Opinion
Civil Action No. 96-1258, Section "I"
July 21, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tidewater Marine, Inc. (Tidewater Marine) and Twenty Grand Offshore, Inc. (Twenty Grand) (collectively referred to herein as Tidewater) brought this suit in admiralty for damages to the M/V MAC TIDE 63, an offshore tug. The MAC TIDE 63 was damaged when it struck a submerged, unlighted. obstruction to navigation and sank in the Gulf of Mexico, in South Timbaher Block 96 off the coast of Louisiana. The obstruction was a portion of the D/B OCEAN STAR, a three-legged jack-up rig, which had broken while under tow eleven months prior to the allision.
Tidewater Marine was the operator of the MAC TIDE 63, which was owned by Twenty Grand. Sanco International, Inc. (Sanco) owned the OCEAN STAR. Tidewater brought its damage claim against: (1) Sanco, as the owner of the obstruction; (2) Saber Steel Corporation (Saber), which contracted on behalf of Sanco with various third parties with respect to marking the site in accordance with Coast Guard requirements; (3) Rig Ventures, Inc. (Rig Ventures) which held an ownership interest in the OCEAN STAR for one day prior to its transfer to Sanco; and (4) Emilio Sanchez, Sr. (Sanchez), the President and sole shareholder of these companies, in an attempt to pierce the corporate veil and hold him personally liable. These four defendants are referred to collectively as the Sanco Group.
During the trial, the court bifurcated the issue of whether to pierce the corporate veil and hold Sanchez liable as the alter ago of his companies. Therefore, that issue is not addressed herein.
All three companies are engaged in various aspects of the scrap metal business.
The corporations in the Sanco Group brought third-party claims against Professional Divers of New Orleans, Inc. (PDNO) and Sub Sea International, Inc. (Sub Sea), for acts and omissions resulting in the site being marked by an unlighted buoy. The Sanco Group also asserted a counter-claim for contributory negligence against Tidewater for alliding with the obstruction. Sub Sea asserted a cross-claim against PDNO, a counter-claim against Sanco, Saber, and Rig Ventures, and a third-party complaint against Sanchez alleging that each was responsible for the site not being properly marked.
I. FACTUAL FINDINGS A. The Obstruction to Navigation
Rig Ventures purchased the OCEAN STAR on or about February 14, 1995, and sold it the next day to Sanco. On March 21, 1995, one of the rig's jack-up legs broke while under tow. The remaining two legs and mat had to be cut free in order for the rig's tow to continue. Oceaneering International, Inc. (Oceaneering), a diving contractor, cut the rig's legs under the direction of Frank Ruiz, a salvor, who was present on the job as Saber's agent/representative and was in contact with Sanchez via cellular telephone. Ruiz decided where to cut the legs in an attempt to facilitate later salvage and also to accommodate vessel traffic in the area. When the legs were cut, the mat fell to the floor, with the two legs sticking up approximately 18 feet from the surface of the water.
The Sanco Group was aware of Sanco's obligation, as owner of the obstruction, to properly mark it as a hazard to navigation.
Saber through Sanchez and his son, Emilio Sanchez, Jr. (Sanchez, Jr.), who was employed by Saber Steel at the time, took responsibility for marking the submerged obstruction.
Sanchez, Jr. is the Vice-President and Secretary of all three Sanco Group corporations.
Oceaneering installed a Coast Guard approved hazard buoy with a red flashing light to mark the obstruction on or about March 25, 1995.
In May or June, 1995, Saber hired Ruiz to attempt to salvage and/or remove the obstruction. When Ruiz returned to the site, he was unable to find the obstruction because the buoy had been lost or stolen. He located the obstruction by dragging anchors. For over a month, Ruiz made several attempts to raise the mat. Finally, in an attempt to lessen the weight, he allowed the front end to break off and sink to the floor. This left the mat in two pieces with one leg protruding only three feet from the water's surface. There were no more attempts to remove the obstruction or cut the legs from the mat prior to the allision nine months later, even though the evidence established that it would have taken only one day to cut and drop the legs.
Richard Jaross, a business partner of the Sanco Group, warned the Sanchezes as early as April 18, 1995 (almost 10 months before the casualty and before Ruiz attempted salvage), that the legs should be cut off. He explained that time was of the essence. He further warned them on August 22, 1995, almost six months before the casualty, that they needed to get the mat out of the way.
Despite actual knowledge of the hazard to navigation, Sanco and Saber waited until after the allision (almost a year later) before cutting the legs. When the legs were finally cut, the clearance went from 3' to 48' below the surface, significantly reducing the hazard to navigation.
