Opinion
G059864
10-05-2022
In re Marriage of LINH TU BAO TRAN and KRYSTAL BICH HUYEN VU HA. v. KRYSTAL BICH HUYEN VU HA, Respondent. LINH TU BAO TRAN, Appellant,
Law Offices of Lisa R. McCall, Lisa R. McCall and Erica M. Baca for Appellant. Influential Law and Van Nghiem for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order and judgment of the Super. Ct. No. 16D000647 of Orange County, Donald F. Gaffney, Judge.
Law Offices of Lisa R. McCall, Lisa R. McCall and Erica M. Baca for Appellant.
Influential Law and Van Nghiem for Respondent.
OPINION
O'LEARY, P. J.
Linh Tu Bao Tran appeals from two court actions: (1) A denial of his collateral attack on the trial court's 2018 marital dissolution judgment that incorporated his stipulation to his date of marriage to Krystal Bich Huyen Vu Ha, and (2) a 2020 judgment on community property division that awarded Ha rights to Tran's retirement benefits based on the stipulated date of marriage. Tran asserts the stipulated date is incorrect and created a bigamous marriage because of his prior marriage. He concludes this should support appellate relief based on voidness. Given the trial court had fundamental jurisdiction to enter the 2018 marital dissolution judgment, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2011, Tran received a divorce decree from the trial court for his marriage to a woman who is not a party to this case and, in 2014, a license and certificate of marriage to Ha. In the certificate's information field, Tran indicated he had no previous marriages.
Tran requests we take judicial notice of four documents: (1) the license and certificate of marriage; (2) a blank affidavit form for amending a marriage record; (3) a blank application to amend a marriage record; and (4) a copy of Tran's 2011 dissolution judgment regarding his previous wife. The second and third documents were not presented to the trial court and Tran does not explain why they are relevant to his appeal. We grant Tran's request only as to the first and fourth documents, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452 and California Rules of Court, rule 8.252.
I. Marital Dissolution Petition and Judgment Incorporating Marital Settlement Agreement
In 2016, Tran filed a petition to dissolve his marriage to Ha. Tran asserted he married Ha in 2014 but Ha pleaded in response that the couple had been married for 14 years, since 2002. No minor child support issues were implicated because the couple's daughter had become an adult by the time of Tran's petition. On spousal support, the trial court ordered Tran to pay Ha $1,500 per month while litigation continued.
Two years after Tran and Ha's initial pleadings, Tran moved to conduct an early and separate trial on the couple's marital dissolution status. In his supporting declaration, Tran pointed out the factual discrepancies between his position and Ha's, stating as follows: "We were married on June 9, 2014 (evidenced by our marriage certificate despite [Ha's] [r]esponse having stated that the date of marriage was February 1, 2002) and separated on September 1, 2015 ([r]esponse states date of separation was February 16, 2016)."
Tran's trial court motion became unnecessary two months later because he and Ha entered into a marital settlement agreement (the agreement) that the court incorporated into a May 2018 judgment dissolving the couple's married status and reserving issues for future adjudication. For example, the six-page agreement stipulated the court's earlier spousal support order could remain "in full force and effect" until ordered otherwise. Also, the agreement identified two sources of Tran's retirement benefits and stipulated the court could "reserve jurisdiction over the division of [that specific] community property."
Tran signed the agreement and notarized his signature. He also initialed each page preceding his signature page, including the page containing the agreement's second paragraph that stated: "The parties agreed they were married to each other on August 1st, 2004 and have been [h]usband and [w]ife continuously since that date. The parties separated on January 12, 2016. The parties were married for approximately eleven (11) years and five (5) months." (Original boldface replaced by italics.) In sum, based on the incorporated agreement stipulations, the trial court's dissolution judgment states that Tran married Ha in 2004, seven years before he divorced his previous wife.
II. The Unchallenged 2019 Rulings
After the dissolution judgment was entered and noticed in May 2018, Tran filed a June 2019 motion to set aside the judgment's provisions regarding the couple's "date of marriage and the related award of spousal support." Tran alleged his assent to the incorporated agreement was the product of fraud and, also, that he had initialed and signed the agreement under duress.
