Treen v. Boston Elevated Railway

Full title: DAISY B. TREEN vs. BOSTON ELEVATED RAILWAY COMPANY

Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk

Date published: Nov 23, 1925

149 N.E. 625 (Mass. 1925)

149 N.E. 625

Opinion

November 20, 1925.

November 23, 1925.

Present: RUGG, C.J., BRALEY, PIERCE, WAIT, SANDERSON, JJ.

Way, Public: reserved space for street railway. Negligence, Street railway, License.

One walking on the "reserved space" in Huntington Avenue in Boston, where there was neither a break nor a crosswalk, toward a white post with the purpose there to become a passenger of the street railway company for whose occupancy and use the space was reserved by St. 1894, c. 324, cannot recover in an action against the street railway company for personal injuries not caused by wanton or reckless conduct on the part of the defendant or of its employees.

TORT for personal injuries received when the plaintiff was run into by a street car of the defendant on Huntington Avenue in Boston. Writ dated May 10, 1919.

In the Superior Court, the action was tried before Lawton, J. Material evidence is described in the opinion. At the close of the evidence, the defendant moved that a verdict be ordered in its favor. The motion was denied. The jury found for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,975. The defendant alleged exceptions.

R.L. Mapplebeck, for the defendant.

J.D. Graham, ( A.M. Graham with him,) for the plaintiff.

RUGG, C.J.

There was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff, while walking on the "reserved space" in Huntington Avenue in Boston, where there was neither a break nor cross walk, toward a white post with the purpose there to become a passenger of the defendant, was struck by one of the defendant's cars and injured. When Huntington Avenue was laid out, this space was specially reserved under St. 1894, c. 324, for street railway track location. The case at bar is governed by Crowell v. Boston Elevated Railway, 234 Mass. 393, where it was held that, under similar circumstances, the traveller was at most a bare licensee as to the defendant, which owed her no duty except to refrain from wanton or reckless conduct. The differences between that case and the present one are immaterial and do not call for the application of a different principle.

Exceptions sustained.