In June, 1995, Saber rented a buoy from World Marine Transport Salvage, Inc. (World Marine) to mark the obstruction. The rental buoy was installed on June 23, 1995. This buoy was an SB-826 Sentinel, 8 feet wide, 21 feet tall, with an 8-mile maximum range radar reflector, light, and horn. It had a value of approximately $25,000. The buoy was rented to Saber at a cost of $4,455, plus an insurance premium of $1,100 every six weeks.
In mid-November, 1995, Sanchez sent divers to survey the mat for the purpose of cutting the legs. They reported to him that they were unable to locate the buoy or the obstruction. Sanchez subsequently learned in late-December, 1995 that the divers in fact had not gone out to the site and had falsely reported the buoy as lost. In the meantime, on December 14, 1995, Sanchez notified the United States Coast Guard that the obstruction was reportedly unmarked. He also asked his son to purchase a replacement buoy, rather than to rent another one, to save money.
On or about December 14, 1995, Sanco purchased a hazard buoy, light assembly, chains and anchor weights from Dor-Mar, Inc. Sanchez, Jr. did not refer to the dimensions of the rented buoy in purchasing a replacement, but he did have Dor-Mar confirm with the Coast Guard that the purchased buoy was Coast Guard approved for marking an underwater obstruction. In addition, his father reviewed and approved the specifications on the purchased buoy.
The purchased buoy was much smaller than the rented buoy, and it did not have a radar reflector or a horn. It had "HAZARD" printed in bold orange letters and displayed the diamond maritime symbol for hazard. The rental buoy cost approximately $25,000; whereas the purchased buoy cost approximately $1,238.00.
By facsimile dated December 21, 1995, Sanchez advised the Coast Guard that they still were aware of the hazard to navigation, that they "were on top of the situation," and had purchased a buoy which would be shipped to Port Fourchon for ultimate installation at the location of the obstruction.
B. The Missing Buoy Light
Sanchez, Jr., acting on behalf of Saber, contacted PDNO in mid-December, 1995 to perform an underwater video survey of the mat and legs and to install the purchased buoy at the obstruction. Because Sanco had been advised that the divers who reported the buoy missing had not actually gone out to the site, Sanchez, Jr. also asked PDNO to verify whether the rental buoy was still on location.
Sanchez, Jr. arranged for the purchased buoy, light assembly, chain, and anchor weights to be sent to the Bollinger Shipyard facility in Fourchon, Louisiana. The buoy, weights, chain, and light assembly were shipped in three crates. Sanchez, Jr. told PDNO to pick up the buoy at Bollinger. On the morning of January 12, 1996, the buoy, the anchor, chain, and a light assembly were loaded aboard the M/V EMAR J. EYMARD at Bollinger Shipyard. PDNO had chartered the EYMARD to take its crew to the location of the obstruction.
The PDNO supervisor for the job, Richard Hastings, arrived at the Bollinger Shipyard facility in Fourchon, Louisiana on January 11, 1996, approximately four hours before the vessel departed. During this four-hour period, Hastings made no effort to inspect the buoy material, contrary to the expectations of Larry Tomlinson, President of PDNO.
Kris Hepting, Vice-President of Operations with PDNO, telephoned Sanchez, Jr. two or three times on the day of the job before the vessel left port to determine what equipment would be needed to set the buoy into the water. Sanchez, Jr. did not have the information at hand, but called back with the height and weight of the buoy, the length and size of the chain, and the weight of the anchor. He did not mention the light assembly. Sanchez also gave Hepting the coordinates for the obstruction.
The EYMARD crew found the rented buoy still on site. The PDNO divers conducted an underwater survey of the mat and legs, including taking video of the obstruction and pneumo-fathometer (or depth) readings on the obstruction, and determined the shallowest areas. PDNO then placed the purchased buoy in the center of the mat, but failed to install its light assembly. PDNO left the site without installing the light.
During the return trip, a PDNO employee brought the light to Richard Hastings in the wheelhouse. Hastings did not call his office at that time for instructions. After discussion pith Captain Lewis about the rough weather and taking into account that the site, at that time, was properly marked by the lighted, rental buoy, Hastings decided not to return to the site to install the light. The next day, he gave the light to Kris Hepting, who said he would return it to Saber. Instead, Hepting put the light in a storage shed where it stayed until after the allision. Hepting did not think the light was important, but he did tell Larry Tomlinson, President of PDNO, that he had the light and planned to send it back to Saber Steel.
