Opinion
18-CV-4665 (RA) (KNF)
01-07-2021
WILFREDO TORRES, Plaintiff, v. NYC HEALTH + HOSPITALS; JOHN DOE BELLEVUE DOCTORS #1-4; JOHN DOE SECURITY GUARDS #1-3; DOCTOR RACHEL WINCHESTER; DOCTOR MICHAEL KAUFER; JOHN DOE PSYCHIATRIST #1; JANE DOE PSYCHIATRIST #2, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KEVIN NATHANIEL FOX, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO THE HONORABLE RONNIE ABRAMS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Wilfredo Torres (“Torres”), proceeding pro se, commenced this action on May 25, 2018, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, seeking redress for alleged violations of his First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and for violations of “pendent state law claims.” Before the Court is the defendant Health and Hospitals Corporation's (“HHC”) motion, made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Torres opposes the motion.
BACKGROUND
Torres contends that, on September 28, 2015, and on April 28, 2016, members of the New York City Police and Fire Departments broke down the door to his apartment and entered in, without having a warrant or other authorization to do so. In connection with the April 28, 2016 event, Torres maintains that he was removed from his home, against his will by the municipal employees, and transported, via ambulance, to HHC's Bellevue Hospital. According to Torres, while at the hospital, he was assaulted by HHC security personnel and forcibly injected by physicians with medication(s) which caused him to lose consciousness. Torres recalls that he was held at the hospital for 24 hours and “released with a diagnosis of ‘delirium.'”
As a result of the events that occurred on September 28, 2015, Torres commenced an action in this court on March 29, 2016, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the New York City Police and Buildings Departments and his landlord, Bellevue South Associates, for violating his First and Fourth Amendment rights, assault, false arrest and false imprisonment. The action was assigned docket number 16-CV-2362. Thereafter, on October 24, 2016, Torres amended the complaint to name Bellevue Hospital, among others, as a defendant in that action and to include factual allegations pertaining to the events of April 28, 2016.
On June 27, 2017, Torres filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362. Torres maintained that the proposed second amended complaint would provide details about the two invasions of his home noted above and specify “which individuals and institutions are responsible for particular acts.” Insofar as is relevant here, HHC opposed Torres's motion to amend his complaint for a second time and urged the Court to deny it. HHC contended that the Court had granted a request by Torres to enlarge, from October 14, 2016, to October 24, 2016, the time for amending pleadings and joining additional parties, and Torres amended his complaint on October 24, 2016. Therefore, Torres's motion to amend his complaint for a second time was “untimely, unduly delayed and prejudicial to defendants, ” coming “nearly nine months” after the time to amend expired and approximately one month prior to the close of discovery. Furthermore, according to HHC, Torres failed to show good cause, as required by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for modifying the Court's October 18, 2016 order establishing the schedule for amending pleadings.
On February 14, 2018, the Court denied Torres's motion to amend his complaint for a second time, as that proposed amended pleading pertained to HHC and its affiliated personnel. The Court found that Torres had: 1) delayed unjustifiably in seeking to amend the complaint, as it related to HHC and its affiliated personnel; and 2) failed to cure HHC-related pleading deficiencies that could have been cured through his first amended complaint. The Court also found that the time and resources HHC would have to devote to defend itself and its affiliated personnel against the allegations in the proposed second amended complaint, given the posture of the action at that time, would prejudice HHC. HHC contends that, undeterred by the Court's ruling, Torres “took the identical proposed Second Amended Complaint [from the 16-CV-2362 action] . . . and filed it under a different index number (18-cv-4665) on May 25, 2018 [, ] resulting in the instant Action.”
HHC maintains that on June 18, 2020, “the [c]ourt awarded summary judgment to [it], ” a New York public benefit corporation, after analyzing the claims Torres made against HHC in the case bearing docket number 16-CV-2362, and applying the legal standard set forth in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978), applicable to municipal corporations and public benefit corporations against whom § 1983 claims are made. Under that standard, in order for a public benefit corporation like HHC to be liable to Torres for the constitutional violations he alleged, Torres had to establish that the violations resulted from an HHC official policy, custom, ordinance, regulation, or decision. According to HHC, the court “ruled, inter alia, that there was no evidence in the record to suggest that [HHC] had a practice, policy, or custom at all connected to the alleged constitutional violations that [Torres] suffered while being evaluated at [HHC] in April 2016 or more specifically to his alleged injuries and dismissed [Torres's] § 1983 claims against [HHC].” HHC asserts that “[t]here is essentially no difference between” the allegations Torres made against HHC in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362, and the allegations he has made in the instant action; “they relate to the same exact treatment in April 2016 at [HHC].” HHC contends that “what Plaintiff has alleged is at most a single incident consisting of essentially unique circumstances.” However, HHC maintains that, as the court explained in the summary judgment decision rendered in the case bearing docket number 16-CV-2362, “a single incident of errant behavior is an insufficient basis for finding that a municipal policy caused plaintiff's injury.” The court decided not to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction authority over Torres's state-law causes of action, since it determined to dismiss all his federal claims.
HHC'S MOTION TO DISMISS
HHC contends that the instant action “should be dismissed because plaintiff served and filed a duplicate of the Second Amended Complaint [he sought to file against HHC in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362] as a new action in direct contravention of [the Court's] order [, in the earlier action, denying his request to] serve [the Second Amended Complaint] against [HHC and HHC] affiliated defendants.” HHC maintains that Torres “should not be permitted to file a new action to circumvent [the Court's] prior Order in Action 16-cv-2362 . . . which specifically and unequivocally denied plaintiff's Motion to serve the Second Amended Complaint against [HHC] and [HHC] affiliated defendants.” Moreover, the “[p]laintiff's claims related to his treatment at [HHC] in April of 2016 have already been dismissed by the [c]ourt, ” when it granted HHC summary judgment on the claims asserted against it by Torres in the amended complaint filed in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362. Since those claims and the claims asserted by Torres in this action arise out of the same factual predicate, the claims should be dismissed in the instant action as well.
HHC also contends that the doctrine of res judicata bars Torres from prosecuting this action. That is so, according to HHC, because the final judgment on the merits, dismissing Torres's HHC-related federal claims with prejudice, rendered by the court in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362, an action involving the same parties as are present in the instant action, resolved the same federal claims as are asserted by Torres here. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata prevents Torres from re-litigating claims that were raised in the prior action or which could have been raised in that action. HHC maintains that the doctrine of collateral estoppel also precludes Torres from prosecuting this action because: 1) he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and did litigate, in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362, the identical issues he has raised in this action, to wit, that “the evaluation, treatment, and medication without consent in April 2016 by [HHC] violated plaintiff's rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983”; 2) the court decided the issues against Torres in the earlier action; and 3) the resolution of the issues raised by Torres previously was necessary to support the final judgment on the merits that the court rendered.
In support of its motion to dismiss, HHC filed a memorandum of law and the declaration of its counsel, Doreen Dufficy (“Dufficy”). Annexed to the declaration are the following: 1) “Exhibit A - Plaintiff's Complaint (18-cv-4665)”; 2) “Exhibit B - Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (16-cv-2362)”; 3) “Exhibit C - Plaintiff's Proposed Second Amended Complaints [sic] (16-cv-2362)”; 4) “Exhibit D - Order denying Plaintiff's request to Amend the Complaint (16-cv-2362)”; and 5) “Exhibit E - Summary Judgment decision (16-cv-2362).” In addition, HHC filed a “Notice to Pro Se Litigant Who Opposes a Rule 12 Motion Supported by Matters Outside the Pleadings, ” alerting Torres that: i) HHC has asked the court to “resolve this case without a trial, based on these written materials”; ii) “the Court may treat [HHC's Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b)(6) motion to dismiss] as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”; and iii) he must submit evidence such as affidavits and documents countering the facts asserted by HHC, demonstrating that issues of fact for adjudication at a trial exist, in order to oppose a Rule 56 motion and, further, that he cannot rely solely on the allegations in his complaint to oppose a Rule 56 motion.
In response to HHC's motion, Torres filed a document styled “Plaintiff's Answer to Motion for Summary Judgment of HHC Bellevue Hospital Center.” In that document, Torres asserts, inter alia, that “[t]his Court trashes the U.S. Constitution; supports U.S. terrorism.” According to Torres, he is “erroneously included in the U.S. government terrorist list, and as such am persecuted and denied due process of law by the Courts.” Torres contends that on April 28, 2016, “CIA terrorists broke the door of my apartment, kidnapped [sic] and took me as a John Doe to NYU affiliate HHC Bellevue Hospital to be tortured, assaulted, sedated, and forcibly conducted numerous tests including x rays, ct scans, taking urine and blood samples, and released me the next day with a fabricated finding of delirium.” “Commonly known as The Guantanamo of New York, HHC Bellevue Hospital is the torture center where CIA terrorists take their victims to be tortured.” Accompanying Torres's response to the motion are: 1) Exhibit 1, a May 23, 2006 “Freedom of Information Act Request on Behalf of Wilfredo Torres” directed to the “Central Intelligence Agency Information and Privacy Coordinator”; 2) Exhibit 2, a June 17, 2019 document headed “‘It was not Iraq. It were other people', says Trump” regarding an ABC News interview of President Donald J. Trump; 3) Exhibit 3, a document styled “ACLU Terror Watch List Counter: A Million Plus Why are there so many names on the U.S. government's terror list?”; 4) Exhibit 4, a document from PRESS TV styled “US Terrorism List Violates U.S. Civil Liberties”; 5) Exhibit 5, a document styled “Breakthrough U.S. Attorney Agrees to Present Evidence of WTC Demolition to Federal Grand Jury”; 6) Exhibit 6, a photograph, which Torres alleges depicts “CIA terrorists ransacking my apartment in my absence”; 7) Exhibit 7, a document with the following words written on it “Intel McGowan, Dennis, ” which Torres maintains was left at his apartment by those who effected the warrantless raid on September 28, 2015; 8) Exhibit 8, a Bellevue Hospital patient discharge instruction sheet, which Torres asserts contains “a fabricated finding of delirium” with respect to him; and 9) Exhibit 9, a document Torres alleges is “[t]he ambulance report of paramedic Edward Rivera stat[ing] ‘62 YEAR OLD MALE FOUND FULLY AMBULATORY, COMPLAINING OF NOTHING.'”
