wrote the words "I recognized you immediately! Glad you're looking so happy and rested." below the picture of the monkey. Hegan left the card on his desk and his secretary, of her own accord, sent a copy of the card with the added words to both Smith and Rupert. The plaintiff contends that the words written by the defendant Hegan show discriminatory animus towards members of the black race. However, the court finds that the post card is not sufficient to establish either a prima facie case of racial discrimination or that the articulated reasons for the non-renewal of the plaintiff's contract are really a pretext for discrimination. All of the evidence indicates that the words were written merely as a joke, towards both a black and a white administrator, with no offense intended. A copy of the card was mailed by the secretary to both Smith and Rupert. Furthermore, all of this took place long after Hegan had made the decision to not renew the plaintiff's contract. Accordingly, considering all of the evidence before the court, the court finds that the incident with the post card is insufficient to allow the plaintiff to survive summary judgment on the issue of racial discrimination.
Neither party provides an exact date for the post card incident and the postmark on the copy of the envelope sent to Jerome Smith is illegible, but the defendant Hegan indicates in his deposition that the post card incident occurred in July of 1997.
The court is unsure whether these words were printed by the creator of the card or written by the sender, as the flip side of the card was not submitted as an exhibit.
The plaintiff questions the extent of defendant Hegan's involvement in mailing the card. However, both Hegan and his secretary have stated under oath that the secretary mailed the card of her own accord and the plaintiff has provided no evidence to the contrary.
The court likewise finds that the plaintiff cannot establish a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. SEPA provides limited due process rights to certified public school district employees. SEPA requires the school district to furnish written notice of the reasons for non-renewal of an employment contract and an opportunity for a post-non-renewal hearing before a fair and impartial board or hearing officer. Housley v. North Panola Consol. Sch. Dist., 656 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (N.D. Miss. 1987); DeSoto County Sch. Bd. V. Garrett, 508 So.2d 1091, 1093 (Miss. 1987). The evidence is undisputed that the plaintiff received both notice of the reasons for her non-renewal and a hearing before an impartial hearing officer where the plaintiff was permitted to present evidence and witnesses in her behalf, as well as cross-examine witnesses presented by the school district. Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff has failed to establish any violation of her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The plaintiff further contends that the defendants violated SEPA by not notifying her of the board's decision within 30 days of the conclusion of the hearing. Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-111(4). The plaintiff asserts that the hearing provided pursuant to the provisions of SEPA concluded on May 5 and that she was not notified of the board's final decision until June 26, over 30 days later. However, the decision to hold oral argument before the board on June 23 was made after consulting with plaintiff's counsel, who agreed to the date without raising an objection as to the 30-day requirement. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing before the board and no objection was made at that time as to the running of the 30-day period. The court finds that the plaintiff's failure to raise the 30-day issue when scheduling the oral argument or during the oral argument precludes the plaintiff from asserting a violation of the statute now. Furthermore, even if the defendants have committed a technical violation of the statute, so long as there was a substantial and manifestly good faith attempt by the board to comply with the Act and the employee was represented by counsel, procedural defects will not render the board's actions unlawful. See Cox v. Thomas. 403 So.2d 135, 137-138 (Miss. 1981). For that reason as well, the court finds that there has been no violation of the statute.
To establish a prima facie claim of a violation of the plaintiff's First Amendment rights, the plaintiff must show that her conduct is constitutionally protected and that it was a substantial or motivating factor in the school district's decision not to renew her contract.Day v. South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 768 F.2d 696, 700 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986); Lindsey v. Mississippi Research and Dev. Ctr., 652 F.2d 488, 492 (5th Cir. Unit A, Aug. 1981). Although the plaintiff asserts a First Amendment cause of action in her complaint, she has made no allegation that she engaged in any constitutionally protected conduct. The plaintiff does not even address the First Amendment issue in her response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, without any argument or evidence presented by the plaintiff in support of her First Amendment claim, the court finds that it should be dismissed.
Finally, the plaintiff contends that the defendants violated the established policies, practices, and procedures of the school district in one or more ways, including not following the exact letter of the school district's personnel appraisal process. The court finds that the plaintiff has failed to cite any authority for such a cause of action against the school district, and therefore the plaintiff's claims for violation of various school policies should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted. An order will issue accordingly.