Opinion
NO. 03-14-00386-CR
02-04-2016
Gayleen S. Todd, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 3 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
NO. 13-08168-3, HONORABLE DOUG ARNOLD, JUDGE PRESIDINGMEMORANDUM OPINION
Gayleen S. Todd was charged by complaint with the misdemeanor offense of failing to maintain the financial responsibility required to lawfully drive a motor vehicle on a public road. See Tex. Transp. Code §§ 601.051, 601.053(b), 601.191. Following a trial in Round Rock Municipal Court, a non-record municipal court, the jury found Todd guilty of the charged offense and assessed a fine of $175.00. Todd, appearing pro se, appealed to the county court at law, which conducted a trial de novo. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 44.17, 45.042(b); Alexander v. State, 240 S.W.3d 72, 74 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (appeal from municipal court that is not municipal court of record is by trial de novo). The jury again found Todd guilty of the charged offense and assessed a fine of $220.00. The county court rendered judgment on the jury's verdict, and Todd brought this appeal. We will affirm the county court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
Todd was stopped by a police officer in May 2013. The officer wrote Todd a ticket for the offense of failing to maintain financial responsibility. Todd was charged by complaint with the offense and a jury trial was held in Round Rock Municipal Court. The jury found Todd guilty of the charged offense. Todd appealed the case to the county court at law, which conducted a trial de novo. The county-court jury also found Todd guilty of the charged offense. Todd filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. Todd then perfected this appeal challenging the county court's judgment in eleven issues. Many of the issues do not contain comprehensible legal arguments. Although we liberally construe pro se briefs, litigants who represent themselves are held to the same standards as litigants represented by counsel. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978). To hold otherwise would give pro se litigants an unfair advantage over litigants with an attorney. Id. To the extent that we can understand them, we will address the legal arguments that are intelligible and not waived by inadequate briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (brief must contain clear and concise argument for contentions made with appropriate citations to authorities and to record).
DISCUSSION
Todd's main complaint appears to be that the trial court did not permit her to object to the use at trial of the terms "transportation," "vehicle," "driver," "motor vehicle," and "operator." According to Todd, she was not engaged in "transportation" such that her activity could be regulated by the Texas Transportation Code and, therefore, her conduct could not be the basis for any claim that she violated that statute as alleged in the complaint. A number of her issues appear to be based on this premise. In her third, fourth, seventh, and eighth issues, Todd argues that the trial court "compelled" her "to consent" to the fact that she engaged in transportation regulated by the Transportation Code when there was in fact no evidence that she was so engaged, resulting in denying her access to courts, denying her a fair trial, and violating her "right (not) to contract" and her "right (not) to engage in commerce." Other problems allegedly emanating from the trial court's refusal to adopt Todd's definition of "transportation" were that the State lacked standing to prosecute her, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, and the State was relieved of its evidentiary burden of proof. According to Todd, "transportation" necessarily involves moving people or goods for hire, there was no evidence that she did so, and by not sustaining her objection to use of the word "transportation," the trial court effectively deprived her of her defense to the charged offense. Todd asserts that the State went to trial "knowing full good and well that there's no 'transportation' at issue," and erroneously rendered judgment against Todd.
Whether Todd was engaged in what she defines as "transportation" is not relevant to the offense for which she was charged. Todd was charged with operating a motor vehicle on a public roadway while failing to maintain financial responsibility. See Tex. Transp. Code § 601.051. Moreover, we have previously rejected an argument similar to Todd's that "transportation" must involve moving people or goods for hire. See Perkins v. State, Nos. 03-14-00305-0310-CR, 2015 WL 3941572, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Austin June 25, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting argument that "transportation" regulated by Texas Transportation Code involves only activities conducted "for profit or hire"). We overrule Todd's third, fourth, seventh, and eighth issues.
