Opinion
Civil No. 03-1342-MO.
August 26, 2004
ORDER
On July 7, 2004, the court ruled that plaintiff Transportation Credit Service was acting as an unlicensed collection agency in violation of Oregon law. The court, therefore, dismissed plaintiff's case and enjoined it from acting as a collection agency until it had complied with Oregon law. On July 16, 2004, plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the court's ruling. As briefly outlined below, the court DENIES plaintiff's motion (Doc. 55).
As this court has explained: "A motion for reconsideration must demonstrate some reason why the court should reconsider its decision. The motion must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision." Medford Pacific v. Danmor Constr., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1323 (D. Or. 1998). There are three primary grounds justifying granting a motion to reconsider: (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Id.
It is undisputed plaintiff does not have a license and did not register to act as an Oregon collection agency. The Oregon collection-agency statute, ORS 697.015, provides: "a person shall not operate as a collection agency in this state unless the person registers with the Department of Consumer and Business Services." In turn, Oregon law defines "collection agency" as follows: "any person directly or indirectly engaged in soliciting claims for collection, or collecting or attempting to collect claims owed, due or asserted to be owed or due to another person or to a public body." ORS 697.005(1)(a)(A); see generally In re Krysl, 304 B.R. 425 (D. Or. 2004). It also is undisputed on this record that plaintiff's conduct in this case fit Oregon's definition of a collection agency. Plaintiff, in fact, was formed for the sole purpose of pursuing and collecting on the claims held by motor carriers. As a result, plaintiff does not, nor could it, contend it does not technically qualify as a "collection agency" under Oregon law.
Oregon's collection-agency statute exempts from the registration requirement entities qualifying as "factoring companies." As discussed at the July 7 hearing, plaintiff has no probative evidence showing it qualified as a factoring company.
Instead, in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiff's only argument is that because it obtained a federal license to act as a federal transportation broker it did not have to comply with Oregon's collection-agency statute. Plaintiff, however, does not cite any new evidence or law which was unavailable at the time the court made its decision. While plaintiff argues it did not foresee it would need to argue the collection-agency issue, that potentially dispositive issue was squarely raised by defendant's summary judgment briefing. In sum, plaintiff offers no good explanation for why it failed to respond fully to the collection-agency issue.
In addition, plaintiff has not persuaded the court that it committed "clear error" or that "manifest injustice" would result. See Medford Pacific, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1323. Plaintiff argues that regulatory provisions enacted under the Federal Motor Carrier Act preempt application of Oregon's collection-agency statute. The regulation upon which plaintiff primarily relies defines "brokerage service," in pertinent part, as "the arranging of transportation or the physical movement of a motor vehicle or of property." 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a). The same regulation also defines "broker" as including a "person who, for compensation, arranges, or offers to arrange, the transportation of property by an authorized motor carrier." 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(b). While plaintiff relies on this regulatory provision in making a preemption argument, plaintiff cites no supporting case law.
"Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause `start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'"Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (emphasis added) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Especially in light of plaintiff's failure to cite any legal authority on the issue of preemption, plaintiff has failed to overcome the presumption in favor of allowing a state to exercise its police power. See id. In fact, plaintiff has failed even to show that it acted as a "broker" in relation to the shipments at issue, as plaintiff has not shown it "arranged the transportation" of the shipments. 49 C.F.R. § 371.2. Instead, after the transportation of the shipments had been completed, plaintiff was formed for the sole purpose of collecting debts on behalf of third parties, thus acting as a collection agency within the meaning of Oregon law. As a result, the court need not decide whether a federally licensed entity which actually did arrange for transportation of shipments must satisfy Oregon's collection-agency statute.
In sum, plaintiff has failed to carry its heavy burden to show clear error, manifest injustice, new evidence, or new case law. The court, therefore, denies plaintiff's motion to reconsider the court's July 7 ruling. (Doc. 55).
IT IS SO ORDERED.