The trial court held a hearing and denied Tran's motion, finding the fraud assertion untimely and the duress assertion timely but factually insufficient. Also in 2019, Tran unsuccessfully moved to "eliminate [his] spousal support" obligation to Ha based on changed circumstances. In addition to claiming Ha was earning more income than she represented, Tran reasserted that "[t]he date of marriage on the marriage settlement agreement agreement [was] incorrect" and his marriage to Ha was "a shortterm marriage" based on the 2014 certificate of marriage. (Capitalization and boldface omitted.)
The trial court found no material change in circumstances and denied Tran's motion. Tran did not appeal either 2019 ruling.
III. The Challenged 2020 Rulings
In July 2020, Tran moved to "amend or correct" the May 2018 dissolution judgment. Tran asserted the following: "I did not notice the error in the date of marriage at the time of the signing of the [a]greement - again, I would have had this corrected. This was truly a clerical error by all concerned. I was still married to my previous wife on that date and could not have been married to the Respondent in this matter." Tran claimed he had "trusted that [Ha] and her attorney had prepared the [a]greement" using the couple's marriage certificate date, and that there had been "no opportunity to ask any questions" on the day he reviewed and signed the agreement.
Tran cited Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) (section 473(d)), and asserted the trial "court ha[d] the inherent power to correct clerical mistakes" and that "there is no limitation on time as to when this can be brought to the attention of the court." Tran also asserted the "court ha[d] the power, under the rules of equity, to rectify any injustice and windfall generated by the mistakes of the parties within the [j]udgment and [m]arital [s]ettlement [a]greement, as prepared by [Ha] and her counsel." He further asserted that, "alternatively," the court should "set aside the void judgment in this matter due to the blatant misrepresentations made within the [j]udgment and the [m]arital [s]ettlement [a]greement."
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
The trial court denied Tran's motion and entered a formal December 2020 order that stated: "The court finds there is no clerical error within the [j]udgment and there are no equity arguments that persuade the court that any modification to the [j]udgment is necessary."
Also in 2020, the trial court conducted a trial on Ha's motion for the court to "divide equally" Tran's noted retirement benefits, based on the 12-year marriage duration stipulated to in the couple's agreement incorporated into the court's 2018 dissolution judgment. Tran counterargued the stipulated marriage date of 2004 was incorrect and any order regarding Ha's right to Tran's retirement benefits should be based on the couple's 2014 certificate date of marriage.
The trial court ruled in favor of Ha and entered a December 2020 judgment containing the following decree: "For purposes of drafting the Qualified Domestic Relations Order ('QDROs'), the date of marriage shall be A[ugust] 1[st], 2004 and the date of separation shall be J[annuary] 12th, 2016 pursuant to the [2018] divorce [j]udgment."
See 29 U.S.C. § 1056 [defining "'qualified domestic relations order'" regarding pension plan benefits].
Tran filed a January 2021 notice of appeal. He challenges (1) the trial court's order denying his 2020 motion to set aside the 2018 judgment, and (2) the court's 2020 judgment awarding Ha rights to Tran's retirement benefits (collectively the challenged court actions).
DISCUSSION
We take no issue with the general proposition that a "valid marriage date between two parties is the one on their marriage certificate." (See Fam. Code, §§ 300 et seq.) According to Tran, not only was the stipulated date of marriage in the agreement incorrect, but it also preceded the date he dissolved his marriage to his previous wife. Based on these points, Tran contends a bigamous marriage was "created by the parties' [stipulated 2018 dissolution] judgment" (see Fam. Code, § 2201 [bigamous and polygamous marriages]), and that "the trial court did not have jurisdiction to approve a stipulation to an incorrect date of marriage, resulting in a void judgment."
I. Standard of Review and Collateral Attack Principles
Tran's request for appellate relief rests on a theory the 2018 dissolution judgment's incorporation of a stipulated but incorrect marriage date results in voidness due to bigamy. Under section 473, subdivision (b), Tran had six months to seek relief from the judgment. Additionally, under Family Code section 2122, Tran had six timelimited grounds upon which to request the judgment be set aside. As noted, Tran asserted two of those grounds in 2019-fraud and duress-but did not appeal from the trial court's rejection of the assertions.
