Opinion
C/A No. 8:08-532-SB-BHH.
February 25, 2008
Report and Recommendation (partial summary dismissal)
This is a civil action filed pro se by a county detention center inmate. Plaintiff is currently confined at the Oconee County Detention Center pending trial on state criminal charges. In the Complaint filed in this case, Plaintiff makes numerous claims of federal constitutional violations against many persons/entities involved in either the state court or criminal prosecution or in the conditions of his confinement at the detention center. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and damages from all Defendants.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and D.S.C. Civ. R. 73.02(B)(2)(e), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).
Specifically with regard to Defendant Norton, a county magistrate judge, Plaintiff alleges that certain rulings made by the judge regarding Plaintiff's request for bail violate the federal constitution. He asks this Court to so declare and to require the judge to lower Plaintiff's bond so that he can be released from detention and to rule that all of Plaintiff's seized personal property be returned to him. This Court cannot grant the relief requested against Defendant Norton because all of Plaintiff's claims about this Defendant's alleged wrongdoing are legally barred from consideration by this Court as stated below. As a result, Defendant Norton should be dismissed as a party to this case without the issuance of service of process for him.
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se Complaint filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) ( en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, _ U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N. Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Complaint filed in this case is subject to partial summary dismissal as to Defendant Norton only under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages from Judge Norton based on Norton's performance of his judicial duties in connection with Plaintiff's state court criminal action, such claim is barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. As the Fourth Circuit has stated relevant to the reasons for the doctrine of absolute immunity for judges:
The absolute immunity from suit for alleged deprivation of rights enjoyed by judges is matchless in its protection of judicial power. It shields judges even against allegations of malice or corruption. . . . The rules is tolerated, not because corrupt or malicious judges should be immune from suit, but only because it is recognized that judicial officers in whom discretion is entrusted must be able to exercise discretion vigorously and effectively, without apprehension that they will be subjected to burdensome and vexatious litigation.McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds, Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 77 (4th Cir. 1995).
The doctrine of absolute immunity for acts taken by a judge in connection with his or her judicial authority and responsibility is well established and widely recognized. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (judges are immune from civil suit for actions taken in their judicial capacity, unless "taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction."); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) ("A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors."); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (a suit by South Carolina inmate against two Virginia magistrates); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) ("It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions."); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (immunity presents a threshold question which should be resolved before discovery is even allowed); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (safeguards built into the judicial system tend to reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (absolute immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability"). Clearly, Defendant Norton's activities in setting bond and ruling on motions to suppress evidence and/or to release seized property are performed as part of his judicial duties. As such, Norton's performance of those duties are protected from damage claims under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.
Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff's Complaint seeks declaratory and/or injunctive relief against Judge Norton, those claims are barred from consideration by this Court while the state court criminal action is proceeding by the doctrine established by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and its progeny. Younger and other cases hold that, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not authorized to interfere with a state's pending criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 44; Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 370 n. 8 (1873); Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148, 169-70 (1898); Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989). Any award of declaratory or injunctive relief from this Court against a presiding state court judge based on his judicial rulings while the criminal case is still pending would clearly interfere with those proceedings, and would thus be precluded under Younger.
In Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that federal district courts should abstain from constitutional challenges to state judicial proceedings, no matter how meritorious, if the federal claims have been or could be presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding. 887 F.2d at 52. Moreover, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, expressly prohibits this court from enjoining such proceedings. Bonner v. Circuit Ct. of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975). In Bonner, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit pointed out that federal constitutional claims are cognizable in both state courts and in federal courts: "Congress and the federal courts have consistently recognized that federal courts should permit state courts to try state cases, and that, where constitutional issues arise, state court judges are fully competent to handle them subject to Supreme Court review." Id.; see also D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (federal courts cannot review state court proceedings in an appellate sense); Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, 411 F.2d 586, 587-88 (4th Cir. 1969) (federal courts may not issue writs of mandamus against state courts); Craigo v. Hey, 624 F. Supp. 414 (S.D.W. Va. 1985) (same).
As indicated in the cases cited above, Plaintiff is not foreclosed from raising what appear to be primarily unreasonable bail and unreasonable search and seizure objections and having them ruled on in his on-going state criminal prosecution by the state court judge. This Court cannot remove the authority to rule on such an objection from the judge who is actually in control on Plaintiff's state criminal case. Also, to grant the relief Plaintiff seeks: declaration of improper judicial rulings and/or release from incarceration and confinement and return of property, this Court would be required to enjoin the state prosecution. As stated above, this is not something we can do under Younger, Cinema Blue, and Bonner.
Recommendation
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court partially dismiss the Complaint in this case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process as to Defendant Norton only. See Denton v. Hernandez; Neitzke v. Williams; Haines v. Kerner; Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-04 (4th Cir. 1993); Boyce v. Alizaduh; Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d at 74; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).The Complaint should be served on the remaining Defendants as detailed in the Order issued contemporaneously with this Report and Recommendations.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. In the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court judge need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must "only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005).Specific written objections must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three (3) days for filing by mail. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) (e). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
P.O. Box 10768
Greenville, South Carolina 29603Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); U. S. v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).