Opinion
December 7, 1927.
1. APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Assessment of Taxes. In an action to enjoin the collection of so much of the taxes assessed and collected as results from a valuation in excess of $1.25 per acre on wild lands, this court does not have jurisdiction of the appeal where (a) the amount in dispute is less than $7500; (b) no constitutional question was preserved in the motion for a new trial; (c) there is no issue in the case which calls for a construction of the revenue law, and (d) neither party is a state officer.
2. ____: ____: Revenue Laws: Classification. Where there is no issue in the case relating to the construction or meaning or validity of the revenue laws relating to the classification of property for purposes of taxation, but the sole issue is whether the things admitted to be violations of these laws were actually done, this court cannot entertain the appeal on the sole ground that a construction of the revenue laws is involved.
Appeal from Howell Circuit Court. — Hon. E.P. Dorris, Judge.
TRANSFERRED TO SPRINGFIELD COURT OF APPEALS.
Will H.D. Green and W.J. Orr for appellant.
(1) There can be no classification of property in this State for the purposes of taxation, but all property, both real and personal, is placed in a single class by the Constitution. State ex rel. v. Shipman, 290 Mo. 65; Constitution, art. 10, sec. 4; Secs. 12802, 12803, R.S. 1919. (2) The placing of all "wild lands" in Oregon County into a single class by the County Board of Equalization and assessing these on the flat basis of five dollars per acre, irrespective of soil type, topography, location, water supply, stand of timber or other characteristics peculiar to each tract, is illegal. Cases supra. (3) The classification and valuation of all "wild lands" in the county on a flat basis of five dollars per acre, which is many times "the true value in money at the time of the assessment" of many of the tracts so assessed, is illegal. Cases supra. (4) The undervaluation of all property in the county, outside this illegal and artificially created class, is illegal and denies to appellant the equal protection of the law. State ex rel. v. Shipman, 290 Mo. 65; Green v. Railroad, 244 U.S. 499; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441; Taylor v. Railroad, 88 F. 350; Cummins v. Bank, 101 U.S. 153; Bohler v. Calloway, 207 U.S. 479; Railroad v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94; Chicago E. Ry. v. Eveland, 13 F.2d 442; 26 R.C.L. sec. 219. (5) "Each tract of land shall be assessed and valued separately." R.S. 1919, sec. 12802. (6) "Each tract of land shall be chargeable with its own taxes, no matter who is the owner, nor in whose name it is, or was, assessed." R.S. 1919, sec. 12803; 26 R.C.L. sec. 317; Washington v. Pratt, 5 L.Ed. 714; Emmerson v. Shannon, 23 Colo. 274. (7) Each tract, for purposes of taxation, is all lands owned by one person in one section, whether this be a whole section or less than a whole section, but no tract can include more than one section. R.S. 1919, sec. 12790. (8) The placing of all "wild lands" of the county into a single class, irrespective of the true value of each tract, and assessing these lands as a class on a flat basis many times the true value in money of the tracts, and the undervaluation of all property outside this class, is illegal. Constitution, art. 10, secs. 3, 4; art. 2, sec. 30; R.S. 1919, secs. 12790, 12802, 12803, 12822; Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Bryan, Williams Cave for respondent.
(1) This court has no jurisdiction of this appeal. There is no affirmative showing in the record that as much as $7500 is involved in this case. There is no constitutional question in it. The case does not call for the construction of a revenue statute, and no party to it is a state officer. Sec. 12, Art. 6, and Sec. 3, Amendment 1884 to Art. 6, Mo. Constitution; Secs. 2411, 2418, R.S. 1919. (a) To give this court jurisdiction the record must affirmatively show that the amount involved is greater than $7500. Cambert v. Hydro-Electric Co., 292 Mo. 570; Re Bennett's Estate, 243 S.W. 769; Tinsley Tobacco Co. v. Rombauer, 113 Mo. 435. (b) There is no constitutional question in this case. An attempt was made to raise a constitutional question in the petition, but that attempt dropped out of the case when no reference was made to the denial of constitutional rights in the motion for new trial. Kircher v. Evers, 238 S.W. 1086; Oklahoma v. Nat. City Bank, 267 S.W. 120. (c) There is no issue which calls for the construction of a revenue statute or law. Kircher v. Evers, 238 S.W. 1086. (d) The respondent county collector is not a state officer. State ex rel. Holmes v. Dillon, 90 Mo. 229; State ex rel. Buder v. Spencer, 91 Mo. 206; State ex rel. v. Bus, 135 Mo. 325; State ex rel. v. Higgins, 144 Mo. 410. (2) The evidence of the witness who contradicted the record of the Board of Equalization was incompetent. The record is the best and only competent evidence of what the board did in the absence of a charge that it was falsified. Sec. 12823, R.S. 1919; Washington Co. v. Railroad, 58 Mo. 372; Chicago Railroad Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585; Hagenmeyer v. Bd. of Equalization, 82 Cal. 214; State v. Railroad, 17 Nev. 270. (3) Regardless of the question of the competency of the evidence, it was insufficient to prove that a hearing was refused and was rightly disbelieved by the trial chancellor. Sec. 12812, R.S. 1919. (4) The greater weight of the evidence shows that the lands of appellant were not overvalued, but were undervalued and the finding and judgment is correct. (5) If the valuation of appellant's lands should be reduced, the values of other lands would have to be increased beyond what the officers believe to be their true values, for the local board cannot reduce the total assessment beyond that fixed by the State Board of Equalization. Sec. 12821, R.S. 1919; Trust Co. v. Schram, 269 Mo. 489. (6) The assessment of a large number of tracts of land at the same price per acre is not a classification of property.
