Opinion
Case No. 99 C 1971
August 9, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Dorothy Townsend, was denied benefits under the Social Security Act by Joanne Barnhart, the Commissioner of Social Security. On January 23, 2002, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated that judgment and remanded the case back to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Plaintiff has now filed a motion for an award of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d). As we explain below, we deny Ms. Townsend's application for attorney's fees.
Under the EAJA, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the government, attorney's fees and expenses, unless the court finds that the position of the Commissioner was "substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A). Townsend is a prevailing party because her case was disposed of pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 296-7 (1993). The Commissioner's position is substantially justified "if a reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact." Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 1994) cited in Corder v. Massanari, No. 00 C 2714, 2001 WL 1355986 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 1, 2001) (citations omitted). Demonstrating substantial justification requires that the government show "that its position was grounded in reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; 2) a reasonable basis in law for the the propounded; and 3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and the legal theory advanced." United States v. Hallmark Construction Co., 200 F.3d 1076, 10809 (7th Cir. 2000) citing Phil Smidt Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1987), internal citations omitted.
Under the EAJA, the government bears the burden of proving that its position was substantially justified. Cummings v. Sullivan, 950 F.2d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1991). The question of the government's "substantial justification" is reviewed on appeal under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.
The facts underlying the plaintiff's complaint are set out in the opinion of the Seventh Circuit, No. 01 C 2336, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1018 (7th Cir., January 23, 2002), and thus will only be briefly mentioned here. The plaintiff sought relief from the Commissioner's denial of disability insurance benefits ("DIB") in federal district court, arguing that the ALJ and Commissioner unreasonably determined that she did not have any problems rotating her neck or with neck pain, which would prevent her from working. On July 13, 2000, Magistrate Judge Rosemond affirmed the Commissioners decision, finding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's denial of benefits. The judge also denied Ms. Townsend's motion to reconsider. The plaintiff filed a timely appeal, and on January 23, 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit stated that there was insufficient articulation, explanation and analysis of the evidence by the ALJ to affirm the Commissioners decision. Specifically, the ALJ failed to explain why he found Ms. Townsend's testimony about pain to be inconsistent with the medical evidence and with her description of her daily activities. The ALJ similarly failed to minimally articulate why he credited certain doctors' testimony over others, especially with regards to the conflicting evidence of whether plaintiff suffered from a herniated disk. Finally, the ALJ failed to address Ms. Townsend's three failed attempts to return to work when he determined that she was able to perform her past work as a circuit board assembler.
The Commissioner argues that its litigation position in the underlying action was substantially justified, so we should reject the plaintiff's application for attorney's fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d). The Commissioner further argues that if this Court should find that fees are appropriate, that those fees should be lowered because the plaintiff failed to show that the fee request was reasonable.
The plaintiff argues that because she overcame the difficult standard of proving there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision, this Court should find that the Commissioner's position was not substantially justified. Although the plaintiff recognizes that the question of substantial justification at the EAJA stage is distinct from that of whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence (the "merits standard"), see Cummings, 950 F.2d at 498, she argues that the standards are so similar that in determining whether there is substantial justification, the court's merits reasoning may in fact be quite relevant. "In some cases, the standard of review on the merits is so close to the reasonableness standard applicable to determining substantial justification that a losing agency is unlikely to be able to show that its position was substantially justified." F.J. Vollmer Co., Inc. v. Magaw, 102 F.3d 591, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1996); See United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 209 (1st Cir. 1992).
While the Seventh Circuit's merits reasoning may in fact be relevant to this decision, a district court at the EAJA stage must look at the case from a fresh perspective and reach a judgment separate from its merits decision. Federal Election Commission v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1087-90 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The government's position, although ultimately rejected, can have a reasonable basis in law and fact, and therefore be substantially justified. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). The Underwood court expressly noted that the losing party in an EAJA case may have taken a substantially justified position. Id. at 569.
In this case, the Commissioner's arguments — although ultimately unsuccessful on the merits — were substantially justified. The major reason for remand by the Seventh Circuit was the ALJ's lack of analysis and explanation in deeming Ms. Townsend's testimony insufficient and in crediting certain doctors' opinions over others. The evidence in the case was conflicting. That is, some doctors (including a treating neurologist) found that Ms. Townsend was able to return to work, while other doctors were less certain. Another of Ms. Townsend's treating physicians (Dr. Jacob), found that she did not have a herniated disk, although an MRI indicated the existence of such an impairment. Although Ms. Townsend testified that she could not work because of constant neck pain, she performed gardening work "a little at a time" and sometimes took care of her one-year-old grand-daughter. Thus, even though the Seventh Circuit ultimately determined that the ALJ did not minimally articulate the reasoning behind his conclusions, we find that there was enough evidence that conflicted with the plaintiff's position for the Commissioner to be able to justifiably rely on it and argue that the plaintiff was not entitled to benefits. The fact that the ALJ may not have explained his analysis of the evidence sufficiently to support his position does not alter the fact that the evidence was strong enough for the Commissioner to reasonably rely on it.
Therefore, the plaintiff's petition for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Justice Act is denied. It is so ordered.
ENTER: