Opinion
NNHCV156052307
10-24-2017
Jannitti Torres v. Adelaida Alvarez-Maisonet et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RULING ON MOTION FOR ADDITUR/MOTION TO SET ASIDE
Frechette, Matthew E., J.
This case was tried to the jury, and a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff. Both liability and damages were contested. Evidence took one day to present, and the verdict was rendered that following day. The evidence showed that after the accident, the plaintiff was taken by ambulance to the Hospital of St. Raphael in New Haven and that she did not treat with any health care provider after that date. The jury found liability in favor of the plaintiff and awarded economic damages for the ambulance and hospital bills in the amount of $4, 684.15 and non-economic damages in the amount of $815.85.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 16-35 and General Statutes § § 52-228a and 52-228b the plaintiff has now moved that the court set aside the verdict in this case and order an additur.
" A court should be especially hesitant to set aside a jury's award of damages." Donahue v. State, 27 Conn.App. 135, 139, 604 A.2d 1331 (1992). " It is rudimentary that litigants have a constitutional right to have issues of fact and damages determined by a jury . . . As a result, a trial court should not set aside a jury's verdict unless it 'so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption . . .' The evidence offered at trial 'must be given the most favorable construction. to which it is reasonably entitled in support of verdict.' " (Citations omitted.) Geryk v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 19 Conn.App. 585, 586-87, 563 A.2d 324 (1989).
" It is fundamental that a jury may accept a portion of the evidence and reject the remainder of it." Id. Thus, in the case at bar, " the jury . . . could reasonably have accepted or rejected the plaintiff's evidence of permanent partial disability . . . or [her claims of] pain and suffering . . . In addition, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the plaintiff did or did not establish a causal connection between certain injuries and the collision." Id. (See also, Donahue, supra at 141-42: " The amount of damages that a plaintiff is entitled to receive is based on [her] ability to establish a causal relationship between [her] injuries and the physical condition that [she] claims resulted from the accident . . . This connection must rest on more than surmise and conjecture. Further, the jury is the arbiter of the credibility of witnesses . . . It is not obliged to accept the opinions of expert witnesses [or the testimony of the plaintiff] and may reject those opinions [and testimony] on the ground that they were based on subordinate facts that were not proven." (Emphasis added.))
In the case at bar, there was no assessment of permanent impairment by a physician, and the plaintiff testified that she was in some discomfort for the week following the accident, and for about a month thereafter. The plaintiff also testified that she was forced to cancel a vacation due to her claimed injuries.
" [T]he jury's decision to award economic damages and zero [or modest] noneconomic damages is best tested in light of the circumstances of the particular case before it. Accordingly, the trial court should examine the evidence to decide whether the jury reasonably could found that the plaintiff had failed in [her] proof of the issue. That decision should be made, not on the assumption that the jury made a mistake, but, rather, on the supposition that the jury did exactly what it intended to do ." (Emphasis in original.) Smith v. Lefebre, 92 Conn.App. 417, 421, 885 A.2d 1232 (2005). Given the disputed nature of the testimony and evidence in the case at bar, there are simply insufficient facts " that justify the extraordinary relief of additur." Turner v. Pascarelli, 88 Conn.App. 720, 723-24, 871 A.2d 1044 (2005). The plaintiff bore the burden of proof both with regard to liability and the nature and extent of her injuries. " When determining whether to order an additur, the court should not assume that the jury made a mistake, but should suppose that the jury did exactly what it intended to do." Weiss v. Bergen, 63 Conn.App. 810, 814, 779 A.2d 195, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 908, 782 A.2d 1254 (2001). When there is evidence in the record tending to support the damages award reached by the trier of fact, an award does not shock the sense of justice. Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107, 116-17, 663 A.2d 398 (1995).
Based upon the evidence adduced at trial, the court finds that the jury was not influenced by partiality, prejudice or mistake. Rather, the jury made a reasoned decision based upon the evidence, and, as instructed in the charge, " without regard to amounts . . . suggested by counsel in argument." Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion for additur and to set aside is denied.