Opinion
24A-CR-508
06-14-2024
Tracy A. Toddy, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jane Ann Noblitt Columbus, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana, Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Bartholomew Superior Court The Honorable Jonathan L. Rohde Trial Court Cause No. 3D02-2209-F4-4678
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jane Ann Noblitt Columbus, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana, Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BRADFORD, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] In March of 2022, Tracy Toddy, after ingesting marijuana, fentanyl, and methamphetamine, caused a traffic collision that resulted in Kevin Burton's death. He subsequently pled guilty to Level 4 felony causing death while operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance in the blood and was sentenced to twelve years, with nine years executed in the Department of Correction ("DOC") and three years suspended to probation. Although Toddy frames the issue on appeal as an appropriateness challenge under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), he actually contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find his remorse, the fact that he had previously successfully completed a drug-court program, and the alleged low amounts of the drugs in question in his blood to be significant mitigating factors. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On March 10, 2022, Toddy "caus[ed] a crash" while operating his vehicle in Bartholomew County. Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Burton died as a result of the collision. Prior to operating his vehicle, Toddy had consumed marijuana, fentanyl, and methamphetamine.
[¶3] On September 18, 2022, the State charged Toddy with Level 4 felony causing death while operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance in the blood and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the blood. On January 11, 2024, Toddy pled guilty to the Level 4 felony charge. In exchange for Toddy's guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the Class C misdemeanor charge and that the executed portion of Toddy's sentence would be capped at nine years. The trial court accepted Toddy's guilty plea and sentenced him to a twelve-year sentence, with nine years executed in the DOC and three years suspended to probation.
Discussion and Decision
[¶4] "A person who commits a Level 4 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and twelve (12) years, with the advisory sentence being six (6) years." Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. In challenging his sentence on appeal, Toddy "concedes that his sentence fell within the statutorily permissible range for a Level 4 Felony - as well as within the terms of his plea agreement." Appellant's Br. p. 11.
The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Sentencing Toddy
[¶5] Again, we note that although Toddy frames his argument on appeal as a claim that his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), the substance of his argument is an assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him and we will address it as such. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom." Id. (quotation omitted).
We review for an abuse of discretion the court's finding of aggravators and mitigators to justify a sentence, but we cannot review the relative weight assigned to those factors. When reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified by the trial court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 416 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (citation and quotation omitted), trans. denied. "A single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to enhance a sentence." Id. at 417.
[¶6] The trial court found the following aggravating factors in sentencing Toddy: (1) Toddy's criminal history; (2) prior attempts at leniency have failed, as Toddy has previously violated the terms of his probation five times; (3) prior attempts at substance-abuse rehabilitation have failed; (4) Toddy had been charged with another felony offense one month after the instant case had been filed; (5) the pain and suffering to Burton's family; and (6) Toddy's lack of remorse. Toddy does not argue on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that factors one through five warranted aggravating weight. He argues, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in finding his lack of remorse to be an aggravating factor, claiming that he had demonstrated remorse and that his remorse should have been given significant mitigating weight. He also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find mitigating the allegedly low levels of the drugs in question in his blood at the time of the collision and the fact that, despite having begun using drugs at age fifteen, he had previously demonstrated an ability to "successfully complete a [drug-treatment] program when monitored - and so is likely to respond affirmatively to probation or short-term imprisonment." Appellant's Br. p. 12.
[¶7] "The finding of mitigating factors is not mandatory and rests within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court is not required to accept the defendant's arguments as to what constitutes a mitigating factor." Williams v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1154, 1163 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). "Further, the trial court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as the defendant does, nor is it obligated to explain why it did not find a factor to be significantly mitigating." Id. at 1163-64. "An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record." Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.