At no time prior to the allision did PDNO advise the Sanco Group or Sanchez, Jr. that it had installed the buoy without the light. To the contrary, PDNO gave them every reason to believe that the buoy had been properly installed. Sanchez, Jr. did not specifically inquire about the status of the light because PDNO had told him that everything was fine. Sanchez, Jr. was an contact with Larry Bourg while the PDNO crew was on its way back from site, and Bourg, who at that time did not know that the light had not been installed, assured him that everything was fine and working.
Notwithstanding that Hastings, Hepting, and Tomlinson, were aware that the light had not been installed, PDNO issued a wreck site report prepared by Hastings to Saber confirming that "another hazard buoy" had been installed, but failed to report that the light had not been installed or that PDNO had possession of the light. Work sheets attached to PDNO's report also state that "another wreck buoy" was installed by PDNO's dive crew.
After receiving the January 16, 1996 letter from PDNO, Sanchez, Jr. had several further contacts with PDNO through Bourg. He contacted Bourg to ensure that the purchased buoy would not drift; he conferred with him about returning to the site in six months to change the batteries on the light; and he asked PDNO to bid on removing the rental buoy and salvaging the obstruction. Bourg never advised Sanchez, Jr. that PDNO had not put the light on the buoy, but the evidence does not show that Bourg was aware that the light had not been installed. Sanchez, Jr. did speak to Hastings, who was aware of the problem, but Hastings did not mention the light. Because of assurances from PDNO, and its failure to inform any of the Sanco Group, about the light, the Sanco Group believed that the site had been properly marked.
PDNO did not have clear instructions on the scope of its work and would have benefited by having a Sanco or Saber company representative on the job, as is customary practice. The evidence does not establish that Sanchez, Jr. put any of his instructions in writing or that he gave PDNO a copy of Dor-Mar's printed specifications on the buoy. The evidence also does not establish that he specifically advised PDNO that the purchased buoy was going to be shipped in three crates, that the buoy had a light, or that the light needed to be assembled. Notwithstanding this lack of communication, the testimony of Captain Lewis, the relief captain on the PDNO chartered vessel, shows that PDNO crew members were aware of the existence of the buoy's light assembly prior to commencing the dive operations. Captain Lewis testified that the box containing the light was marked "water light" and that PDNO's dive tenders assisted in loading that box onto his vessel. And, after arriving at the site, Capt. Lewis showed the light assembly to a PDNO dive tender.
PDNO argues that it should not be held accountable for not notifying Saber that the light had not been installed on the hazard buoy because (i) it believed the purchased buoy was to mark the obstruction for survey purposes only and assumed the lighted rental buoy would remain at the site or, alternatively, (ii) it assumed that the underwater obstruction had been removed and a lighted buoy was no longer needed.
The evidence shows that PDNO was aware that the purchased buoy was intended to mark an obstruction as a hazard to navigation. Sanchez, Jr. clearly advised PDNO that the buoy on site might be missing. PDNO was aware that the obstruction needed to be marked and that if the buoy on site was missing, the one they were going to set would have been the replacement. In addition, PDNO was aware of the obstruction's presence as a result of the underwater survey it conducted.
The evidence also shows that after PDNO returned from the site with the light, at least one person, Larry Tomlinson, President of PDNO, had knowledge of both the fact that the light had not been installed and that PDNO wanted to remove the rental buoy. Notwithstanding these facts, prior to the sinking, PDNO never notified Saber that the light had not been installed and was sitting in PDNO's warehouse. To the contrary, PDNO's actions and inactions resulted in the Sanco interests incorrectly assuming that the light had been installed on the purchased buoy.
According to PDNO's own expert, David Cole, a "wreck buoy" is supposed to be lighted. Cole testified that if he saw an entry in a report that stated "Set another wreck buoy" he would understand that to mean a lighted buoy.
The court likewise cannot accept PDNO's argument that it thought the underwater obstruction had been removed, inasmuch as PDNO had submitted bids on removal of the obstruction up until the day of the allision. Nor does the evidence support PDNO's argument that the light would have been too difficult to install aboard the vessel once they were underway.
