Summary
In Timbers v. State, 2 Md. App. 672, we specifically held that the preliminary hearing was not a critical stage in the proceeding merely because, in the absence of counsel, the accused's ability to discover the State's case and to cross-examine the State's witnesses would be more limited than if he had counsel representing him at the hearing.
Summary of this case from Tyler v. StateOpinion
No. 33, September Term, 1967.
Decided January 5, 1968.
PRELIMINARY HEARING — Purpose — Right To Counsel — Hearing Not Intended To Provide Forum For Discovery. The basic purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine whether to hold the accused for the action of the grand jury. p. 673
Where the defendant enters a plea of not guilty at the preliminary hearing, such hearing is not, of itself, and in the absence of unusual circumstances, such a critical stage in the judicial process as to require appointment of counsel for an indigent accused. p. 673
It is not the purpose of the preliminary hearing to provide a forum for discovery; and, although it does afford, as an incidental by-product, some opportunity for discovery, the constitution does not require, for that reason, that counsel be afforded at that non-critical stage of the proceedings. p. 673
Decided January 5, 1968.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (MOORMAN, J.).
Bernard Timbers, a/k/a William Williams, was convicted in a jury trial of grand larceny and shoplifting, and, from the judgment entered thereon, he appeals.
Affirmed.
The cause was argued before MURPHY, C.J., and MORTON, ORTH, and THOMPSON, JJ.
Joseph E. O'Brien, Jr., for appellant. William B. Whiteford, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, William A. Linthicum, Jr., State's Attorney for Montgomery County, and Rudolph N. D'Agaris, Assistant State's Attorney for Montgomery County, on the brief, for appellee.
Convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on December 1, 1966, of grand larceny and shoplifting, and thereafter sentenced to three years imprisonment, appellant's sole contention on this appeal is that he was illegally convicted because denied his constitutional right to counsel at his preliminary hearing.
The basic purpose of the preliminary hearing in Maryland is to determine whether to hold the accused for the action of the Grand Jury. Arrington v. Warden, 232 Md. 672. It has been repeatedly held that where, as here, the defendant enters a plea of not guilty at the preliminary hearing, such hearing is not, of itself, and in the absence of unusual circumstances, such a critical stage in the judicial process as to require appointment of counsel for an indigent accused. Gopshes v. Warden, 240 Md. 732; Mercer v. State, 237 Md. 479; Fabian v. State, 235 Md. 306, cert. den. 379 U.S. 869; DeToro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341, cert. den. 379 U.S. 909; State v. Hardy, 2 Md. App. 150; Crumb v. State, 1 Md. App. 98.
The thrust of appellant's contention that the preliminary hearing is a critical stage of the proceedings is based upon the proposition that his right to discovery of the State's case, including the right to cross examine the State's witnesses, would be limited in the absence of counsel representing him at that time. We do not feel, however, that it is the purpose of the preliminary hearing to provide a forum for discovery, and although it does afford, as an incidental by-product, some opportunity for discovery, we do not believe that the Constitution requires, for that reason, that counsel be afforded at that non-critical stage of the proceedings. See Sciortano v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.).
Judgment affirmed.