Opinion
Case No. 03-3335-JAR.
November 22, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, who is pro se, brings this action seeking $1.5 million in actual damages and an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive damages for "Intentional [I]nfliction of Physical and Emotional Duress" alleging that defendants conspired and violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in the course of arresting him on August 13, 2002. This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 40.) Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, defendants' summary judgment motion is granted.
(Doc. 1 at 13.)
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
There are two statutory bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction. First, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal district courts have original jurisdiction of civil actions where complete diversity of citizenship and an amount in excess of $75,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) in controversy exist. Second, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts "have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States," or federal question jurisdiction. In addition, if the Court has federal question or diversity jurisdiction of some claims, it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.
The Tenth Circuit has commented on the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and summarized the duties of the district court in considering whether it has jurisdiction to consider a case:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedures [sic] direct that "whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.". . . Moreover, "[a] court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.". . . Nor may lack of jurisdiction be waived or jurisdiction be conferred by "consent, inaction or stipulation." Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against our jurisdiction, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. Plaintiff is responsible for showing the court by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction is proper. Mere allegations of jurisdiction are not enough.
Penteco Corp. v. Union Gas System, 929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 797 (10th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 798.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The requirement of a "genuine" issue of fact means that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Id. at 251-52.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. This burden may be met by showing that there is a lack of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact left for trial. "A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Therefore, the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. The court must consider the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
Id.
Id.
Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).
Defendants filed their summary judgment motion on October 12, 2005. Plaintiff's response to the summary judgment motion was due twenty-three days later, on November 4, 2005. On November 17, 2005, plaintiff filed an untimely response, which was dated November 14, 2005. The District of Kansas Local Rules provide that a party's failure to file a timely response constitutes a waiver of the right to file a response, except upon a showing of excusable neglect. Plaintiff has not attempted to make this showing. He never asked this Court for an extension of time to file. Moreover, his response does not even acknowledge that he failed to file timely. Nevertheless, the Court will consider plaintiff's response in analyzing defendant's summary judgment.
D. Kan. R. 6.1(d)(2).
D. Kan. R. 7.4.
III. Pro se Litigant Standard
In a pro se case, the pro se litigant's pleadings are to be liberally construed and are held to a less stringent standard. This rule requires the Court to look beyond a failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, and poor syntax or sentence construction. The Court is not authorized to become the advocate for the pro se litigant. "Despite the liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings, the court will not construct arguments or theories for the plaintiff in the absence of any discussion of those issues." Moreover, plaintiffs are not excused from compliance with fundamental rules of procedure because they are proceeding pro se. Pro se litigants must follow rules of procedure, including local rules. Plaintiff's pro se status, in and of itself, does not prevent this Court from granting summary judgment.
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1110.
Id.
Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991).
Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1090 (1995).
Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 940 (1993); Campbell v. Meredith Corp., 260 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1097 n. 10 (D. Kan. 2003).
Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1992).
IV. Uncontroverted Facts
Plaintiff was convicted and sentenced for conspiracy to commit securities fraud in the District of Nevada. He was instructed to self-surrender to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facility in Leavenworth, Kansas on August 8, 2002. Plaintiff failed to self-surrender. On the following day, August 9, 2002, the BOP advised the United States Marshals Service (USMS) in the District of Nevada, of plaintiff's failure to surrender.
On August 13, 2002, Defendant Diliberti, a deputy marshal for the USMS in Nevada, telephoned plaintiff's father and requested that he have plaintiff contact Diliberti. Almost immediately, plaintiff telephoned Diliberti, explaining that he was hiring a new lawyer and would be filing for a new court date. Diliberti informed plaintiff that he was subject to arrest, for his name had been entered in the National Crime Information Center as a wanted felon. Diliberti advised plaintiff to call the sentencing judge in the District of Nevada in order to resolve any issue about self-surrender. Plaintiff confirmed for Diliberti plaintiff's telephone number and address in Topeka, Kansas.