Will H.D. Green and W.J. Orr for appellant in reply.
If this case is not one "involving a construction of the revenue laws of the State," then the Boonville case, 317 Mo. 1298, was not such a case. Nor was the case of Jacobs v. Cawthorne, 293 Mo. 164, and many other cases which could be cited. An all-sufficient answer is found in the decision of this court in State ex rel. v. Adkins, 121 Mo. 112, where the cases construing the clause of the Constitution reserving to this court appellate jurisdiction of suits "involving the construction of the revenue laws of this state" are reviewed. The only case cited by respondent in support of their contention that this case does not come within this provision of the Constitution is Kircher v. Evers, 238 S.W. 1086. This must have been an error of the printer, since this point is not mentioned in the case.
This is an equity suit in which appellant seeks to enjoin the Tax Collector of Oregon County, Missouri, from collecting so much of the taxes assessed and levied and which were due and payable in the year 1925 upon about 57,784 acres of its land in Oregon County as results from a valuation in excess of $1.25 per acre.
Respondent asserts that we are without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, and assigns the following reasons: (a) the amount in dispute is less than $7500; (b) no constitutional question was preserved in the motion for a new trial; (c) there is no issue in this case which calls for the construction of a revenue statute or law; (d) the respondent is not a state officer. The abstract of the record discloses that the total tax, the collection of which is here involved, is $3838.96, and that the motion for a new trial contains no reference to any constitutional question. In fact, appellant's counsel apparently concedes the validity of the first, second and fourth reasons by replying only to assigned reason (c) which is, that there is no issue in this case which calls for the construction of a revenue statute or law.
It is true, as stated in State ex rel. v. Adkins, 121 Mo. 112, cited by appellant in support of our jurisdiction, that "the term `revenue law' covers and includes laws relating to the disbursement of the revenue and its preservation, as well as provisions relating to the assessment, levy and collection of it." This would include Sections 3 and 4 of Article X of the Constitution of Missouri, providing that taxes "shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax," and that "all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value." We have carefully examined plaintiff's petition, defendant's answer, and the admissions of fact made and entered of record, and find no allegation that those charged with the duty of making the assessments made any classification of property for the purpose of taxation. All of plaintiff's lands were what were commonly known as "wild lands," and at the trial plaintiff sought to prove that all such lands in Oregon County had been put into a separate class and uniformly valued and assessed at the flat sum of five dollars an acre. This evidence was not only contradicted by countervailing testimony introduced by defendant, but defendant's answer, to which no reply was filed, plainly avers "that all the lands owned by other parties of the same class, character and quality as the lands owned by plaintiff are assessed to the other parties at a valuation of five dollars per acre and more." Furthermore, we find nothing in the entire record of the case indicating that defendant has anywhere joined issue with plaintiff as to the construction or meaning of these constitutional provisions or any revenue law or statute. Plaintiff frankly concedes, and at every stage of the case has conceded the construction and meaning given them by plaintiff, to-wit, that there can be no classification of property for the purpose of taxation, and that all property subject to taxation must be taxed in proportion to its value. The sole issue between the parties is one of fact, namely, whether the things admitted to be violative of these provisions were actually done in this case. As this court said in Kircher v. Evers, 238 S.W. 1086, speaking through JAMES T. BLAIR, J., "the controversy did not arise on this phase of the case, out of a difference of opinion as to what the section mentioned means, but did arise rather upon the question of fact whether the things said to be violative of that section had been done." What was further said in the same opinion, l.c. 1087, is also true of this case, to-wit: "It is clear that this record, in view of what has been said, does not show that a constitutional question was `inexorably involved' (Lohmeyer v. Cordage Co., 214 Mo. 685, 113 S.W. 1108) in the sense in which those words are used in connection with the question of appellate jurisdiction."
Being satisfied that there is no issue in this case which calls for the construction of a revenue statute or law, and that we are without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, it is ordered that the cause be transferred to the Springfield Court of Appeals for its determination. All concur.