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Toll v. American Airlines, Inc.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
May 10, 2002
No. 3-02-CV-0208-M (N.D. Tex. May. 10, 2002)

Opinion

NO. 3-02-CV-0208-M

May 10, 2002


FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


Defendants American Airlines, Inc., Dr. Thomas Bettes, Dr. David McKenas, Joyce Hood, Vincent Heyer, Alexandria Kuhner, Sharyn Holley, and Pat Lane ("AA Defendants") and the Association of Professional Flight Attendants ("APFA") have filed separate motions to dismiss this pro se disability discrimination and retaliation case. For the reasons stated herein, both motions should be granted and plaintiff should be barred from instituting any other legal proceedings against defendants without first obtaining permission from a court of competent jurisdiction.

I.

Plaintiff Barbara Toll is a flight attendant for American Airlines and a member of the APFA. Her tenure with the company has been marked by frequent run-ins with her supervisors and union representatives over a variety of issues. These disputes have resulted in at least seven different lawsuits. In 1995, plaintiff sued American Airlines in federal court for disability, gender, and race discrimination after she was suspended for not meeting the weight standards for flight attendants. While that case was pending, plaintiff filed a separate lawsuit against the APFA for failing to represent her in a grievance against American Airlines. Both cases were dismissed with prejudice. Toll v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 4-96-CV-659-A (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 1998); Toll v. Ass'n of Professional Flight Attendants, No. 3-96-CV-3164-T (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 1998). A subsequent case against American Airlines for discrimination and retaliation was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Toll v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 4-98-CV-329-A (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 1998).

Nearly two years later, plaintiff sued American Airlines and the APFA in separate actions in Pennsylvania federal court. This time, plaintiff alleged that: (1) she had been subjected to derogatory comments based on her ethnicity and disability since the early 1970s; (2) she was retaliated against following her suspension in 1995; and (3) her return to work after an ear injury in 1998 was delayed by a request that she undergo psychiatric treatment and by false accusations that security was required to remove her from company headquarters. The case against the APFA centered on allegations that the union failed to represent her in a grievance against the company involving weight standards for flight attendants. Both cases were dismissed. Toll v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 00-CV-5078 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 4, 2001); Toll v. Ass'n of Professional Flight Attendants, No. 00-CV-5079 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 25, 2001).

In dismissing plaintiff's complaint against American Airlines, the court noted:

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is a varied collection of bald assertions pertaining to Plaintiff's medical condition, work history and "discrimination." Plaintiff does not, however, explain how she was discriminated against by Defendant or how any of the facts alleged amount to a colorable legal claim. Indeed, as Defendant points out, Plaintiff does not even mention her own age, race, nationality, ethnicity or religion in the Amended Complaint.
Toll, No. 00-CV-5078, op. at 1. Similar observations were made by the judge in dismissing the case against the APFA:
Giving Plaintiff's amended complaint the most liberal reading possible, it appears to be nothing more tan a series of rambling and conclusory allegations concerning an ear injury, immune system dysfunction, weight problem, breast condition, and paycheck, attendance record and performance errors which are somehow related to Plaintiff's allegedly having been harassed wit comments regarding her ethnicity, nationality or religion and on the basis of some unidentified disability or perceived disability.
Toll, No. 00-CV-5079, op. at 1-2.

Undeterred, plaintiff sued the AA Defendants and the APFA in Texas state court on June 13, 2001. Once again, she alleges that her return to work following an ear injury in 1998 was delayed by a request that she undergo psychiatric treatment and by false accusations that security was required to remove her from company headquarters. Plaintiff also accuses the APFA of failing to represent her on those claims and conspiring with American Airlines. After the case was removed to federal court, the AA Defendants and the APFA filed separate motions to dismiss. Plaintiff was ordered to file a written response to the motions by April 26, 2002, but has failed to do so. The motions are now ripe for determination.

Plaintiff has also sued American Airlines and the APFA again in Pennsylvania federal court. Toll Ass'n of Professional Flight Attendants, No. 02-CV-108; Toll v. American Airlines, No. 02-CV-248. Those cases remain pending.

Responses to these motions were originally due on March 11, 2002. See ORDER, 2/11/02. At her request, the Court extended this deadline until April 11, 2002. See ORDER, 3/12/02. A second motion for an additional 60-day extension was denied, and plaintiff was ordered to file her responses by April 26, 2002. See ORDER, 4/12/02.