Diliberti then called Judge Pro, the sentencing judge in Nevada, learning that plaintiff had called the judge's office. But, Judge Pro advised Diliberti that Judge Pro was not going to grant plaintiff another extension of time to self-surrender. Judge Pro verbally instructed Diliberti to arrest plaintiff, and Judge Pro informed Diliberti that an arrest warrant would be issued that day. Diliberti then spoke with an Assistant United States Attorney in Nevada, who assured Diliberti that he would immediately file for a federal arrest warrant; this prosecutor also advised Diliberti that he could arrest plaintiff on the basis of the Judgment and Commitment Order previously filed with the court.
Diliberti then telephoned Defendant Beam, a USMS deputy marshal in Kansas, who leads a task force that searches for fugitives. Diliberti advised Beam that he had spoken with plaintiff, that plaintiff was located in Kansas, that plaintiff had failed to surrender to serve his sentence, that the sentencing judge had ordered that he be arrested and that the judge would be signing an arrest warrant that very day, August 13, 2002. In fact, after this phone call, Diliberti was the affiant on the Complaint filed in the United States District Court in Nevada, alleging that plaintiff was in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2), Failure to Surrender for Service of Sentence.
Based on what Diliberti had told him, Beam relayed the information to defendant Schuster; and Schuster went to plaintiff's residence in Topeka. As he stood outside plaintiff's residence, Schuster made a cellular phone call to plaintiff's residential phone. No one answered. Several times Schuster knocked on the door of the residence. No one responded. Schuster commenced surveilling the residence.
Some time later that day, plaintiff telephoned Beam, advising that plaintiff's wife had told him that the USMS had been at his home earlier that day. This, of course, indicated that plaintiff's wife had been home when Schuster had knocked and called the residence earlier that day. Beam told plaintiff that the USMS was there to take plaintiff into custody because he had failed to surrender to the BOP as appointed. Plaintiff responded that he was going to arrange his surrender through his attorney. Beam reiterated that plaintiff should immediately turn himself in, before new charges were filed against him. After telling Beam that he was at a gym, plaintiff advised that he would turn himself in to the BOP.
But plaintiff was not at a gym, for shortly thereafter, Schuster, who was still surveilling the residence, made another cellular phone call to plaintiff's residential phone. Plaintiff answered. Schuster identified himself, told plaintiff that he was outside, and instructed plaintiff to come to the door. Plaintiff did not comply, again stating that he would surrender later through his attorney; plaintiff then hung up the phone. Schuster again knocked loudly on plaintiff's door, instructing him to come to the door. Schuster placed at least two more cellular phone calls to plaintiff's residence. No one answered the phone. After knocking again and receiving no response, Schuster advised Beam of the circumstances, then waited outside plaintiff's front door for other officers to arrive.
Defendants Beam and Weber responded to the location. Having obtained approval from a USMS supervisor to make a forcible entry, Weber broke the back window of the residence and entered through the window, followed by Schuster. As they entered the home, plaintiff's wife vocally objected to their entry and questioned why they had damaged her window. Weber identified himself to her and repeatedly instructed her to open the door. Plaintiff's wife refused to open the door. Weber and Schuster handcuffed plaintiff's wife and had her sit on the couch. Schuster then opened the front door of the residence, allowing other officers to enter the residence. Plaintiff's wife repeatedly gave false information about plaintiff's location, first denying that he was home, then stating that he was in the bedroom. After hearing a crashing sound in the garage area, Schuster found plaintiff crouching beside a car in the attached garage. Schuster placed plaintiff under arrest and transported him to the Shawnee County jail pending his transfer to a BOP facility.
Plaintiff brings this action against Dilberti, Schuster, Beam, and Weber along with three unnamed defendants, who are USMS Task Force Officers. Plaintiff claims that defendants conspired and violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights during the course of his arrest. Plaintiff asserts that defendants arrested him without having an arrest or search warrant, but this is not a material issue of fact. It is clear that defendants had no search warrant. And, from their factual assertions, it appears that defendants did not have an arrest warrant in hand when they arrested plaintiff in the District of Kansas. However, defendants had been instructed to arrest defendant, and were aware that a Complaint and arrest warrant were being contemporaneously obtained in the District of Nevada at the time they were in the process of arresting plaintiff. In fact, an arrest warrant was issued that day, August 13, 2002, signed by United States Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen.