The grounds for relief from a court action are "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, [and] excusable neglect." (§ 473, subd. (b).)
The grounds to set aside a qualifying judgment are fraud, perjury, duress, mental incapacity, mistake (for stipulated or uncontested judgments), and failure to comply with the financial disclosure requirements. (Fam. Code, § 2122, subds. (a)-(f).)
Tran's appellate contention in this court-that the 2020 challenged court actions were erroneous because the 2018 dissolution judgment is void-amounts to a review of collateral attacks on the court's 2018 dissolution judgment. (See Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 492-493 [looking to "rules which govern collateral attacks on judgments since the defendants' motion was not timely under section 473"]; see 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2021) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 8, pp. 592-593.)
Tran asserts the trial court should have ruled in his favor for the challenged court actions based on section 473(d), which states: "The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order." Relief based on section 473(d) is not limited by time. (Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 175, 181.) Counterbalancing the freedom from deadlines is the narrowness of grounds for relief: clerical error and voidness. On the first ground, because the date of the couple's marriage reflects exactly what the parties' stipulated to in the agreement, there is no basis to conclude a clerical error by the court warrants relief. (See In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705.) Accordingly, Tran must show he was entitled to relief because the challenged court actions were void. We review the question of whether a judgment or order was void de novo. (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495-496.)
Tran's argument he was entitled to equitable relief rises and falls with his voidness argument. (See Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 901, fn. 8 ["'To the extent that the court's equity power to grant relief differs from its power under section 473, the equity power must be considered narrower, not wider'"].)
"In the absence of extrinsic fraud or mistake" a judgment "cannot be set aside [in a collateral proceeding] unless it is void on its face. [Citations.]" (Wells Fargo &Co. v. City &County of San Francisco (1944) 25 Cal.2d 37, 40 (Wells Fargo).) Tran does not provide any briefing on either of the first two theories so they are forfeited. (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
"'Extrinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of his opportunity to present his claim or defense to the court, where he was kept in ignorance or in some other manner fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding.'" (In re Marriage of Varner (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 128, 140.) "'Extrinsic mistake involves the excusable neglect of a party. [Citation.] When this neglect results in an unjust judgment, without a fair adversary hearing, and the basis for equitable relief is present, this is extrinsic mistake. [Citation.]'" (Ibid.)
"'It is well settled that a judgment or order which is void on its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion, at any time after its entry, by the court which rendered the judgment or made the order. [Citations.] Equally well settled is it that a judgment or order, which is in fact void for want of jurisdiction, but the invalidity of which does not appear from the judgment-roll or record, may be set aside on motion within a reasonable time after its entry, not exceeding the time limit prescribed by [former] section 473.'" (Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, 19 (Plaza Hollister).)
In a case involving one defendant who has answered (see § 670, subd. (a)), the judgment roll is limited to: "the pleadings, all orders striking out any pleading in whole or in part, a copy of the verdict of the jury, the statement of decision of the court, or finding of the referee, and a copy of any order made on demurrer, or relating to a change of parties, and a copy of the judgment." (Id., subd. (b).) "'Every presumption is in favor of the validity of the judgment, and any condition of facts consistent with its validity [and not affirmatively contradicted by the judgment roll] will be presumed to have existed rather than one which will defeat it. [Citations.]'" (Wells Fargo, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 40; cf. Evid. Code § 666 [Where court action is challenged through collateral attack: "Any court of this state or the United States, or any court of general jurisdiction in any other state or nation, or any judge of such a court, acting as such, is presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction"].)
Voidness questions are answered by analysis for jurisdictional error, which generally "can be of two types. A court can lack fundamental authority over the subject matter, question presented, or party, making its judgment void, or it can merely act in excess of its jurisdiction or defined power, rendering the judgment voidable. [Citations.]" (In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 56.) "'While the fundamental type of jurisdiction can never be conferred by consent of the parties, the latter type is often subject to principles of consent and waiver. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Hinman (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 711, 716-717; accord, Kristine H. v. Lisa R. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 156, 164-165, quoting Adoption of Matthew B. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1239, 1269 ["'Where a court has subject matter jurisdiction, a party's request for or consent to action beyond the court's statutory power may estop the party from complaining that the court's action exceeds its jurisdiction'"].)
