Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-1462-K.
August 26, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants Mortenson Broadcasting Company, Individually, and d/b/a KHVN Radio's ("Mortenson") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Eunecia A. Tippens-Washington's ("Tippens-Washington") claim for tortious interference with contractual relations. Having considered the merits of the motion, and because Tippens-Washington's claim fails as a matter of law, the motion GRANTED.
I. Background
Mortenson, doing business as KHVN radio station in Dallas, Texas, hired Tippens-Washington in September of 2000 as an intern, and subsequently promoted her to the position of "promotional assistant" on or about November 30, 2002. Mortenson terminated Tippens-Washington's employment on May 27, 2003.
After she was terminated, Tippens-Washington brought this case against Mortenson alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and hostile work environment. Additionally, Tippens-Washington brings state claims of tortious interference with contractual relationship and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In its motion for partial summary judgment, Mortenson argues that Tippens-Washington's claim for tortious interference with contractual relationship should be dismissed.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits and other summary judgment evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2551-54. Once a movant makes a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment should not be granted; the nonmovant may not rest upon allegations in the pleadings, but must support the response to the motion with summary judgment evidence showing the existence of a genuine fact issue for trial. Id. at 321-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2551-54; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14 (1986). All evidence and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993 (1962).
III. Analysis
Mortenson claims that Tippens-Washington's tortious interference with contractual relationship cause of action fails as a matter of law because Tippens-Washington was an at-will employee. Tippens-Washington argues that although the parties had a contract stating that she was an at-will employee, "Plaintiff was working for Defendants in a significant job and that a significant relationship existed between Plaintiff and Defendants."
Mortenson's claim that Tippens-Washington was an at-will employee is immaterial, as even if Tippens-Washington's at-will relationship did arise to a contractual relationship, her claims nevertheless fails as a matter of law. Under Texas law, an employment agreement which is at-will may be subject to a claim of tortious interference. See Duncan v. Amarillo Pathological Assoc., 1998 WL 889100, *1 (Tex.App.-Amarillo Dec. 22, 1998) ( citing Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1989)). However, even if the parties were bound by a contract, Tippens-Washington's tortious interference claim fails as a matter of law.
Under Texas law, a claim for tortious interference with contractual relationship generally cannot lie against a party to the contract. See Latch v. Gratty, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. 2003); see also Vireo, P.L.L.C. v. Cates, 953 S.W.2d 489, 499 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied) (holding that a claim for tortious interference with a contractual relationship generally concerns a third-party's disruption of a plaintiff's contract, and liability for the cause of action is normally based upon the acts of an interfering third-party) (internal citations omitted). It is clear that Tippens-Washington complains only of the conduct of Mortenson and its employees, not the acts of any third-party. Therefore, even if the parties did have an employment contract, Mortenson could not tortiously interfere with its own contract as a matter of law.
Tippens-Washington fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to her tortious interference with contract claim. Accordingly, Mortenson is entitled to judgment in its favor on that claim as a matter of law.
IV. Conclusion
Tippens-Washington has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on her tortious interference with contract claim. Therefore, Mortenson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.