Opinion
No. CV08 501 41 79 S
October 29, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiffs, Brion and Kristen Tierney (the Tierneys), filed a three-count revised complaint on June 3, 2008, against the defendants, Renaud Morin Siding, Inc., (Renaud) and Elite Excavation, LLC (Elite). The plaintiffs allege the following relevant facts. On October 20, 2004, the Tierneys entered into an agreement with Eric Murray and REM Architectural Services, LLC (REM), as general contractor, to renovate the Tierneys' residence. On or before February 28, 2005, REM hired Renaud as a subcontractor for the installation of cedar siding. The siding was installed by Renaud using finish staples and rust staining developed on the siding sometime thereafter. A home inspector determined that the siding was improperly installed and affixed with improper fasteners. Renaud breached an implied warranty to install the siding in a skillful and workmanlike manner resulting in damages which include the cost of replacing the siding, damage to the interior structure during replacement and emotional distress for "witnessing the deterioration of their family residence." The Tierneys also allege that in doing this Renaud breached an express warranty to REM to complete the work in a "substantial workmanlike manner," and is thereby liable to the Tierneys as "third-party beneficiaries of the express warranty."
Renaud is the only moving defendant for the motion for summary judgment at issue.
The Tierneys further allege that Elite breached an implied warranty to perform the excavation in a workmanlike manner. This allegation, however, is unrelated to the pending motion for summary judgment filed by Renaud.
Renaud filed its answer to the Tierneys' revised complaint with special defenses. In its first special defense to counts one and two, Renaud argues that the doctrine of res judicata applies in the present matter to bar the action. Renaud alleges that in 2006 the Tierneys sued Eric Murray and REM for breach of contract in Superior Court, docket number FBT CV 06 5002655 S, and the "[p]laintiffs' claim for damages for alleged defects in the cedar siding was raised in the pleadings." Renaud further alleges that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over all parties in that matter, REM was in privity of contract with Renaud related to a contract for the cedar siding at issue, the matter was stayed and submitted to arbitration and the arbitrator held a hearing on the merits, which included an examination of Renaud Morin on behalf of the corporation. Renaud alleges that the arbitrator issued a decision which determined the Tierneys' claim for alleged defects in the cedar siding, the Superior Court affirmed the arbitration award and judgment was thereby rendered on the merits, which became final and was satisfied on December 4, 2007. The Tierneys filed a reply to Renaud's special defenses, "denying each and every allegation set forth in the first, second and third special defenses."
Renaud has filed this motion for summary judgment, arguing that "[t]here is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs' siding defect claims against Renaud Morin Siding, Inc., arise out of the same transaction, would entail the presentation of the same evidence and involve infringement of the same rights as a prior valid, final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Res judicata [and/or] collateral estoppel bars this action. The defendant, Renaud Morin Siding, Inc., is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Practice Book § 17-49 "provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barrett v. Montesano, 269 Conn. 787, 791-92, 849 A.2d 839 (2004). "A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). "[S]ummary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for raising a claim of res judicata . . ." (Citations omitted.) Joe's Pizza, Inc. v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 236 Conn. 863, 867 n. 8, 675 A.2d 441 (1996).
In its memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judgment, Renaud argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the doctrine of res judicata because "this action arises out of the same siding defect claim as the valid, final judgment in the prior Murray action." Renaud argues that in the alternative, collateral estoppel bars the current action by the Tierneys. In their opposition, the Tierneys argue that they should not be estopped from asserting claims against Renaud because "[Renaud] was not a signatory to the arbitration clause . . . and could not be forced into arbitration for that very reason" and also because he was not a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the Tierneys and REM nor "in sufficient privity to the parties in the arbitration" to "entitle him to claim any benefit from the arbitration proceeding." The Tierneys further argue that Renaud cannot establish "any preclusive effect because the arbitration award was never confirmed and does not constitute a final judgment."
"[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, [provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action [between the same parties] on the same claim. A judgment is final not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain the claim, but also as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose . . . The rule of claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim regardless of what additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support of it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridges v. Commissioner of Correction, 97 Conn.App. 119, 122, 905 A.2d 103, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 921, 908 A.2d 513 (2006). "Res judicata is a doctrine grounded in public policy, whose primary function is to prevent the relitigation of issues already decided in a court of competent jurisdiction." Dunham v. Dunham, 221 Conn. 384, 391, 604 A.2d 347 (1992). "[T]he decision of an arbitration panel is binding as res judicata in a subsequent judicial proceeding." Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 21 n. 5, 699 A.2d 964 (1997).
In deciding whether the doctrine of res judicata is determinative, we begin with the question of whether the second action stems from the same transaction as the first. We have adopted a transactional test as a guide to determining whether an action involves the same claim as an earlier action so as to trigger operation of the doctrine of res judicata. [T]he claim [that is] extinguished [by the judgment in the first action] includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the transaction arose. What factual grouping constitutes a transaction, and what groupings constitute a series, are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understandings or usage . . . In applying the transactional test, we compare the complaint in the second action with the pleadings and judgment in the earlier action. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Powell v. Infinity Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 594, 604, 922 A.2d 1073 (2007).
"An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined . . . An issue is necessarily determined if in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered." (Citations omitted.) Id., 600-01. "The doctrine of res judicata holds that an existing final judgment . . . is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated as to the parties and their privies . . ." (Emphasis added.) Somers v. Chan, 110 Conn.App. 511, 526 (2008). "While it is commonly recognized that privity is difficult to define, the concept exists to ensure that the interests of the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted have been adequately represented because of his purported privity with a party at the initial proceeding . . . A key consideration in determining the existence of privity is the sharing of the same legal right by the parties allegedly in privity." Bagoly v. Riccio, 102 Conn.App. 792, 802, 927 A.2d 950, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 931, 934 A.2d 245 (2007).
