Opinion
23A-DC-3034
07-16-2024
Leslie Townsend, Appellant-Petitioner v. Brian Townsend, Appellee-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Brian A. Karle Ball Eggleston, PC Lafayette, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Kurtis G. Fouts Fouts Law Office Delphi, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the White Circuit Court The Honorable Jason A. Thompson, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 91C01-2209-DC-44
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Brian A. Karle
Ball Eggleston, PC
Lafayette, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Kurtis G. Fouts
Fouts Law Office
Delphi, Indiana
Bradford and Tavitas Judges concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Leslie Townsend (Wife) appeals the decree dissolving her marriage to Brian Townsend (Husband). She challenges the valuation of the parties' business, the trial court's finding regarding the business's goodwill, the child support calculation, the valuation date for the mortgage on the marital home, the division of the marital property, and the valuation of a certain marital asset. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Husband and Wife were married in August 2012. They had one child, E.T. (Child), born in December 2013. During the marriage, the parties resided in a home located in Monticello. Husband worked in the crop-dusting industry, and Wife worked in a dental office.
Wife ended her employment with the dental office in 2015.
[¶3] In 2018, Husband entered into an agreement with his father to purchase his father's crop-dusting business. Husband and Wife formed an entity, On Target Applicators, LLC (OTA), to operate the business. Husband and his father agreed on a total purchase price of $565,000, without the benefit of an appraisal, instead basing the price on the business's average revenue over the last five years and informal conversations with other crop-dusting pilots about what they would pay for the business. The purchase price included the purchase of the father's customer list, and Husband agreed that OTA would pay his father $340,000 for the list in equal annual installments of $34,000 over the next ten years at zero interest. The most significant tangible asset held by the business was a helicopter, which in 2018 had appraised at a value of between $275,000 and $300,000.
[¶4] OTA provides crop-dusting services using a helicopter, which has maneuvering capabilities to allow OTA to service farmland that cannot be accessed with a fixed-wing plane. In 2018, the first year of operation, OTA hired a pilot to fly the helicopter and perform the crop-dusting services. Later, Husband obtained his helicopter pilot's license and began performing those duties himself. Wife performed administrative duties, including bookkeeping and paying bills.
[¶5] In September 2022, Wife petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. In December, the trial court issued a provisional order that, among other things, granted possession of the marital home to Wife, ordered Husband to pay 75% of the mortgage "in lieu of child support[,]" and ordered Wife to pay 25% of the mortgage. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 15. The Court further provisionally ordered OTA to pay various expenses of the parties, including Husband's truck payment and gasoline, Wife's internet, cable, and land-line telephone, and the parties' cellphones and health insurance. The court also ordered that the parties each receive $4,000 per month from OTA. In addition, Wife was permitted to retain her income as a personal trainer, which the trial court found to be $25,000 per year. Husband was permitted to retain his VA benefits of $1,300 per month. The parties were directed to "attempt to agree to select a business valuator" for the business. Id.
[¶6] The final hearing for the dissolution was held in August 2023. The most significant assets of the marriage were the marital home and OTA. Regarding the marital home, the parties agreed that it was valued at $300,000. The home was subject to a mortgage, and Wife asked the trial court to use the $124,889 mortgage balance, the balance as of the date she had filed her petition for dissolution, in determining the division of the marital property. Husband asked the court to use the $113,167.74 balance that existed when the final hearing took place.
[¶7] As for the value of OTA, Wife offered the testimony of Glen Allie from Del Principe &Allie, P.C. (Wife's Expert), along with his written valuation report. Husband offered the testimony of Thomas Wagner of Blue &Company, LLC (Husband's Expert), and his written valuation report. Wife's Expert valued the business at $558,000, and Husband's Expert valued the business at $204,000.
[¶8] The parties' assets also included two one-wheeled skateboards. Both Husband and Wife agreed that the skateboards should be valued, in total, at $4,000.