[¶8] Toddy argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find his remorse to be a significant mitigating factor. In support, Toddy points to statements he made during the completion of the presentence investigation report ("PSI") and at sentencing. In the PSI, while Toddy reported that he felt "'horrible for committing the current offense,'" he also stated that "'accidents happen' and 'people make mistakes.'" Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 58. In addition, while he reported that he felt "bad" for Burton's family, he seemed to downplay any potential pain or suffering by Burton, claiming that he had been "told that [Burton had] 'passed quickly.'" Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 58. At sentencing, Toddy said
I just want to say how sorry I am for the stress and the cause of the things that I have done and the loss of your family member, Mr. Burton. I promise to do everything I can in my power to get rehabilitation so this never happens again. Again, I am very sorry for your loss.Tr. Vol. II p. 14.
[¶9] The Indiana Supreme Court has classified a trial court's determination of the sincerity of a defendant's claimed remorse to be similar to a determination of credibility. Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 535 (Ind. 2002). As such, "the trial court is in the best position to judge the sincerity of a defendant's remorseful statements." Stout v. State, 834 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. In finding Toddy's lack of remorse to be an aggravating factor, the trial court clearly did not find his claimed remorse to be sincere. The trial court noted the statements recorded in Toddy's PSI, finding that the statements were "clearly missing [] any type of apology." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 61. The trial court also noted that Toddy had attempted to avoid accountability by failing to appear at certain proceedings. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 61. Again, the trial court was not required to accept Toddy's argument as to what constituted a mitigating factor or to give a proffered mitigating factor the same weight as Toddy. See Williams, 997 N.E.2d at 1163-64.
[¶10] Toddy also asserts that the trial court should have found the alleged fact that "the levels of marijuana, fentanyl, and methamphetamine in his blood at the time of the event were clearly under any degree of impairment," to be a significant mitigating factor at sentencing. Appellant's Br. p. 12. First, the relevant question was not whether Toddy was impaired at the time of the collision, but rather whether he had caused death while operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance in the blood. See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(a)(2) (providing that a person who causes the death of another person when operating a vehicle with a controlled substance or its metabolite in the person's blood commits a Level 4 felony). Again, Toddy admitted that he had ingested marijuana, fentanyl, and methamphetamine and that all three were present in his blood at the time of the collision. Second, Toddy does not point to any evidence indicating that he was not impaired or setting forth the levels of the drugs in his blood at the time of the collision. He merely points to his trial counsel's argument at sentencing regarding his alleged lack of impairment and the allegedly low levels of the drugs in his blood. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in not finding Toddy's alleged lack of impairment or allegedly low level of the drugs present in Toddy's blood to warrant significant mitigating weight.
Toddy was charged under Indiana Code § 9-30-5-5(a)(2), which does not require intoxication or a specific amount of any substance to be present.
[¶11] As for Toddy's claim that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to recognize that he had previously responded well to drug-treatment programs, we observe that any such prior success was, at most, short-lived, as Toddy admitted to having used various drugs prior to the traffic collision at issue in this case. Given that Toddy had continued to use drugs despite claiming to have successfully completed prior drug-treatment programs, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that any prior success in such programs did not warrant significant mitigating weight. See generally, Woodcock v. State, 163 N.E.3d 863, 879 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (providing that the defendant's continued drug use, despite having previously completed a rehabilitation program, reflected poorly on defendant's character), trans. denied; Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 1002 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009) (providing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find the defendant's substance-abuse problem to be a significant mitigating factor when defendant was aware of his problem but had not taken appropriate steps to treat it), trans. denied. Having noted the unchallenged aggravating factors and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to find that the proposed mitigators were entitled to mitigating weight, we further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Toddy.
To the extent that Toddy might be making a separate appropriateness argument, we likewise cannot say that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. Toddy caused a traffic collision that resulted in Burton's death after having ingested marijuana, fentanyl, and methamphetamine. Toddy's criminal history includes three prior felony convictions, five prior misdemeanor convictions, and five prior probation revocations. He was also charged with a Level 6 felony possession charge less than two months after the instant charges were filed. Toddy had failed to take advantage of prior attempts at leniency and chose to continue using illegal drugs despite having completed prior drug-treatment programs.
[¶12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.