In the present matter, there was a valid, final judgment on the merits through arbitration which was conclusive as to the cause of action arising out of the defective cedar siding and the facts and issues therein litigated by the parties and their privies. The Tierneys and REM submitted their first action to arbitration. A hearing was held to resolve the issues in dispute, which included the siding defect claim, evidence was submitted and witnesses were called, including Renaud Morin on behalf of Renaud Morin Siding, Inc. A decision was issued by the arbitrator which included an award of damages for the plaintiffs in the amount of $51,049.60 for defects in the cedar siding. The Superior Court declined to modify or vacate the arbitration award in Tierney v. Murray, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 06 5002655 (August 22, 2007, Gilardi, J.). On February 16, 2007, Renaud paid $45,000.00 to REM for a general release from REM for the siding work done at the Tierneys' residence. The present action stemmed from the same cause of action as the first lawsuit that was ultimately arbitrated, and they are related by that same origin and time period under which the facts took place in the prior action. The issue of the defective cedar siding was clearly raised in the pleadings and submitted for determination by the arbitrator. As such, the issue the Tierneys wish to raise in this action was actually litigated in the previous action that was ultimately resolved by arbitration. Further, the plaintiffs in the first action are the same in the present matter, the Tierneys. Thus, there is no issue of privity because the parties against whom res judicata is to be asserted are the same in both actions and the party asserting it here was in contractual privity with the defendant in the first action. Bagoly v. Riccio, supra, 102 Conn.App. 802.
The Tierneys argue that since "[Renaud] is not a signatory to the arbitration clause contained within the [c]ontract" it "cannot take advantage of any benefits that inure from those arbitration provisions." The Tierneys, however, filed a lawsuit in that action instead of initially submitting their dispute with REM to arbitration. There was nothing preventing the Tierneys from including Renaud in their initial suit, and by the time they filed their lawsuit they knew that Renaud was the subcontractor who installed the defective siding. This, in contrast to what the Tierneys argue, did not prevent them from bringing a claim against Renaud in the same action, regardless of whether Renaud was a signatory to the arbitration agreement between the Tierneys and REM and would have been included in that arbitration. See Practice Book § 9-6; General Statutes § 52-102. Quite to the contrary, the same facts and issues were raised in that action that are raised in the current, and the Tierneys may very well have been able to adjudicate their claim against Renaud through judicial processes aside from the arbitration involving the Tierneys and REM. The Tierneys cite no authority for the proposition that they would have been forced to include Renaud in their arbitration with REM if Renaud had been a party to the first action. Further, public policy favors res judicata in this instance, a doctrine that is "based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate . . . Stability in judgments grants to parties and others the certainty in the management of their affairs which results when a controversy is finally laid to rest." Powell v. Infinity Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 594, 601-02, 922 A.2d 1073 (2007). Therefore, the fact that the agreement to arbitrate only included the Tierneys and REM, not Renaud, does not bar the application of the doctrine of res judicata in this matter.
Practice Book § 9-6 provides in relevant part:
[a]ny person may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest in the controversy, or any part thereof, adverse to the plaintiff, or whom it is necessary, for a complete determination or settlement of any question involved therein, to make a party.
General Statutes § 52-102 provides in relevant part:
[u]pon motion made by any party or nonparty to a civil action, the person named in the party's motion or the nonparty so moving, as the case may be, (1) may be made a party by the court if that person has or claims an interest in the controversy, or any part thereof, adverse to the plaintiff . . .
The Tierneys also argue that "[a]rbitration proceedings may only have a preclusive effect on subsequent proceedings if the award is confirmed or otherwise constitutes a final judgment." The Tierneys cite no Connecticut case law to support this proposition. The Tierneys cite federal case law and General Statutes § 52-421(b). The United States Supreme Court case of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985), cited by the Tierneys, is distinguishable from the present matter because it discusses the preclusive effect of arbitration proceedings "on the litigation of nonarbitrable federal claims," specifically "the federal statutory and constitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard." Id., 222-23. Similarly, the plaintiffs' cite § 52-421(b) as requiring the entry of a confirmation by the Superior Court. Section 52-421(a), however, does not state that making application to confirm an arbitrator's award is mandatory. Nor does the language of § 52-421(b) require a party to confirm an arbitrator's award. Upon further examination of the General Statutes relevant to arbitration, the confirmation of an award by the Superior Court is not mandatory. "At any tine within one year after an award has been rendered . . . any party to the arbitration may make application to the superior court . . . for an order confirming the award." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-417. Here, the arbitrator awarded the Tierneys $51,049.60 from REM, and Renaud paid REM $45,000.00 as a result of the defective siding claim and award. The Tierneys sought to modify or vacate the award, and that application was denied. Tierney v. Murray, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 06 5002655. No further action was taken in that matter. The Supreme Court has held that "the decision of an arbitration panel is binding as res judicata in a subsequent judicial proceeding." Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 243 Conn. 21 n. 5. Therefore, the decision of the arbitrator in the first action was a valid, final judgment for purposes of res judicata, regardless of whether the court confirmed the award.
Section 52-421(a) provides in relevant part: "[a]ny party applying for an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award . . ."
Because there was a valid, final judgment on the merits through arbitration, which was conclusive as to the cause of action arising out of the defective cedar siding and the facts and issues therein litigated by the parties and their privies, this court grants Renaud's motion for summary judgment.