II. Core Fundamental Jurisdiction Grounds
Tran attempts to show voidness by asserting the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter a judgment containing an incorrect date of marriage. That is, Tran asserts the trial "court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter [of this case], because the trial court did not have the power to make orders to modify the parties' legally valid date of marriage." According to Tran, "[b]ecause the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the date of marriage, the judgment changing the parties' legally recognized date of marriage was void, not voidable, and subject to set aside under" section 473(d).
Putting aside the fact it was Tran's stipulation and not the trial court's finding of fact that established the date of marriage (see In re Marriage of Hinman, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 716 ["A party who participates in or consents to a judgment which otherwise would be beyond the court's authority is precluded from attacking it collaterally, absent exceptional circumstances"]), more fundamentally, Tran has not shown the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when the challenged court actions occurred.
Tran's contention misunderstands the nature of subject matter jurisdiction, which stands or falls on "'the inherent authority of the court involved to deal with the case or matter before it.' [Citation.] Thus, in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court has no power 'to hear or determine [the] case.' [Citation.]" (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 196.)
The Legislature has explicitly conferred on trial courts original subject matter jurisdiction over proceedings based on the Family Code. (Fam. Code, § 200.) "In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage," trial courts have "jurisdiction to inquire into and render any judgment and make orders that are appropriate concerning the following: [¶] (a) The status of the marriage . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (d) The support of either party. [¶] [and] (e) The settlement of the property rights of the parties." (Fam. Code, § 2010; see § 2310 ["Dissolution of the marriage or legal separation of the parties may be based on . . .: [¶] (a) Irreconcilable differences, which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage"]; see also In re Marriage of Lackey (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 698, 702 [discussing trial court subject matter jurisdiction based on predecessor statutes].)
The trial court had, at all relevant times, subject matter jurisdiction to take the challenged court actions. Because there is no dispute about personal jurisdiction over the parties or in rem jurisdiction over their marriage, Tran has not shown the trial court lacked any core element of fundamental jurisdiction.
III. Authority to Grant Relief as Part of Fundamental Jurisdiction
Tran quotes Plaza Hollister, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 1, for the proposition that "[t]he granting of relief, which a court under no circumstances has any authority to grant, has been considered an aspect of fundamental jurisdiction for the purpose of declaring a judgment or order void." (Id. at p. 20.) Tran relies on this proposition to argue the trial court in this case had no authority under any circumstances to enter a judgment that contained an inaccurate marriage date that amounted to a bigamous marriage, rendering the 2018 dissolution judgment void.
Plaza Hollister involved a property tax refund action against the county where the property was located. (Plaza Hollister, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 7.) The appellate court reviewed for voidness a stipulated judgment entered between the property owner and the county that did not include the participation of the county's board of equalization. The stipulation between the owner and county "reduced the base-year value of the property," determined what values would be placed on assessment rolls for multiple years, and guaranteed tax refunds to the owner. (Id. at pp. 7-8.) The appellate court concluded the judgment improperly invaded the board of equalization's constitutional duty to assess property values, the trial court had been unauthorized to grant the stipulated relief absent the board's participation, and that collateral attack on the judgment was valid. (Id. at pp. 20-25.)
We take no issue with Plaza Hollister's general proposition that a grant of unauthorized relief can amount to a judgment or order void for lack of fundamental jurisdiction that allows a collateral attack on the judgment or order. (Plaza Hollister, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.) But the case is not helpful to Tran's position here because he has not shown how the analysis of the legal authorities at issue there are apt for analogy here. Indeed, Tran correctly notes the Plaza Hollister court explicitly based its analysis on the premise that "'[i]n some instances the requirements of a statute may relate to subject matter jurisdiction, and disregard of the statute may render a judgment void and subject to collateral attack. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Plaza Hollister, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 22.)