In its reply to Torres's response to the motion, HHC asserts that the “Plaintiff's Opposition fails to rebut, or even address, the arguments set forth in [HHC's] motion to dismiss.” According to HHC, “Plaintiff's Opposition readily admits that the allegations and injuries pled in [the instant action] arise from the same period of treatment at [Bellevue Hospital] and are identical to those claims alleged in [the action bearing docket number 16-CV-[2]362].” Therefore, “[d]ismissal is warranted” because: 1) the instant action was filed “improperly . . . by Plaintiff in an attempt to circumvent the order denying his motion to amend the complaint in [the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362]; 2) summary judgment has already been granted with respect to plaintiff's allegations in [the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362]”; and 3) “the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude Plaintiff from re-litigating the rulings in [the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362] and claims arising from the April 2016 treatment at [Bellevue Hospital].”
DISCUSSION
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, a litigant's pro se status does not relieve him or her of the obligation to comply with relevant procedural and substantive law. See Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006). In this judicial district,
[e]xcept for letter-motions, as permitted by Local Rule 7.1(d) . . . all motions shall include the following motion papers: (1) A notice of motion, . . . which shall specify the applicable rules or statutes pursuant to which the motion is brought, and shall specify the relief sought by the motion; 2) A memorandum of law, setting forth the cases and other authorities relied upon in support of the motion, and divided, under appropriate headings, into as many parts as there are issues to be determined; and 3) Supporting affidavits and exhibits thereto containing any factual information and portions of the record necessary for the decision of the motion.... Except for letter-motions as permitted by Local Rule 7.1(d) or as otherwise permitted by the Court, all oppositions and replies with respect to motions shall comply with Local Civil Rule 7.1(a)(2) and (3) above.Local Civil Rule 7.1(a), (b).
Courts have found that a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a proper vehicle for challenging an action as duplicative of another action. See, e. g., Fido's Fences, Inc. v. Radio Systems Corp., 999 F.Supp.2d 442, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). To survive such a motion, a plaintiff's complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). “If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). “[T]he conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment under Rule 56 when the court considers matters outside the pleadings is strictly enforce[d] and mandatory.” Global Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir.2006)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted, alteration in original text).
Summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A material fact is one “that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). A genuine issue of fact exists where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. When resolving a motion for summary judgment, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. See McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir. 2007). A party opposing summary judgment “may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Scotto v. Almenes, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). Instead, the party opposing summary judgment “must offer some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful.” D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998).
An action that is duplicative of another action is subject to dismissal. See Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000). The dismissal of one action, as duplicative of another, “may be justified, if the claims, parties, and available relief do not significantly differ between the two actions.” Northern Assur. Co. of America v. Square D Co., 201 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2000)(quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, a party may not file a new action, which is duplicative of another action, in an attempt to expand the party's legal rights. See Curtis, 226 F.3d at 140. Therefore, “[d]istrict courts may dismiss duplicative lawsuits that are filed . . . for the purpose of circumventing amendment deadlines.” McFarlane v. Iron Mountain Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 17cv9739, 2018 WL 941748, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2018).
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel may be implicated when a motion to dismiss is made challenging an action as duplicative of another action. Under the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, “[a] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2428 (1981). When a party makes an application to amend a complaint asserting a claim(s) that arose after the original complaint was filed, and leave to amend is denied on a procedural ground such as untimeliness, and not on the merits, a subsequent litigation of the claims in the proposed amended complaint is not precluded by the doctrine of res judicata because “[o]nly denial of leave to amend on the merits precludes subsequent litigation of the claims in the proposed amended complaint.” Curtis, 226 F.3d at 139.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel holds that “once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414 (1980). The doctrine applies when: 1) the identical issue was raised in a prior action; 2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the prior action; 3) a full and fair opportunity was afforded the party to litigate the issue; and 4) resolution of the issue was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits. See Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 2003).