C. Removal of the Rental Buoy
Sanchez, Jr., acting on behalf of Saber, contacted Sub Sea on January 29, 1996, about delivering equipment to a drilling rig, the D/B OCEAN EXPLORER, located in South Pelto 21. In a subsequent conversation, he asked if Sub Sea could also pick up the rental buoy located in South Timbaher 96, which was only 5 or 6 miles from the drilling rig. He explained that he was eager to remove the rental buoy to "get it off rent," because he had replaced it with a purchased buoy. His written bid request stated with respect to the buoy, only: "We would also like to know how much you would charge for picking up a lighted buoy located at lat. 28.743018 long. 90.625668. It is a rented buoy that needs to be returned . . . . Buoy is in 56 feet of water." Later, at the request of Sub Sea's Operations Manager, Wesley Freeman, Sanchez, Jr. provided the following additional information about the buoy:
Buoy is marked as Saber Steel ST96/Model SB-826 red fiberglass buoy/consists of lantern with re [sic] lens, solar generator, 1 shot (90 feet) of 1 1/8" stud link chain, bridle and swivel assembly 2 1/14" shackles, 2 5000 pound concrete sinkers. If you need additional information, don't hesitate to call.
When Freeman asked Sanchez, Jr. what the buoy was marking, he replied that it was marking a submerged pad. He did not describe the protruding legs, the 3 foot clearance, or where the buoy was in relation to the mat. He did not advise Sub Sea that the submerged pad or anything else at the location was a hazard or obstruction to navigation. To the contrary, he told Sub Sea that the water was 56 feet deep at the location. He also did not describe the purchased buoy or ask Sub Sea to check on the status of the purchased buoy.
Sub Sea was hired to do the job. It used the M/V MR. FRANK, a liftboat, to perform its work. The navigation crew consisted of Captain Richard McLean, a mate, a cook, and a deckhand. The dive crew consisted of two divers and a tender. All were employed by Sub Sea. There were no representatives of the Saber Group aboard the vessel.
After delivering the equipment to the OCEAN EXPLORER, the MR. FRANK traveled the five or six miles to the buoy during daylight with visibility of 10 or 12 miles. Capt. McLean had the longitude and latitude coordinates for the buoy's location. With the coordinates, he was able to use the vessel's Loran system to obtain the course, distance, direction, speed and estimated time of arrival at the buoy's location. He did not consult his navigational charts or Notices to Mariners at any time during the job.
The obstruction was listed on current Coast Guard navigational charts. In addition, the obstruction had been the subject of five Notices to Mariners, including most recently, Notices issued on December 19 and 26. The obstruction also was the subject of a broadcast Notice to Mariners on December 14, 1995, but there is no evidence that Capt. McLean was in a position to hear that broadcast.
Even though Sub Sea normally would advise its dive crews of any dangerous conditions, none of the Sub Sea personnel on the MR. FRANK knew that the buoys were marking a hazard or obstruction to navigation; they knew only that the buoys marked a submerged pad of some kind.
Upon arrival at the site of the obstruction, they saw that there were two buoys approximately 50 feet apart. The dive crew knew that they were to pick up a "marker buoy" and called the shop to verify which buoy to pick up. Capt. McLean proceeded to the larger of the two buoys (the rental buoy) and positioned downwind from the it and as far away as possible to avoid jacking down on the submerged pad. After jacking down and lifting the vessel without incident, Capt. McLean went to sleep.
By this time, it was dark, and both buoys, which were in front of the MR. FRANK'S bow, were illuminated by spotlights from the vessel rental buoy, which was approximately 60 feet out from the bow the closest of the two buoys. The purchased buoy was positioned another 50 feet away from the rental buoy. As the wheelhouse approximately 60 feet from the bow, the purchased buoy would have been approximately 170 feet from the MR. FRANK's wheelhouse.
The dive supervisor, Stephen Barkely, and the diver, John Sutton, noticed at some point during the evening that the smaller buoy was not lighted. Neither they nor any of the other Sub Sea employees on the MR. FRANK ever discussed this fact. Sutton did not see the obstruction during his dives, one of which was to a depth of ___ feet, because visibility was only two feet.
Sub Sea retrieved the rental buoy without incident. Upon departing the site in the dark at 4:00 a.m., Capt. McLean, who was at the wheel, did not notice whether the other buoy was lighted. Based upon what he knew at the time, Capt. McLean did not feel that he was leaving a dangerous situation at the site.
After the MR. FRANK returned to port, the Sanco Group did not inquire about the status of the purchased buoy.
There is no express contractual agreement between Saber and Sub Sea requiring Sub Sea to inspect, mark, or report on the condition of the rental buoy. There is likewise no evidence that Sub Sea knew that the Sanco Group was relying on it to assure that the remaining buoy conformed to Coast Guard standards before removing the rental buoy. See Tidewater Marine, Inc. v. Sanco International, Inc. No. Civ. A. 96-1258, 1997 WL 543108 * 9-10 (E.D. La. Sept. 3, 1997).
