Opinion
No. 01-06-00097-CV
Opinion issued July 19, 2007.
On Appeal from the 80th District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2001-50728.
Panel consists of Justices NUCHIA, HANKS, and BLAND.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court in this case signed a "Final Judgment" on December 30, 2005. The judgment recited, "[T]he parties . . . announced to the Court that all causes of action herein have been disposed either voluntarily, or by Motion for Summary Judgment, as follows." The judgment then listed 12 orders signed by the trial court. Each of the first 11 orders disposed of claims by and against various parties to this lawsuit. The twelfth order stated,
On December 10, 2004, the Court signed an Order severing Intervenor, Hassan Mousavi's Intervention against Plaintiffs from this cause of action and creating cause no. 2001-50728A for said Intervention.
Appellants filed a notice of appeal on January 30, 2006.
January 29, 2006, the 30th day after the "Final Judgment" was signed, was a Sunday. Therefore, any time period ending on that date ran until January 30. Tex. R. App. P. 4.1.
On February 14, 2007, this Court issued an order advising appellants that it appeared that this Court did not have jurisdiction over their appeal and ordering appellants to respond by explaining what parties or issues remained in the trial court after the December 10, 2004 order of severance. Appellants' response to that order stated the procedural history of the case and the remaining issues on appeal. They did not claim that any parties or issues remained in the trial court after the December 10, 2004 severance of the intervenor's action against the plaintiffs. Our review of the record on appeal has not revealed any parties or issues remaining in this case after the severance.
When some parties and claims in a lawsuit are disposed of in interlocutory orders and all remaining parties and claims are severed, the severance renders the interlocutory orders final and starts the appellate time table. See Howell v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 84 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (noting that severance of remaining claims rendered summary judgment final for purposes of appeal). A judgment that actually disposes of all claims and parties is final for purposes of appeal regardless of whether it has language indicating finality. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Tex. 2001).
In this case, the "Final Judgment" recited that the parties announced that all causes of action had been disposed of through a series of interlocutory orders. Thus, all claims and parties had been disposed of by December 10, 2004, and the interlocutory orders then became final for purposes of appeal. Appellant's notice of appeal was due within 30 days after the order of severance was signed — on or before January 10, 2005. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. The trial court's plenary power expired on January 10, 2005, and the trial court had no jurisdiction to sign a "Final Judgment" on December 30, 2005. See Tex. R. Civ. R. 329b(d) ("The trial court . . . has plenary power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment within thirty days after the judgment is signed."). Therefore, the notice of appeal filed on January 30, 2006 was untimely. Because no timely notice of appeal was filed, this Court must dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 564 (Tex. 2005) (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction because notice of appeal was untimely).
Because January 9, 2005, the 30th day after the order of severance was signed, was a Sunday, the notice of appeal was due to be filed by January 10. Tex. R. Civ. P. 4.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.