[¶9] On October 6, 2023, the trial court issued its findings, conclusions, and order dissolving the parties' marriage and addressing child- and property-related issues. Relevant to this appeal, the court adopted the later mortgage balance of $113,167.74 for the marital home and adopted the $204,000 value for OTA. The court ordered equal parenting time, calculated the child support obligation based on Husband exercising 184 overnight visits with Child, and ordered Husband to pay Wife $299 per week in child support. The court valued the parties' one-wheeled skateboards at $2,000, not $4,000 as agreed. The relevant findings and conclusions read specifically as follows:
MARITAL ESTATE
Agreed Values
21. That the parties have presented evidence regarding their assets and liabilities at the date of final hearing. The parties have agree[d] the following property, at the time of hearing, is in the marital estate with the agreed values, to-wit:
[Marital Home]
Fair Market Value $ 300,000.00
Pennymac Mortgage Loan $-113[,]167.74
Tangible Personal Property
Two (2) one-wheeled skateboards $ 2,000.00
PROPERTY DIVISION
24. That the primary issue between the parties is the proper business valuation of [OTA].
28. That part of the sale agreement consisted of payments of $34,000.00 over 10 years for the intangibles and enterprise goodwill assets of the company.
29. That Wife's [E]xpert .. provided the court a valuation of .. $558,000.00. 30. That Husband's [E]xpert .. provided the court a valuation of ... $204,000.00.
35. That "the court distinguishes between enterprise goodwill, which is divisible property, and personal goodwill, which is excluded from the marital estate. Enterprise goodwill is based on the intangible, but generally marketable, existence in a business of established relations with employees, customers and suppliers, and may include factors such as a business location, its name recognition and its business reputation."
36. That Wife's [E]xpert failed to address the varying degrees of personal goodwill and enterprise goodwill. Furthermore, Wife's [E]xpert had minimal conversations with Husband about the business, who is the pilot, holds the namesake of the business, does a majority of the maintenance on all the aircraft, and runs many other aspects of the business.
37. That this [c]ourt adopts [Husband's Expert's] business valuation in the amount of $204,000.00[.]
42. Based upon the division of assets and liabilities of the marriage as set out herein, . . . Wife should receive a net of [$234,637.26] and . . . Husband should receive a net of [$284,818.23].
43. Based upon the division of such marital assets and liabilities, ... Husband is receiving approximately $50,180.97 in excess of value compared to Wife.
44. Based upon the evidence presented and the findings of the [c]ourt herein, the [c]ourt now FINDS and ORDERS that . . . Wife shall receive a credit of [$25,090.48] as her share of contribution toward the equity in the marital estate. This sum shall be paid by . . . Husband to . . . Wife within 180 days hereof the date of this Order[.]
Appealed Order at 1-7 (emphases added) (internal citations omitted).
[¶10] On November 2, 2023, Wife filed a motion to correct error. The trial court denied the motion. Wife now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[¶11] Where, as here, the trial court asks the parties to submit proposed findings and then enters findings of fact and conclusions on its own motion, "the specific findings control only as to the issues they cover, while a general judgment standard applies to any issue upon which the court has not found." Apter v. Ross, 781 N.E.2d 744, 751 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), trans. denied. "The specific findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous, and we will affirm the general judgment on any legal theory supported by the evidence." Id. "A finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom that support it." Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. Buse v. Trs. of Luce Twp. Reg'l Sewer Dist., 953 N.E.2d 519, 523 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011).
[¶12] "In reviewing the trial court's findings, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support the finding." Apter, 781 N.E.2d at 751 (citation omitted). While we defer substantially to a trial court's findings of fact, we do not do so to conclusions of law. Buse, 953 N.E.2d at 523. "We evaluate questions of law de novo and owe no deference to a trial court's determination of such questions." Id. (quoting McCauley v. Harris, 928 N.E.2d 309, 313 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), trans. denied (2011)). "In other words, '[a] decision is clearly erroneous if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances that were before the trial court' or if the court misinterprets the law." Id. (quoting Young v. Young, 891 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2008)).
[¶13] Wife contends that the trial court erred by (1) adopting the value of $204,000 for OTA and finding that Wife's Expert failed to address in detail the business's goodwill, (2) calculating child support based on an incorrect determination of Husband's overnight visits with Child, (3) using the mortgage balance for the marital home that existed at the time the final hearing was held, (4) dividing the marital property without crediting her for her share of the mortgage payments, and (5) assigning an incorrect valuation to Husband's two one-wheeled skateboards. We address each argument in turn.
