Summary
In Travillion v. Heartland Pork Enterprises, Inc., No. 02-1429, WL 21464807 (Iowa Ct.App. June 25, 2003), the appellate court held that only the employer, not the supervisory employee, could be held liable in a suit for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
Summary of this case from Tiengkham v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.Opinion
No. 3-151 / 02-1429.
Filed June 25, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Davis County, Annette J. Scieszinski, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of his wrongful termination claims against defendants. AFFIRMED.
Richard C. Bauerle of Orsborn, Bauerle, Milani Grothe, L.L.P., Ottumwa, and R. Kurt Swaim of Swaim Law Office, Bloomfield, for appellant.
Rebecca Boyd Dublinske of Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee Adrian Starbuck.
Kathryn Atkinson Overberg and Mary E. Funk of Nyemaster, Goode, Voigts, West, Hansell O'Brien, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee Heartland Pork Enterprises, Inc.
Heard by Zimmer, P. J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Rodney Travillion appeals from the district court order dismissing his wrongful termination claim against his supervisor, Adrian Starbuck. He also contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of his employer, Heartland Pork Enterprises, Inc., on his claims he was wrongfully discharged in violation of the employee handbook and wrongfully discharged because of absenteeism due to a workers' compensation injury. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Rodney Travillion began working for Heartland Pork Enterprises, Inc. (Heartland) in Sessions Nursery on July 13, 2000. Upon receiving the employee handbook, Travillion signed a document titled "Acknowledgment of Receipt," which states in pertinent part, "I also realize the employment relationship between the company and me is terminable at will. . . ." The employee handbook states that an employee who is absent three consecutive work days without notifying their supervisor for the reason for the absence will be considered to be resigned.
Travillion suffered an injury at work on October 1, 2000, which he reported to his supervisor, Adrian Starbuck, on October 2. An injury report was completed and Travillion was treated by a physician. Travillion was returned to work at the nursery with restricted use of his left arm. When Travillion received additional restrictions that prohibited him from performing his duties at the nursery, Starbuck arranged for Travillion to perform work within his restrictions at the Heartland office in Bloomfield.
The parties have differing views of the events that transpired next. Travillion alleges that while meeting with Starbuck on October 18, Starbuck became irritated and told Travillion he was no help. Travillion further alleges Starbuck told him he wished Travillion was not there because he could not perform his work. Starbuck then granted Travillion three days off work without leave for October 19, 20 and 23. Travillion alleges he called Starbuck on the morning of October 23 to request October 24, 25, and 26 off. Travillion claims Starbuck granted him the leave because he could not do work anyway. However, Starbuck documented Travillion as "no call no show" on October 24. Travillion contends he called Starbuck on October 26 to inform him he had been in Kansas City visiting a sick great aunt and that he would be back to work the following day. Travillion claims Starbuck told him he had not asked for the days off and he had to let Travillion go under the three-day "no call no show" policy set forth in the employee handbook.
Starbuck contends that on October 18, Travillion requested leave for October 19 and 20, which Starbuck granted. Starbuck claims that Travillion called him on October 23 to ask for one more day of leave, which Starbuck granted without pay. Starbuck alleges Travillion never asked for additional time off. Travillion did not come to work on October 24 or 25. When Travillion did not show or call on October 26, Starbuck filled out a termination paper.
On June 28, 2001, Travillion filed a petition alleging Heartland and Starbuck wrongfully terminated him in violation of public policy because he exercised his right to workers' compensation, and that Heartland had acted in bad-faith in denying his workers' compensation benefits. Starbuck filed a motion to dismiss the claim against him, which the district court granted on September 21, 2001. Travillion dismissed with prejudice the second claim made only against Heartland on May 6, 2002.
On June 26, 2002, Heartland filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to Travillion's wrongful discharge claim. Travillion filed his resistance to the motion on July 18. On July 22, Travillion filed an amended petition, adding one count to allege Heartland terminated him because of absenteeism due to work related injuries that were not unduly unreasonable or unreasonably disruptive to Heartland's business, and therefore the termination was in violation of public policy. On July 25, Travillion filed a second amended petition, which added a claim that Heartland terminated him contrary to the employee handbook. On July 23, Heartland filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment with respect to the two new claims. Travillion filed a resistance to Heartland's supplemental motion for summary judgment. On August 23, the district court granted Heartland summary judgment on all three of Travillion's claims.
II. Motion to Dismiss. Travillion first contends the district court erred in dismissing his wrongful discharge claim against Starbuck.
We review a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for errors at law. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). Although we are not bound by the district court's legal conclusions, we are bound by the court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. Id.
Starbuck filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.421( f). We will affirm the dismissal of the claim only if the petition shows no right of recovery under any state of the facts. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 442 (Iowa 2002). In reviewing the trial court's grant of Starbuck's motion to dismiss, we consider the allegations in the petition in the light most favorable to Travillion. See id.