In her first and ninth issues, Todd seems to contend that she did not have notice of the proceedings against her. As evidence of this, Todd claims she never entered a plea. However, the trial court's judgment recites that Todd appeared in person at trial on June 2, 2014 and announced "ready" for trial. The record also includes notices of trial settings provided to Todd on February 11, 2014 and April 7, 2014, both of which bear her signature. Todd also appeared at a pre-trial hearing on March 25, 2015. The appellate record does not include a reporter's record of the underlying proceedings, and there is nothing to controvert the recitals in the judgment that Todd appeared for trial, waived her right to counsel, and announced "ready" for trial. See Breazeale v. State, 683 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (when record is otherwise silent, judgment recital is presumed to be correct); Ford v. State, 848 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.) ("Absent a statement of facts, there is nothing to rebut the presumption of regularity in a plea."). To the extent Todd complains that her conviction should be reversed because she did not enter a plea, we observe that the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if the defendant refused to answer when asked how she pleads to the offense charged, a plea of not guilty shall be entered into the minutes of the court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.12. The judgment in this case recites that "the Court entered a plea of NOT GUILTY to the offense" at the commencement of Todd's trial. The record reflects that Todd had notice of the offense for which she was charged, had notice of and appeared at trial, and a plea of not guilty was entered in the minutes of the court. We overrule Todd's first issue.
We also overrule Todd's second issue, which does not advance a reason for reversing the county court's judgment but simply states that Todd is not seeking an abatement of this case because this Court has the power to reform the judgment in the event it contains clerical errors.
In her fifth issue, Todd complains that she was denied a fair trial because "the prosecutors were allowed to access all kinds of materials via the computer during the trial" and "Todd was not allowed to access anything by computer and had to rely on the printed materials," creating "a flagrantly unfair trial environment." Regardless of the validity of this complaint, without a record of the county court proceedings, Todd's claims are merely unsubstantiated assertions that cannot serve a basis for reversing the county court's judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 50(d) (party seeking review is responsible for providing record sufficient to show error). We overrule Todd's fifth issue.
We also overrule Todd's tenth issue in which she complains that the State had "two prosecuting attorneys conspiring against [her]" while she "was not allowed to have representation other than herself." The judgment recites that Todd "voluntarily waived her right to counsel," and Todd provides no reason for us to conclude otherwise. --------
Todd's sixth issue states no comprehensible legal argument that could support reversing the county court's judgment for the charged offense. In this issue Todd references theoretical, yet allegedly non-existent, differences between interstate and intrastate travel, and claims that because there are no "States," there is no practical difference between the two. As a result, she maintains, there are either "no interstate theories that apply at any time" and there is no such thing as "interstate travel" or else the interstate "'right to travel' permeates the entirety of 'this state.'" We can discern no manner in which this issue could be construed as a challenge to the county court's judgment and, to the extent that it can be so construed, it is overruled.
Todd's eleventh issue addresses the manner in which the county court responded to the following written question submitted to the court by the jury during deliberations: "Is there a legal procedure allowing the entry of a license plate into a database for the purpose of identifying whether a car has insurance?" The court responded in writing stating: "The Court under the law is not permitted to answer the question you presented. Please consider only the instructions that have been given to you and continue with your deliberations." Todd queries "what 'law' allows or disallows the trial court to answer a jury's question?" The record does not indicate that Todd preserved any error regarding the county court's response to the jury's question such that the trial court's action is properly before us on appeal. See id. R. 33.1 (preservation of error prerequisite to presenting complaint for appellate review). Moreover, it is improper for a trial court to answer a jury question if that answer would amount to providing the jury with additional evidence or commenting on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. If the trial judge responds substantively to a jury question during deliberations, that communication essentially amounts to an additional or supplemental instruction. See Wilson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 131, 138 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.). Todd has identified no deficiency in the charge that would warrant the trial court's responding to the jury's question. Again, to the extent this issue can be construed as a challenge to the county court's judgment, it is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of Todd's appellate issues, we affirm the judgment of the county court at law.
/s/_________
Scott K. Field, Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Pemberton and Field Affirmed Filed: February 4, 2016 Do Not Publish