Section 1 - The trial court did not abuse its discretion by adopting Husband's Expert's value of $204,000 for OTA, but it did err by failing to add back to that amount the discount that had been applied due to neither party holding a controlling interest in OTA at the time the valuation was completed.
[¶14] Wife challenges the trial court's decision to adopt the $204,000 valuation for OTA, arguing that the figure is "a gross undervaluation" considering the following:
the value of [OTA's] tangible assets, OTA's consistent and growing gross sales and annual profit, its present earnings and bank balance, . . .the absence of any competitor in the market[,] profits in excess of $230,000 for three consecutive years[, the primary tangible asset[, the helicopter, is] worth $300,000 (with no debt tied to it)[, and the business has] approximately $330,000 in bank deposits and anticipated receipts.
Appellant's Br. at 13. Wife also challenges the valuation on grounds that OTA's only long-term debt consists of the four installments of $34,000 owed to Husband's father, and the $204,000 valuation is more than $360,000 less than OTA's purchase price. Wife contends that OTA should be valued at $558,000.
[¶15] A trial court's decision in assigning a value to property in a dissolution action is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Del Priore v. Del Priore, 65 N.E.3d 1065, 1076 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), trans. denied (2017). Generally, there is no abuse of discretion if a trial court's chosen valuation is within the range of values supported by the evidence. Id. "A valuation submitted by one of the parties is competent evidence of the value of property in a dissolution action and may alone support the trial court's determination in that regard." Id. (citing Alexander v. Alexander, 927 N.E.2d 926, 935 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), trans. denied). On appeal, "we resist the temptation to get deeply involved in analyzing the valuation evidence presented at trial." Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ind. 1996). Finally, when we review a trial court's valuation of property in a dissolution, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Del Priore, 65 N.E.3d at 1076-77.
[¶16] The concept of a business's goodwill is relevant to our review of OTA's valuation. In Yoon v. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265, 1268 (Ind. 1999), the Indiana Supreme Court discussed goodwill as follows:
Goodwill has been described as the value of a business or practice that exceeds the combined value of the net assets used in the business. Goodwill in a professional practice may be attributable to the business enterprise itself by virtue of its existing arrangements with suppliers, customers or others, and its anticipated future customer base due to factors attributable to the business. It may also be attributable to the individual owner's personal skill, training or reputation. This distinction is sometimes reflected in the use of the term "enterprise goodwill," as opposed to "personal goodwill."(Internal citations omitted.)
[¶17] In valuing the business, the trial court must consider whether goodwill that is included within the total value of a business enterprise is personal to one spouse. Id. at 1269. The portion of a business's goodwill attributable to the skill, training, or reputation of the owner as an individual-the personal goodwill-is not includable as a divisible marital asset. Id. Conversely, the portion of the goodwill attributable to the name recognition, location, and reputation of the business itself-the enterprise goodwill-is properly includable as a divisible marital asset. Id. at 1268-69.
[¶18] Here, the trial court heard testimony from both parties' experts regarding the value that should be assigned to OTA. Wife's Expert testified that, in preparing the evaluation, he relied on "two main sources of information[,]" the business's financials and discussions with Husband. Tr. Vol. 2 at 15. Wife's Expert told the court that he had spent approximately thirty minutes speaking with Husband about his "participation in the business[,]" . . . "what the future held[,]" the equipment Husband used in the business, the competition that the business faced, and the business serving a niche market. Id.
[¶19] Wife's Expert further testified that he had used the excess earnings method to determine OTA's value, explaining that the method involves calculating "not only the tangible value of [the business's] assets, but . . . also . . . the intangible value of assets." Id. at 16-17. Wife's Expert testified that the tangible assets included the helicopter and a semi-tractor-trailer truck. In arriving at the value of $558,000, Wife's Expert explained that he added $100,000 to the 2018 appraised value of the tangible assets, based on Husband keeping up with "all of the required maintenance" for the helicopter. Id. at 21, 22. Wife's Expert further testified that he had applied a 5% discount of $30,937 to account for Husband and Wife each owning a 50% share of OTA at the time the valuation was completed, with neither party holding a controlling interest. Wife's Expert told the court that, in valuing the business, he had also examined the business's debt, cash flow, and earnings. However, Wife's Expert did not assign separate values for the enterprise and personal goodwill.