In an Order dated August 10, 2004 (Doc. 24), this Court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the USMS and the individual defendants in their official capacities for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court did not address plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities because the Court believed plaintiff's Complaint had failed to state such a claim. After reviewing plaintiff's appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed this Court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the USMS and the defendants in their official capacities, but reversed and remanded the case after determining that the context of the Complaint and the accompanying documents indicate that plaintiff was also raising claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities. (Doc. 37.) Defendants now move for summary judgment arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the individual defendants in their individual capacities because the defendants are subject to qualified immunity and quasi-judicial immunity.
III. Analysis
As federal officials, defendants may be held individually liable for actions taken under color of federal authority. In the seminal case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs may seek damages from federal officials in their individual capacities for violations of the Fourth Amendment. Courts since Bivens have characterized additional constitutional claims against federal officials as Bivens claims. Here, plaintiff brings a Bivens action against the defendants in their individual capacities for violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971).
Id. at 395-97.
See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (recognizing a Bivens action for Eighth Amendment violations).
A. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is a defense to a Bivens action. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court explained that qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for damages incurred in the performance of discretionary functions as long as their conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Courts use an objective standard, evaluating the official's conduct in light of the state of the law at the time of the purported constitutional or statutory violation. The Court reviews summary judgment motions involving qualified immunity claims differently than standard summary judgment motions because of the purpose behind qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1311-12 (10th Cir. 2002).
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
Upon a defendant's assertion of a qualified immunity defense in a summary judgment motion, plaintiff has a two-part burden. Plaintiff must come forward with facts or allegations that the defendant's conduct was a violation of a clearly established constitutional or statutory right at the time of its occurrence and that the violated right was "clearly established such that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known the conduct violated the right." The issue of immunity is a legal one and the Court may not avoid it by framing it as a factual issue. The Supreme Court counsels that before addressing the issue of qualified immunity, the Court must first consider: "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?"
Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir. 1997); see Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (10th Cir. 1988).
Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1347.
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
1. Fourth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff asserts that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when USMS officers entered his home and arrested him on August 13, 2002 because the officers did not have a search warrant or arrest warrant in their possession. The Fourth Amendment assures citizens the privacy and security of their homes unless a "neutral and detached" judicial officer determines that there is probable cause to issue a warrant. This procedure governs not only in cases of entry to search property, but also in cases of entry to arrest a suspect. In this case, it is undisputed that defendants did not have a search warrant or an arrest warrant in their possession on August 13, 2002. However, an arrest warrant for the plaintiff was issued that day by the United States District Court in Nevada. Although the documents submitted with this summary judgment motion do not specify at what time the warrant was issued, it was dated August 13, 2002, the day of plaintiff's arrest. The Court determines that the timing of the warrant is irrelevant here when a neutral judicial officer, Judge Pro, ordered Diliberti to arrest the plaintiff, and specifically told plaintiff that an arrest warrant was going to be issued that day from the District of Nevada. Further, the appropriate paper work authorizing the arrest was completed that day when Judge Keen signed the warrant.
United States v. Ramirez, 63 F.3d 937, 941 (10th Cir. 1995).
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980).
This authorization from Judge Pro is in stark contrast to a case cited by plaintiff as analogous to his case. In Buenrostro v. Collazo, the court held that officers who entered a suspect's home to arrest him on the authority of a "wanted person" circulation from another state, but without a search warrant or an arrest warrant, were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court found it "obvious to us that, in the context of seizing an individual within the confines of his own home, a wanted person request circulated by an out-of-state police department differs significantly from an arrest warrant issued by a neutral, detached magistrate. . . ." In this case, the USMS's authority to arrest the plaintiff came from an order given by Judge Pro and the arrest warrant contemporaneously signed by Judge Keen. This judicial authorization to arrest the plaintiff differs significantly from a wanted circulation lacking judicial approval. Therefore, plaintiff's argument that his rights were violated because of the timing of the arrest warrant's issuance must fail because the USMS had judicial authorization to arrest plaintiff.
973 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1992).
Id. at 44.
Id. at 43.