Torres did not comply with Local Civil Rule 7.1(b) of this court in opposing the instant motion. He did not file an affidavit(s) with exhibits thereto containing factual information and the portions of the record necessary for decision of the motion. Therefore, Torres failed to present any evidence in opposition to HHC's motion for the Court to consider. Torres also failed to file a memorandum of law divided, under appropriate headings, into as many parts as there are issues to be determined, and setting forth the cases and other authorities upon which he relies in opposing HHC's motion.
The Court determined that resolution of HHC's motion required it to examine and not exclude the exhibits provided through Dufficy's declaration. As a consequence, the Court converted HHC's Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss this action, as a duplicative action, to a motion for summary judgment. Torres was aware that the Rule 12(b)(6) motion could be analyzed as a Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 motion, via the notice provided to him by HHC, which is discussed above.
The Court's comparison of the complaint filed in this action, Exhibit A to the Dufficy declaration, and the proposed second amended complaint Torres sought, unsuccessfully, to file against HHC and its affiliated employees in the action bearing docket number 16-CV- 2362, Exhibit C to the Dufficy declaration, reveals that the two documents are substantially the same pleading. In each pleading, Torres alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that violations of his First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were committed by HHC and certain HHC medical and security personnel after he was transported to Bellevue Hospital on April 28, 2016, following the forcible and warrantless removal of Torres from his home by municipal employees on that date. Torres also asserts “[p]endent state law claims” in each pleading. The factual assertions made against HHC and its personnel are almost identical in each of the pleadings.
The Court also compared the amended complaint filed in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362, Exhibit B to the Dufficy declaration, to the complaint filed by Torres to initiate the instant action, Exhibit A to the Dufficy declaration. These complaints are substantially the same. Each recounts the events that occurred at Torres's apartment on September 28, 2015, and April 28, 2016, culminating in Torres's being transported to, and detained at, Bellevue Hospital. In each pleading, Torres alleges that rights secured to him under the Constitution and by New York's laws were violated by HHC employees. No new claims are asserted by Torres against HHC and its personnel in the instant action. Furthermore, the relief sought by Torres in both actions is the same: money damages of $10,000,000.
The Court's comparison of the two complaints, Exhibits A and B to the Dufficy declaration, leads it to conclude that the actions are duplicative actions. Given the temporal proximity that exists between the February 14, 2018 denial, as untimely, of Torres's request to file a second amended complaint in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362, and the May 25, 2018 filing of the complaint to commence the instant action, it is reasonable to conclude that the instant action was commenced by Torres to circumvent the pleading-amendment deadline established by the Court in the earlier action and the Court's denial of his request for leave to file, against HHC and its affiliated employees, the proposed second amended complaint in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362. This, Torres cannot do. See McFarlane, 2018 WL 941748, at *2. Under these circumstances, dismissing the instant action because it is duplicative of the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362 is warranted.
The court's award of summary judgment to HHC in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362 serves as an adjudication on the merits of the federal claims Torres made in that action against HHC and its affiliated employees. See Weston Funding Corp. v. Lafayette Towers, Inc., 550 F.2d 710, 712-15 (2d Cir. 1977); Nori v. Postmaster General, 55 Fed.Appx. 26 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order). Torres makes the same federal claims against HHC in the instant action that he made against HHC in the earlier action; therefore, the doctrine of res judicata, as explained above, bars Torres from prosecuting those same federal claims, for which a final judgment has already been awarded against him and in favor of HHC on those claims. As a result, dismissing the action, based on the doctrine of res judicata, is also warranted.
As noted above, under the collateral estoppel doctrine, “once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.” Allen, 449 U.S. at 94, 101 S.Ct. 414. HHC does not contend that Torres is asserting any new cause of action in this case, that is, a cause of action not asserted in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362. Rather, HHC maintains that identical issues are raised in both actions: that the evaluation, treatment and medication of Torres by HHC, without his consent on April 28, 2016, violated Torres's federal and state rights. Since HHC concedes that no cause of action different from any cause of action asserted by Torres in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362 has been made in the instant case, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not implicated in this action and dismissing the action premised on that doctrine is not warranted.
HHC has established, based on the motion record, that no genuine dispute exists respecting the fact that the § 1983 claims raised by Torres here have been resolved against him, on the merits, in the action bearing docket number 16-CV-2362. Therefore, as a matter of law, an award of summary judgment to HHC, in the case at bar, is warranted.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that HHC's motion, Docket Entry No. 26, be granted.
FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days from service of the Report to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Such objections, and any responses to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Ronnie Abrams, United States District Judge, 40 Centre St., Room 2203, New York, New York 10007, and to the chambers of the undersigned, 40 Centre St., Room 425, New York, New York 10007. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Abrams. FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993); Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1992); Wesolek v. Candair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 57-59 (2d Cir. 1998); McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1983).
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the plaintiff.