[¶20] Husband's Expert testified to his valuation process, telling the trial court that he had spent between twenty-five and thirty hours interviewing Husband about the business. He testified that he had relied on the income approach method to determine the business's value and that, per that method, "the value of the business is dependent on the cash flows the business develops[.]" Id. at 52. He added that the method is "typically most appropriate[ly applied] to a closely held business[.]" Id. Husband's Expert also testified that he had assigned values for both the enterprise goodwill and the personal goodwill.
[¶21] Husband's Expert further testified that he had reviewed Wife's Expert's valuation report. He told the court that he disagreed with the use of the excess earnings method, stating that it is considered a disfavored method of last resort that should not be used if other valuation methods are available. Husband's Expert also testified that he believed that Wife's Expert had used outdated appraisal standards and had mischaracterized unearned revenue as an asset when it should have been reflected as a liability. In arriving at the $204,000 value, Husband's Expert applied a 5% discount of $11,257 to account for neither party holding a controlling interest in OTA at that time. On crossexamination, Husband's Expert was asked if "the [5%] discount for lack of control" of OTA would change and produce an increased valuation amount "if Husband had full legal rights to make a hundred percent of the [business] decisions[.]" Id. at 95. Husband's Expert replied, "Correct." Id.
The parties and their expert witnesses also provided competing evidence on the values assigned for the labor Husband and Wife provided for OTA as pilot and bookkeeper, respectively. And the parties presented competing positions as to the characterization and division of the funds in OTA's bank account as of the date of the final hearing. Wife testified that the money in the business bank account was primarily profit, while Husband testified that the funds were needed to cover significant maintenance and other expenses, including the purchase of new rotor blades for the helicopter.
[¶22] Here, the trial court heard the testimony of two qualified experts who presented opposing opinions, supported by their reports and reasoning, as to the value of OTA. Ultimately, the court found the testimony of Husband's Expert to be more instructive and persuasive regarding the appropriate valuation of OTA and rejected Wife's Expert's valuation. It was for the trial court to decide which opinion to accept. We cannot reweigh the evidence or "judge the credibility of the battling expert witnesses." Goodwine v. Goodwine, 819 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in adopting Husband's Expert's $204,000 valuation of OTA over Wife's.
Wife challenges the trial court's finding that her expert "failed to address the varying degrees of personal goodwill and enterprise goodwill." Appealed Order at 5 (finding 36). However, the record reveals that Wife's Expert did not differentiate between personal and enterprise goodwill. Indeed, when Wife's Expert was asked on direct examination whether he had "differentiate[d] in any way about [goodwill,]" when he assigned a particular value to goodwill, the expert agreed that the assigned value included "all the [goodwill] from the business[.]" Tr. Vol. 2 at 28 (emphasis added). During Husband's Expert's direct examination, in response to being asked if Wife's Expert had made a distinction between personal and enterprise goodwill, Husband's Expert testified, "No, he did not." Id. at 50. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Wife's Expert failed to address the "varying degrees" of personal and enterprise goodwill. Appealed Order at 5 (finding 36).
[¶23] However, we find that the trial court did err by failing to add to the $204,000 value the $11,257 discount that Husband's Expert had applied due to neither party holding a controlling interest in OTA at the time the valuation was completed. In its final decree, the trial court awarded OTA to Husband in its entirety, resulting in Husband obtaining a 100% interest in the business and negating the need for a lack-of-control discount. Accordingly, we remand this case and instruct the trial court to add back the $11,257 discount to the $204,000 valuation and add one-half of the discount, that is, $5,629, to the equalization payment that Husband owes to Wife, without the necessity of another hearing.
Section 2 - The trial court did not abuse its discretion by calculating Husband's child support obligation based on Husband exercising 184 overnight visits with Child.
[¶24] Next, Wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating Husband's child support obligation. The trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $299 per week in child support. The court's child support obligation worksheet included a parenting time credit to Husband for 184 overnight visits with Child, which equated to a weekly credit of $106.76.
[¶25] Wife argues that the calculation "over-credits" Husband's overnight visits. Appellant's Br. at 20. Wife maintains that Husband will not exercise the seventeen visits because Husband's work as a crop-dusting helicopter pilot "includes a period of 5-6 weeks [in the summer] in which much of that labor is concentrated[,]" and, during that time, Child is with Wife "[p]retty much everyday[,] [t]wenty-four seven[.]" Id. (internal citation omitted). According to Wife, the child support calculation should be based on 168 overnight visits to avoid "shifting] the support burden to Wife ... and incorrectly reduc[ing] Husband's child support obligation." Id.