Further, defendants may also rely on their good faith execution of the arrest warrant, regardless of the timing of its issuance. In the context of motions to suppress evidence, the Supreme Court has articulated a "good faith exception" allowing the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment as long as the evidence was "obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant." This exception does not apply in cases where the magistrate was misled or the supporting affidavit contained false information. There was no misleading or false information in this case. It was objectively reasonable for all of the defendants to rely on the assertions by Judge Pro. Because the USMS officers entered plaintiff's home on the good faith belief that a judge in the District of Nevada had ordered plaintiff's arrest and had issued an arrest warrant, defendants are entitled to a good faith exception for their acts.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
Id. at 923.
With the authority of a valid arrest warrant, the USMS officers did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights by entering his home to arrest him. "[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within." The defendants knew that Judge Pro had verbally ordered plaintiff's arrest and had advised that an arrest warrant was contemporaneously being issued. The USMS officers knew that plaintiff lived in the home because this was plaintiff's residence in Topeka, Kansas. Further, there was reason to believe that plaintiff was inside the home after he answered Schuster's cellular phone call to plaintiff's residential phone line. Therefore, because defendants satisfied the requirements of Payton, they did not violate plaintiff's rights under the Fourth Amendment by entering his home to effectuate his arrest.
To the extent plaintiff complains about a violation of his wife's rights, he has no standing to do so when she is not a named plaintiff in this action.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980).
Plaintiff also complains defendants did not have in their possession, at the time of his arrest, the arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court in Nevada. Plaintiff does not contest the validity of the arrest warrant, but only asserts that the arrest warrant must have been in the possession of the arresting officers. But, under neither federal statutory law, nor under Constitutional law, are defendants required to possess the arrest warrant at the time of arrest. Fed.R.Crim.P. 4(c)(3)(A) specifically denies the obligation of an arresting officer to present an arrest warrant at the time of arrest. Rule 4(c)(3)(A) provides in relevant part that:
See Lewis v. Nelson, 113 F.3d 1246, 1997 WL 291177, at *3 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table opinion) (denying defendant's claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the arresting officer's failure to present an arrest warrant at his arrest because defendant is afforded no such right under federal or Constitutional law).
Upon arrest, . . . [i]f the officer does not possess the warrant, the officer must inform the defendant of the warrant's existence and of the offense charged and, at the defendant's request, must show the warrant to the defendant as soon as possible.
As long as the officers have "reliable knowledge" of the existence of a warrant for the defendant's arrest, "[n]o more is necessary" to effectuate the arrest. Here, defendants Schuster and Weber had reliable knowledge of the existence of an arrest warrant. Judge Pro had verbally instructed Diliberti to arrest plaintiff, and he advised that an arrest warrant would be issued that day. Diliberti also spoke with an Assistant United States Attorney in Nevada, who assured Diliberti that he would immediately file for a federal arrest warrant. Dilberti then informed defendant Beam that an arrest warrant for plaintiff was being issued in the District of Nevada. Beam then relayed this information to Schuster and Weber, who arrested plaintiff at his home, with the knowledge of the existence of an arrest warrant for plaintiff in Nevada. And, in fact, an arrest warrant was issued that day by Judge Keen.
United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297, 301 (6th Cir. 1983); Bartlett v. United States, 232 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1956).
Further, Fed.R.Crim.P. 4(c)(2) provides that a "warrant may be executed . . . within the jurisdiction of the United States or anywhere else a federal statute authorizes an arrest." Therefore, though the warrant was issued in Nevada, the officers had the authority to execute the warrant in Kansas because it "has efficacy throughout the United States and constitutes authority for arresting the defendant wherever found."
United States v. Harper, 550 F.2d 610, 614 (10th Cir. 1977).
Additionally, plaintiff cannot complain about defendants' forced entry into his home when defendants complied with the federal "knock and announce statute." This statute provides that an "officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant." The knock and announce statute applies both to the execution of an arrest and search warrant. Here, Schuster knocked and announced his presence several times throughout the day as he was surveilling plaintiff's home. Schuster was refused admittance, and he was told by plaintiff that he would not surrender to the USMS but would arrange his surrender through his attorney. Schuster and Weber then went to the back of the house. Weber broke the window and entered the home to arrest plaintiff. Schuster followed. Because Weber's and Schuster's actions were authorized under federal statute, plaintiff cannot complain about the broken window and the forced entry into his home.
18 U.S.C. § 3109.
United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2001).