Our supreme court has recognized that an employee may bring a cause of action against an employer for wrongful discharge due to the filing of a workers' compensation claim. Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1990). Iowa Code section 85.18 (1999) states, "No contract, rule, or device whatsoever shall operate to relieve the employer, in whole or in part, from any liability created by this chapter except as herein provided." This section is a clear expression that the public policy of this state is that an employee's right to seek the compensation which is granted for work-related injuries should not be interfered with regardless of the terms of the contract of hire. Springer v. Weeks Leo Co., Inc., 475 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Iowa 1991). An employer who discharges an employee to avoid paying workers' compensation benefits violates the public policy behind section 85.18. See Hanna v. Fleetguard, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1110, 1119 (N.D.Iowa 1995).
Travillion asserts the district court erred in concluding a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy due to filing a workers' compensation claim could only be brought against an employer and not a supervisor. He concedes there is no Iowa case law supporting his claim. Because Iowa Code chapter 85 applies only to employers, Iowa Code § 85.1A, we agree with the district court's conclusion. We affirm the district court's order granting Starbuck's motion to dismiss.
III. Summary Judgment. Travillion next contends the district court erred in granting Heartland's motion for summary judgment to dismiss his claims he was wrongfully terminated in violation of the employee handbook and because of absenteeism due to a workers' compensation injury.
We review rulings on motions for summary judgment for errors at law. Sain v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 626 N.W.2d 115, 121 (Iowa 2001). The record before the district court is reviewed to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact existed and whether the district court correctly applied the law. Id. We review the facts in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion. McIlravy v. North River Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Iowa 2002). The resisting party has the burden of showing a material issue of fact is in dispute. Id. A. Count V of Travillion's second amended petition, titled "Bad Faith Termination of Employment," alleges he was terminated in violation of Heartland's employee handbook. The district court granted Heartland's motion for summary judgment, concluding Travillion was an at-will employee.
In Iowa, employment relationships are presumed to be at will. Jones v. Lake Park Care Center, Inc., 569 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Iowa 1997). As a general rule, if no employment contract exists, either party may terminate the relationship for any lawful reason at any time. Id. at 374-75. One exception to this rule exists when an implied contract of employment is created by a handbook or employee policy manual guaranteeing that discharge will occur only under certain circumstances. Id. at 375.
An employee handbook creates an implied contract if: (1) the handbook is sufficiently definite in its terms to create an offer, (2) it is communicated to and accepted by the employee so as to create an acceptance; and (3) the employee provides consideration. Id. A disclaimer can prevent the formation of a contract by clarifying the intent of the employer not to make an offer. Anderson v. Douglas Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Iowa 1995).
In determining whether a disclaimer prevents the formation of a contract we simply examine the language and context of the disclaimer to decide whether a reasonable employee would understand it to mean that the employer has not assented to be bound by the handbook's provisions. Id. at 288.
Similar to our consideration of handbook language in general, we believe two factors guide our inquiry. First, is the disclaimer clear in its terms: does the disclaimer state that the handbook does not create any rights, or does not alter the at-will employment status? Second, is the coverage of the disclaimer unambiguous: what is the scope of its applicability?
Id.
Travillion received and signed a document acknowledging he had received the employee handbook. The document states in pertinent part:
I understand that the handbook is not an employment contract, but it is an explanation of Company policies. The Company has not solicited my assent or agreement to the policies and procedures set forth in this handbook, and my employment is not in consideration of or in return for my being bound by this handbook. I realize that the Company may interpret, clarify, revise, and/or deviate from the procedures set forth in this handbook.
I also realize the employment relationship between the company and me is terminable at will by either party and that nothing in this handbook creates additional rights or provides a basis for me to believe my employment is not terminable at will.
This disclaimer is clear and unambiguous. From this disclaimer, a reasonable employee would understand that the employer has not assented to be bound by the handbook's provisions. The handbook does not create an offer. As an at-will employee, Travillion could be terminated for any lawful reason. Accordingly, the district court properly granted Heartland's motion for summary judgment.
B. In Count IV of his petition, Travillion alleges he was wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy for absenteeism due to a workers' compensation injury. The district court granted Heartland's motion for summary judgment on this claim because it is not a recognized cause of action in Iowa, and because there is no connection between Travillion's work-related injury and his termination.
In Weinzetl v. Ruan Single Source Transportation Co., 587 N.W.2d 809, 812-13 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998), this court held it is not a violation of Iowa public policy to terminate the employment of an employee for absenteeism due to work-related injuries. Travillion attempts to distinguish the facts of his case from the Weinzetl holding because Weinzetl dealt with a plaintiff who had been absent for a prolonged period of time. Regardless, we conclude, as did the district court, that Travillion's absence is not connected to his work-related injury. In his deposition, Travillion stated he had taken time off because he did not enjoy the work he was assigned to perform while on restricted duty. He also stated he took time off to attend his great aunt's funeral. There is no evidence to show Travillion was unable to go to work because of his work-related injury. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Travillion's claim.