[¶26] Indiana Child Support Guideline 6 provides, "A credit should be awarded for the number of overnights each year that the child(ren) spend with the noncustodial parent." While parenting time credit is not mandatory, it may be awarded in recognition that overnight visits with the noncustodial parent who provides such things as meals and transportation may alter some of the financial burden of the parents. Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 743 (Ind. 2015).
[¶27] When reviewing a child-support order, we presume that the trial court's calculation of child support is valid and will set aside the order only if clearly erroneous. Id. at 738. We may not reverse a parenting time credit determination unless the trial court manifestly abuses its discretion. Vandenburgh v. Vandenburgh, 916 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009). "No abuse of discretion occurs if there is a rational basis in the record supporting the trial court's determination." Saalfrank v. Saalfrank, 899 N.E.2d 671, 681 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
[¶28] Wife testified, and Husband did not dispute, that Husband's busy season as a helicopter pilot is concentrated in a five-to-six-week period in the summer and that, during the summer of 2023, "[t]here were maybe one or two days [Husband] took [the child] for four hours each in that time span." Tr. Vol. 2 at 117-118. Thus, the record supports that there is a period during the summers when Husband inevitably will be unable to exercise his scheduled overnight visitation with Child.
[¶29] However, Wife also testified that she and Husband did not need daycare and could be home whenever necessary, as both have flexible work schedules. And we do not read the trial court's order regarding custody and parenting time as excluding the make-up provision of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (IPTG). Indeed, IPTG Section I(C)(2) provides in relevant part:
2. Adjustments to Schedule / "Make Up" Time. Whenever there is a need to adjust the established parenting schedules because of events outside the normal family routine or the control of the parent requiring the adjustment, the parent who becomes aware of the circumstance shall notify the other parent as far in advance as possible. Recurring events which may require an adjustment, such as . . . annual work obligations, should be communicated as soon as those scheduled events are published. Both parents shall then attempt to reach a mutually acceptable adjustment to the parenting schedule.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in giving Husband a parenting time credit of 184 overnights when calculating his child support obligation.
Section 3 - The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital property by using the $113,167.74 marital home mortgage balance that existed when the final hearing was held, and the trial court's finding regarding that figure was not erroneous.
[¶30] Wife contends that the trial court erred when, in dividing the marital property, the court applied the $113,167.74 marital home mortgage balance that existed as of the date of the final hearing. Wife maintains that the court should have applied instead the $124,889 balance that existed on the date she filed her dissolution petition.
[¶31] A trial court has broad discretion in determining the date upon which to value marital assets. Wilson v. Wilson, 732 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied. For purposes of choosing a date upon which to value marital assets, the trial court may select any date between the date of filing the petition for dissolution and the date of the final hearing. Id. Here, the trial court selected the date of the final hearing as the valuation date for the mortgage balance. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in selecting that date.
[¶32] Wife further maintains that the trial court erroneously found that the $113,167.74 mortgage balance amount was an "agreed" value by the parties. Appealed Order at 3. Regarding the challenged finding, the trial court specifically found that the "parties have agree[d] the following property, at the time of hearing, is in the marital estate with the agreed values, to-wit: . . . Pennymac Mortgage Loan[, $113,167.74]." Id. (emphasis added). "A finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom that support it." Apter, 781 N.E.2d at 751. Here, however, the record established that the parties did not dispute that the $113,167.74 figure was the mortgage balance as of the date of the final hearing. As such, the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous.
Section 4 - The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital property by not crediting Wife for her 25% share of the marital home mortgage payment.
[¶33] In this case, the trial court ordered Husband to pay provisionally 75% of the parties' marital home mortgage in lieu of paying child support. Wife was ordered to pay 25% of the mortgage and the cost of the utilities. In its final decree, the trial court awarded the marital residence, valued at $300,000, to Wife but assigned the $113,167.74 mortgage loan balance to her as a liability, ordering Wife to "pay the ... liabilit[y] and hold Husband harmless." Appealed Order at 6.