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts alleged do not show that defendants violated a constitutional right during the course of arresting plaintiff on August 13, 2002. Because plaintiff has not meet the threshold inquiry under Saucier, his claims must fail. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
The Court finds summary judgment appropriate in favor of all defendants, including the John Doe defendants. Plaintiff describes the John Doe defendants as members of the USMS Task Force, who participated in the entry into plaintiff's home to effectuate his arrest on August 13, 2002. Because plaintiff does not characterize the John Does' actions as inconsistent with any of the actions of the named defendants, the Court may include these defendants in the summary judgment order. See Roper v. Grayson, 81 F.3d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding it appropriate to include John Doe defendants along with the named defendants in summary judgment dismissal when the identities of such defendants was adequately described and based on the acts of such defendants, they would have been entitled to summary judgment as well).
2. Fifth Amendment Claims
Although plaintiff also asserts that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated during the course of his arrest, his claim should instead be addressed in a Fourth Amendment context. Because the Court finds that, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the facts fail to allege a Fourth Amendment violation as discussed above, the Court grants summary judgment on plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claims as well.
Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1560 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Fourth Amendment governs pretrial deprivations of liberty); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that claims alleging excessive force in making an arrest or "seizure" of a person are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than substantive due process standard).
B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Summary judgment in favor of defendants is also appropriate because defendants enjoy quasi-judicial immunity for their actions in plaintiff's case. The Tenth Circuit has held "that an official charged with the duty of executing a facially valid court order enjoys absolute immunity from liability for damages in a suit challenging conduct prescribed by that order." Because "[e]nforcing a court order or judgment is intrinsically associated with a judicial proceeding," officials executing a court order are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for actions taken under the direction of a judge. The Tenth Circuit, explaining the reasoning for cloaking officials with judicial immunity, has stated:
Valdez v. City and County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1286 (10th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1288 (citing Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1285, 1239 (7th Cir. 1986)).
"The fearless and unhesitating execution of court orders is essential if the court's authority and ability to function are to remain uncompromised." Absolute immunity for officials assigned to carry out a judge's orders is necessary to insure that such officials can perform their function without the need to secure permanent legal counsel. A lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process."
Id. (quoting Coverdell v. Dep't of Soc. Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 765 (9th Cir. 1987)).
However, "[t]here are limits to how unlawful an order can be and still immunize the officer executing it." "Because quasi-judicial immunity derives from judicial immunity, the order must be one for which the issuing judge is immune from liability." Thus, an official "is not absolutely immune from damages arising from the execution of an order issued by a judge acting `in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction."'" Further, officials acting "`outside the scope of their jurisdiction'" are not afforded quasi-judicial immunity for their actions.
Turney v. O'Toole, 898 F.2d 1470, 1474 (10th Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id. (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351(1872))).
Id. (quoting Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989); Williams v. Wood, 612 F.2d 982, 985 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Applying this standard, defendants clearly enjoy absolute immunity for arresting the plaintiff. Here, the issuing judges are immune from liability. Plaintiff was convicted in the District of Nevada, and he had failed to surrender himself to the BOP to serve his sentence for this conviction. Because of plaintiff's failure to surrender, there was probable cause to support a warrant for his arrest. Therefore, Judge Pro is immune from liability for ordering plaintiff's arrest, and Judge Keen is immune from signing the arrest warrant. Additionally, it was within Judge Pro's jurisdiction, as the sentencing judge in plaintiff's case in the District of Nevada, to order his arrest. It was also within Judge Keen's jurisdiction, as a magistrate judge in the District of Nevada, to sign the arrest warrant. Therefore, because defendants are officials who were charged with the duty of executing a facially valid court order, defendants enjoy quasi-judicial immunity for their actions during the course of plaintiff's arrest, and the Court must grant summary judgment in favor of defendants.
C. Conspiracy Claims
Plaintiff's Complaint further alleges that defendants "conspired and violated" his constitutional rights. In order to bring a claim against defendants for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, plaintiff must prove both the existence of a conspiracy and the deprivation of a constitutional right. As shown above, the Court has determined that plaintiff failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court must grant summary judgment on plaintiff's conspiracy claims in favor of the defendants.
Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir. 1990).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 40) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.