In this case, Tran relies on Family Code section 2201, dealing with bigamy and polygamy, to show voidness. That section states: "A subsequent marriage contracted by a person during the life of his or her former spouse, with a person other than the former spouse, is illegal and void, unless: [¶] (1) The former marriage has been dissolved or adjudged a nullity before the date of the subsequent marriage. [¶] (2) The former spouse (A) is absent, and not known to the person to be living for the period of five successive years immediately preceding the subsequent marriage, or (B) is generally reputed or believed by the person to be dead at the time the subsequent marriage was contracted. [¶] (b) In either of the cases described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), the subsequent marriage is valid until its nullity is adjudged pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 2210." (Fam. Code, § 2201.)
We decline to conclude Family Code section 2201 is a legal authority "relat[ing] to subject matter jurisdiction" of the trial court similar to the legal authorities analyzed in Plaza Hollister. Indeed, Family Code section 2201 explicitly provides that even a technically bigamous relationship is, under certain factual circumstances, valid until adjudicated otherwise (id., subd. (b)), reinforcing that trial courts have subject matter jurisdiction to resolve factual questions inherent in the statute. In other words, Tran's reliance on Plaza Hollister to argue the trial court here approved a stipulation that it had no authority to incorporate into its dissolution judgment confuses fundamental jurisdictional error with an error that, at most, exceeded the trial court's jurisdiction to grant. The case does not support a conclusion of voidness here.
IV. Estoppel and Public Policy Interests
Based on the above, we conclude Tran has not demonstrated that either the 2018 dissolution judgment or the 2020 challenged court actions were void, as he contends. To the extent Tran wishes to argue the 2018 dissolution judgment was only voidable but still justifies the relief he seeks, we note he would be estopped from making the argument. (See In re Marriage of Kalinawan (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1265, 1271 [citing to Kristine H. v. Lisa R., supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 162, and discussing history of estoppel doctrine applied in marital dissolution cases "'to prevent a party from contesting the validity of a judgment that was procured by that party'"].)
"'Where a court has subject matter jurisdiction, a party's request for or consent to action beyond the court's statutory power may estop the party from complaining that the court's action exceeds its jurisdiction. [Citation.] Whether estoppel applies "depends on the importance of the irregularity not only to the parties but to the functioning of the courts and in some instances on other considerations of public policy."'" (Kristine H. v. Lisa R., supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 164-165.) If we reached the question, we would be satisfied the balance of public policies interests implicated in this case-including the interests in finality of judgments (see Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. McConnell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 715, 725), and limitation of this case's effect on third parties (see Rediker v. Rediker (1950) 35 Cal.2d 796, 801; accord, Kristine H. v. Lisa R., supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 162, fn. 2)-would support estoppel.
To be clear, Tran's assertions raise serious questions about Ha's counsel presenting to the trial court a stipulated marriage date that appears to be at odds with the couple's date of marriage on their marriage certificate. (See Bus. &Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (d) [attorney's duties include "never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law"].) Notwithstanding, under the particular circumstances of this case, the questions do not override the balance of interests supporting estoppel. (Petry v. Petry (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 594, 595 ["final decree of divorce conclusively determines, as between the parties thereto, that they were legally married; and this regardless of the true fact"].)
Finally, we are not persuaded by Tran's argument he is entitled to appellate relief because a trial "court may not endorse or enforce a provision in a settlement agreement or stipulation which is illegal, contrary to public policy, or unjust. [Citations.]" Tran relies on our recent decision in Graylee v. Castro (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1107, which involved a liquidated damages clause in a stipulated judgment that was directly attacked and appealed by the appellants. (Id. at p. 1112.) Tran provides no comparison between application of the public policy implicated there (against contractual penalties provisions enforced against residential tenants) and the policy implicated here (against bigamous marriages). The lack of comparative analysis in Tran's briefing combined with the fact that no collateral attack issues were implicated in Graylee renders the case unpersuasive, particularly given this state's well-established public policy interest in finality of judgments.
DISPOSITION
The December 5, 2020, postjudgment order and December 5, 2020, judgment are affirmed. In the interests of justice, no costs on appeal are awarded. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, J., MARKS, J.[*]
[*] Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.