Opinion
Case No. 4:02CV188.
February 18, 2002.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this civil complaint, Plaintiff seeks, in addition to damages for violations of his constitutional rights, a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to enjoin the government from proceeding to trial against him in criminal case no. 4:01CR207, scheduled to begin on February 4, 2002 in the Northern District of Ohio.
First, the Court, sua sponte, shall consider whether it has subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. Federal courts have a continuing obligation to inquire into the basis of subject-matter jurisdiction to satisfy themselves that jurisdiction to entertain an action exists. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1361 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1140, 116 S.Ct. 973, 133 L.Ed.2d 893 (1996) "Unlike other issues not involving the merits of a case, subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by any party or even sua sponte by the court itself." Franzel v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 959 F.2d 628, 630 (6th Cir. 1992); See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) ("[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action"). Jurisdiction may not be presumed and may not be gained by consent, inaction, or stipulation, even on appeal. Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 130 L.Ed.2d 1082, 115 S.Ct. 118.
Although a pro se complaint must be held to a less stringent standard than that prepared by an attorney, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), the courts have not been willing to abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se suits. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). "[M]ore than bare assertions of legal conclusions is ordinarily required to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements." Id. A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). Thus, the less stringent standard for pro se plaintiffs does not compel the courts to conjure up unpleaded facts to support conclusory allegations. Id.
Furthermore, over the years the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit," Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579, 24 S.Ct. 553, 557, 48 L.Ed. 795 (1904); "wholly insubstantial," Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 82 S.Ct. 549, 551, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962); "obviously frivolous," Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288, 30 S.Ct. 326, 327, 54 L.Ed. 482 (1910); "plainly unsubstantial," Levering Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105, 53 S.Ct. 549, 550, 77 L.Ed. 1062 (1933); or "no longer open to discussion," McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 80, 30 S.Ct. 27, 31, 54 L.Ed. 95 (1909). Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1378-80, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974).
Moreover, a federal question is not substantial if "it is `obviously without merit' or because `its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court [the Supreme Court] as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.'" Levering Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 53 S.Ct. 549; Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288, 30 S.Ct. 326, 327; McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 80, 30 S.Ct. 27, 31." Hagans, 415 U.S. at 537, 94 S.Ct. at 1379 (Quoting Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31-32, 54 S.Ct. 3, 4, 78 L.Ed. 152 (1933)).
Under the holding of Hagans, there must be some minimum degree of substantiality or non-frivolity to the federal claim. If the claim is obviously without merit or wholly frivolous the federal court may dismiss for want of jurisdiction. A strong indicator of the insubstantiality of the federal claim is the resolution of the claimed issue in a prior Supreme Court decision. Nolan v. Meyer, 520 F.2d 1276, 1278 (2d Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
In order to establish a cause of action under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must show that the named defendant was involved in misconduct that was motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 559-60 (6th Cir. 2000) (Quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters Joiners of Am., Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 829 (1983)). Plaintiff's complaint lacks any factual allegations that the defendant's alleged actions were based upon his race or a class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Thus, Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim is without merit and this Court must dismiss the claim for want of jurisdiction.
In his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief based upon alleged violations of his constitutional rights secured under the First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Complaint at 6 10. Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any fights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The plain language of the statute explicitly restricts Section 1983 liability to individual state officials, municipalities, or individuals acting under color of state law. To the contrary, in the instant complaint, Plaintiff alleges federal rather than state action, as the only named defendant is the United States of America.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court announced that plaintiffs may sue federal officials for denying them their constitutional rights. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390-97. Section 1983 case law applies to Bivens actions. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). Based on Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court would necessarily convert his Section 1983 action into a Bivens action, except that a Bivens action for damages may be brought only against individual federal officials, not against the United States. Shaner v. United States, 976 F.2d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1992) (Citing Ashbrook v. Block, 917 F.2d 918, 924 (6th Cir. 1990)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to name individual federal officials as defendants in this action. Thus, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's damages claim.
The Court now turns to Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. In Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the D.C. Circuit addressed federal court power to enjoin a federal criminal proceeding. Deaver challenged the constitutionality of the independent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act and sought to enjoin the counsel's exercise of prosecutorial authority. After the district court, relying on the four-part test in Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977), denied his request for injunctive relief, Deaver moved before the Court of Appeals for a stay pending the determination of the constitutionality of the independent counsel provision. Deaver alleged that he would suffer imminent, irreparable harm from being indicted.
The D.C. Circuit stated:
The district court, applying the Holiday Tours test, thought it necessary to consider the likelihood that appellant would succeed on the merits of his constitutional challenge to the authority of the independent counsel. We do not. Even were we disposed to agree entirely with appellant's constitutional argument, we think he has no right to an injunction restraining a pending indictment in a federal court. The traditional rule, dating back to the English division between courts of law and equity, was that the latter had "no jurisdiction over the prosecution, the punishment or the pardon of crimes or misdemeanors" and therefore could not enjoin criminal proceedings, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210, 8 S.Ct. 482, 487, 31 L.Ed. 402 (1888).
Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d at 68.
The Deaver Court recognized that, "[b]y implication, the existence of [Fed.R.Crim.P.] 12(b)(1) suggests that appellant's constitutional challenge is not to be raised in a preindictment civil injunctive action." Id. at 70. In other words, the proper vehicle for a pre-conviction constitutional challenge is a motion to dismiss in the criminal proceeding.
The D.C. Circuit concluded:
Congress has established a comprehensive set of rules governing federal criminal prosecutions — the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These rules provide adequate, although limited, opportunities for defendants to challenge shortcomings in prosecutorial authority. The final judgment rule, moreover, generally prevents defendants from bringing appeals until after conviction. We cannot allow Deaver to avoid these rules — and thereby encourage a flood of disruptive civil litigation — by bringing his constitutional defense in an independent civil suit. Prospective defendants cannot, by bringing ancillary equitable proceedings, circumvent federal criminal procedure.
Id. at 71 (Emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), held that Section 1983 actions, like civil tort actions, are not "appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments . . . that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement." Id. at 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364. In Ruff v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth Circuit reasoned that, "In order to protect against a collateral attack on pending or outstanding . . . convictions or sentences, the Supreme Court concluded that `in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by action whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . . or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.'" Ruff, 258 F.3d at 502 (Quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486) (Emphasis added).
The Sixth Circuit extended the Heck holding to Bivens actions in Robinson v. Jones, 142 F.3d 905, 907 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that the "Heck holding applies equally to an action brought under Bivens" so that a federal prisoner could not bring a Bivens action until demonstrating that his conviction has been "declared invalid or otherwise impugned as set forth in Heck.") Therefore, the rationale of Heck prohibits courts from granting injunctive relief which would, in effect, require a court in a civil proceeding to render a decision regarding the validity of a pending criminal prosecution.
Consequently, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's action for damages or injunctive relief. Accordingly, this matter is DISMISSED sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.