[¶34] On appeal, Wife contends that when the trial court used the $113,167.74 mortgage balance to calculate the equity in the marital home and determined the division of the marital property, the court provided Husband "a credit of $11,721.26 in the parties' property division[.]" Appellant's Br. at 23. Thus, according to Wife, the court allowed Husband to "benefit[] both from ... Wife's mortgage payments and Husband's payments" and failed to account for Wife's contribution to the mortgage payments. Id. Wife asks this Court to remand the matter with instructions that the trial court use the $124,889 mortgage loan balance for purposes of dividing the marital property and order Husband to make an additional equalization payment.
[¶35] Initially, we note that a provisional order is designed to maintain the status quo of the parties. Mosley v. Mosley, 906 N.E.2d 928, 929 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009). The determination of temporary orders in a dissolution proceeding is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and it can issue orders for temporary maintenance or support, temporary restraining orders, custody orders, and orders for possession of property to the extent it deems just and proper. Ind. Code § 31-15-4-8. A provisional order is temporary in nature and terminates when the final dissolution decree is entered or the petition for dissolution is dismissed. Ind. Code § 31-15-4-14.
[¶36] Regarding the division of marital property, it is well settled that said division lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Del Priore, 65 N.E.3d at 1073. We may not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses, and we will consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's disposition of the marital property. Id. Although the facts and reasonable inferences might allow for a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id. This case turns on "whether the trial court's division of the marital property was just and reasonable." Morgal-Henrich v. Henrich, 970 N.E.2d 207, 210-11 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012).
[¶37] Here, the trial court's provisional order was "merely an interim order in place during the pendency of the dissolution proceedings, which terminate[d] when the final dissolution decree [was] entered." Mosely, 906 N.E.2d at 930. In its final decree, the trial court determined that Husband should keep the term life insurance, OTA, undistributed income from OTA, one vehicle, a fishing boat, various personal property, two bank accounts, and an individual retirement account (IRA)-subject to the parties' credit card debt-for a total value of approximately $284,818. The court determined that Wife should keep the residence, a vehicle, two IRAs, and various personal property-subject to the $113,167.74 mortgage loan balance-for a total value of approximately $234,637. The court found that Husband was receiving approximately $50,000 more than Wife and determined that Wife should receive an equalization payment from Husband of around $25,000.
[¶38] In this case, the trial court's distribution of the marital estate resulted in an equal division of the parties' marital property. The trial court was not required to "follow a rigid, technical formula in dividing the marital estate and we ... assume that it applied the law correctly." Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 229 (Ind. 2022). And there is a statutory presumption that "an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable." Ind. Code § 31-157-5. Based on the foregoing, Wife has failed to show that the trial court's division of the marital property was not just and reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital property by not crediting Wife for her 25% share of the marital home mortgage payment.
Husband also argues that Wife's income was greater than his income at the time the trial court issued its provisional order and that, absent the trial court directing Husband to pay a portion of the mortgage in lieu of child support, Wife would have owed child support, not Husband. However, given our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital property, we do not reach this argument.
Section 5 - The trial court abused its discretion in valuing Husband's skateboards at $2,000.
[¶39] Finally, we address whether the trial court erred by assigning a value of $2,000, in total, for Husband's two one-wheeled skateboards. The parties agree that the skateboards should have been valued at $2,000 each, for a total value of $4,000. After reviewing the record, we agree with the parties and find that the trial court abused its discretion by assigning a value of $2,000. We remand this case and instruct the trial court to assign a total value of $4,000 for the skateboards and add $2,000 to Husband's equalization payment, without the necessity of another hearing.
Conclusion
[¶40] In sum, the trial court did not err in valuing the parties' business at $204,000, finding that Wife's Expert failed to address in detail the business's goodwill, calculating child support, using the mortgage balance for the marital home that existed when the final hearing was held, and dividing the marital property. However, the trial court erred by (1) failing to add to the $204,000 value the $11,257 discount that had been applied due to neither party holding a controlling interest in OTA at the time the valuation was completed and (2) assigning an incorrect valuation for Husband's two one-wheeled skateboards. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions to the trial court to add a total of $7,629 to the $25,090.48 equalization payment that the court ordered Husband to remit to Wife.
[¶41] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.