Opinion
No. 77-744
Decided June 21, 1978.
Court of Claims — Liability of state employees — Jury trial available to determine, when.
Prior to February 7, 1978, a claimant who sued the state in the Court of Claims and joined in that suit state employees alleged to be acting within the scope of their employment in both their official and individual capacites was entitled to a jury trial under R.C. 2743.11 for the determination of the individual liability of state employees.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
Appellee, John R. Torpey, an inmate at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, filed a complaint in the Court of Claims against the state of Ohio, Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, and various employees of the state in both their individual and official capacities. These employees included the Director of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and the following employees of the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility: the Superintendent, the associate superintendent, the director of medical services, a shift captain, two shift lieutenants, three correctional officers, and a nurse. The complaint alleged that the defendants committed various torts against appellee during the course of their employment, among these being assault, battery, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of appellee's constitutional rights including infliction of cruel and unusual punishment and denial of due process of law.
Appellee demanded a trial by jury in the Court of Claims for the purpose of determining the liability of the individual employees in their individual capacities. The motion for jury trial was overruled as to all claims.
The court found that appellee had failed to prove a claim against all defendants. At the close of appellee's case, the court, on motion, dismissed the defendant director and the defendants superintendent and associate superintendent with prejudice as to all claims made against them and ordered judgment for the other defendants, including the above-mentioned employees, and the state, and against appellee.
From the judgment of the trial court, appellee lodged his appeal in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County. That court overruled all of appellee's several assignments of error with the exception of one: that appellee had been denied his right to have the liability of the individual state employees determined by a jury. The court held that the Court of Claims erred in refusing to impanel a jury to decide the factual matters involved in the determination of liability against the defendants individually, since that right is preserved inviolate whether their liability is determined in the Court of Claims through joinder with the state or in a common pleas court. Noting that appellee had demonstrated no prejudicial error in respect to his claim against the state, the court found that it was no longer necessary that the Court of Claims handle the case on remand. Thus it revised the Court of Claims' dismissal with prejudice against the defendants director, superintendent, and associate superintendent to be without prejudice and reversed the judgment granted in favor of the other individual defendants so that appellee's claim could be pursued in the appropriate commom pleas court.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Mr. Thomas R. McGuire, for appellee.
Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general, and Mr. Gene W. Holliker, for appellants.
Appellants are appealing the decision of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis that a right to trial by jury in the Court of Claims did not exist for a claim against a state employee when it was alleged that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment.
By the enactment of the Court of Claims Act, R.C. Chapter 2743, the General Assembly waived the state's immunity from liability and gave its consent to be sued "in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties, subject to the limitations set forth in this chapter." R.C. 2743.02(A). This section recently has been changed by Am. Sub. H.B. No. 149, effective February 7, 1978, to read as follows:
"Sec. 2743.02(A). The state hereby waives, in exchange for the complainant's waiver of his cause of action against state officers or employees, its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims created in this chapter in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties, subject to the limitations set forth in this chapter. To the extent that the state has previously consented to be sued, this chapter has no applicability.
" Except in the case of a civil action filed by the state, filing a civil action in the court of claims results in a complete waiver of any cause of action, based on the same act or omission, which the filing party has against any state officer or employee. The waiver shall be void if the court determines that the act or omission was not within the scope of the officer's or employee's office or employment." (Emphasis indicates new language.)
Thus, the only issue before this court is whether a plaintiff who stated a cause of action in tort against state employees acting within the scope of their employment prior to February 7, 1978, and joined them as individuals in an action against the state in the Court of Claims, had a right to a jury trial in the Court of Claims on the issue of the liability of the individual state employees.
R.C. 2743.03 created the Court of Claims as a forum in which all civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of immunity were to be heard. Subdivision (C) of this section further provides, in pertinent part, that, "A civil action against the state shall be heard and determined by a single judge."
The provision regarding jury trials in the Court of Claims is R.C. 2743.11, which states:
"No claimant in the court of claims shall be entitled to have his civil action against the state determined by a trial by jury. Parties retain their right to trial by jury in the court of claims of any civil actions not against the state," (Emphasis added.)
We find that appellee's suit against the state employees in their individual capacities falls into the above category of "any civil actions not against the state." As such, under the language of R.C. 2743.11, he clearly retains his right to a jury trial in the determination of his claim. We find no language in the sections of R.C. Chapter 2743 applicable to appellee's case which would have limited his right to trial by jury against those individual defendants.
Moreover, practice and procedure in the Court of Claims is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, unless such rules are in conflict with R.C. Chapter 2743. State, ex rel. Moritz, v. Troop (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 90; R.C. 2743.03(D). Civ. R. 38(A), which provides that "[t]he right to trial by jury shall be preserved to the parties inviolate," is not inconsistent with R.C. 2743.11 with respect to civil actions not against the state. As there are no other limitations in Chapter 2743 in conflict with the clear mandate of either the statute or the rule, we agree with the Court of Appeals that appellee was entitled to a jury trial in the Court of Claims on the issue of the liability of the individual employees alleged to have been acting within the scope of their employment.
We also find that we are in agreement with the appellate court that it is no longer necessary that the Court of Claims handle the case on remand, since the case against the state was decided without error. Appellee's claim should proceed to a jury trial in the appropriate common pleas court. Collateral estoppel, based on the trial court's findings in favor of the state, will not apply to the jury trial against the individuals since the effect thereof would be to deny appellee his jury trial as to these matters.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
P. BROWN, Acting C.J., HERBERT, CELEBREZZE, W. BROWN, SWEENEY and LOCHER, JJ., concur.
CASTLE, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for O'NEILL, C.J.