II.

A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to relief FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). The complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and all facts pleaded therein must be taken as true. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1161, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). Although dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is ordinarily determined by whether the facts alleged in the complaint give rise to a cause of action, a claim may also be dismissed if a successful affirmative defense appears clearly on the face of the pleadings. Clark v. Amoco Production Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986). In either case, dismissal is proper when "even the most sympathetic reading of [the] pleadings uncovers no theory and no facts that would subject the present defendants to liability." Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1986).

A.

Both the AA Defendants and the APFA contend that plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata. Under this doctrine, "a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action." Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is appropriate if four conditions are met: (1) the parties in the subsequent action are identical to, or in privity with, the parties in the prior action; (2) the judgment in the prior case was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there has been a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action is involved in both suits. Ellis v. Amex Life Insurance Co., 211 F.3d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 2000).

The first three requirements are clearly met here. This is the third lawsuit filed by plaintiff against the APFA and the fourth against American Airlines arising out of her employment as a flight attendant. All prior cases were dismissed on the merits by final judgments rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction. Thus, the only remaining issue is whether the prior suits involved the same claims or causes of action as alleged in the instant proceeding. The Fifth Circuit applies a transactional test to determine whether two suits involve the same claim. Ellis, 211 F.3d at 938. "[T]he critical issue is whether the plaintiff bases the two actions on the same nucleus of operative facts." Id., quoting Agrilectric Power Partners, Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 20 F.3d 663, 665 (5th Cir. 1994). The Court has little difficulty in concluding that the test is satisfied in this case. In her pro se complaint, plaintiff alleges that her return to work following an ear injury in 1998 was delayed by a request that she undergo psychiatric treatment and by false accusations that security was required to remove her from company headquarters. Plaintiff accuses both defendants of conspiring to deprive her of payroll benefits in retaliation for filing discrimination and disability claims. She also blames the APFA for failing to represent her in grievances against her employer. The claims alleged by plaintiff in this action and those asserted in her prior lawsuits against American Airlines and the APFA are based on "the same nucleus of operative facts." Consequently, she is barred from relitigating those claims. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 2209, 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979) ("Res judicata prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.").

Dr. Thomas Bettes, Dr. David McKenas, Joyce Hood, Vincent Heyer, Alexandria Kuhner, Sharyn Holley, and Pat Lane are all employed by American Airlines. This employer-employee relationship is sufficient to satisfy the privity requirement as to these defendants. See Russell v. SunAmerica Securities, Inc., 962 F.2d 1169, 1173-75 (5th Cir. 1992).

B.

Defendants also seek an injunction against plaintiff to prevent her from filing any other lawsuits against them without first obtaining leave of court. The Court has an obligation to protect the orderly administration of justice and can issue injunctive relief to discharge that duty. Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Sanctions also are appropriate when a pro se litigant has a history of submitting multiple frivolous claims. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986) ( pro se plaintiff has "no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets"); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Litigants who abuse the judicial process are "not entitled to sue and appeal, period." Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1536 (7th Cir. 1989).

As previously discussed, this is the third lawsuit filed by plaintiff against the APFA and the fourth against American Airlines. All prior cases have been dismissed either on the merits or under the doctrine of res judicata with costs taxed against plaintiff. Still, plaintiff continues to harass her employer and union by filing frivolous lawsuits which require the defendants to incur legal fees and tax the valuable and limited resources of the judicial system. The Court therefore determines that plaintiff should be prohibited from instituting any other legal proceedings against American Airlines or the APFA without first obtaining permission from a court of competent jurisdiction. See Day v. Allstate Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting where monetary sanctions are ineffective in deterring vexatious filings, enjoining such filings may be appropriate).

RECOMMENDATION

Defendants' motions to dismiss should be granted. Plaintiff's claims against the AA Defendants and the APFA should be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff also should be barred from instituting any other legal proceedings against defendants without first obtaining permission from a court of competent jurisdiction.


Summaries of

Toll v. American Airlines, Inc.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
May 10, 2002
No. 3-02-CV-0208-M (N.D. Tex. May. 10, 2002)
Case details for

Toll v. American Airlines, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:BARBARA TOLL Plaintiff, vs. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., ET AL. Defendants

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Date published: May 10, 2002

Citations

No. 3-02-CV-0208-M (N.D. Tex. May. 10, 2002)