The presence of a wreck buoy does not necessarily mean that it is currently marking a hazard to navigation because the hazard may have been eliminated. Even so, the presence of the two buoys, and the fact that one buoy was to remain on site, together with the fact that the liftboat and divers would be working in close proximity to the buoys, should have caused Capt. McLean to question the exact nature of what the buoys were marking. Reasonable maritime practice would require, at a minimum, consultation with current charts. Had Capt. McLean consulted the charts and Notices to Mariners which Sub Sea made available to him, he would have had known that the buoys were marking an obstruction to navigation.
Capt. McLean testified that had he known about the obstruction and had he noticed that the remaining buoy was unlit, he would not have left the site without ensuring that the area was marked with a lighted buoy. Sub Sea's operations manager, Freeman, testified that had he known the exact nature of the obstruction, he would not have sent the dive crew to the site.
Notwithstanding his ignorance of the hazard, Capt. McLean encountered no problems in navigating the liftboat at the site. Sub Sea performed its job exactly as requested by Saber and without incident.
The MAC TIDE 63 allision occurred within five days of Sub Sea's removal of the rental buoy.
Sub Sea and Saber asserted claims against each other based on the provisions of their Master Time Charter Agreement. Sub Sea, as owner, claims that Saber, as charterer, was obligated to obtain insurance to protect and indemnify Sub Sea from the third party claims, such as those asserted against it by Tidewater.
Article VIII of the Time Charter contains the only insurance requirement applicable to Saber, as charterer:
CHARTERER agrees to provide full and adequate insurance on its employees and property, and/or those of its subsidiary or affiliated firms, and it further agrees to cause such policies to waive subrogation in favor of OWNER, et al for the risks assumed by CHARTERER under this Agreement.
This insurance provision would apply to any employees or property of Saber involved in the recovery of the rental buoy, which there were none. The provisions do not apply to negligence on the part of Sub Sea. Article VIII does not require the naming of Sub Sea as an "additional assured," but only a "waiver of subrogation" with respect to "risks assumed by CHARTERER" under the Time Charter. The "risks assumed" by Saber did not include the obligation to provide insurance for third party claims against Sub Sea.
Saber claims that under Article V of the Time Charter, Sub Sea was obligated to leave the rental buoy on site and notify Saber that the purchased buoy was unlit. Article V provides:
OWNER shall, upon request, provide the services to CHARTERER as requested and directed by CHARTERER. If OWNER determines it is not safe to perform any services as requested under any given conditions, OWNER shall immediately notify CHARTERER of such unsafe condition, and shall not engage in any activity which may cause damage or loss to life or property. OWNER, its masters and crew have the sole discretion, authority, and last word as to whether any request of CHARTERER should or should not be carried out. OWNER, its masters and crew shall not, under any circumstances, undertake any task by request of CHARTERER which it or they shall deem unsafe; and OWNER, its masters and crew shall have the authority and responsibility not to undertake any task which it or they shall deem improper or unsafe. Should CHARTERER require OWNER to undertake any activity deemed unsafe by OWNER, CHARTERER shall indemnify, defend and hold OWNER harmless against any and all claims for injury or death resulting therefrom to any person and for any and all property damaged, including but not limited to the vessel, as a consequence thereof. OWNER shall further provide competent and capable employees and crewmembers for the operation of any Vessels chartered hereunder.
Article V addresses the performance by Sub Sea of Saber's requested services. It obligates Sub Sea to perform the services as requested and directed by Saber, and to provide a competent crew to operate the vessel, but allows Sub Sea the discretion to back out of any jobs that it determines to be unsafe. Sub Sea did not violate Article V because it performed the services exactly as requested by Sub Sea. Sub Sea never made a determination, partly because of inadequate and inaccurate information provided by Saber, that removal of the rented buoy was unsafe. Because Sub Sea performed its contractual services as requested and without incident, there is no basis for finding that Sub Sea violated Article V.
D. The Sinking of the M/V MAC TIDE 63
Five days after Sub Sea removed the rented buoy, leaving behind the unlit purchased buoy, the M/V MAC TIDE 63 struck the underwater obstruction. At the time of the allision and sinking, it is undisputed that the purchased buoy marking the obstruction was not lit.
On the day of the allision, February 12, 1996, Captain Bilich, the master of the MAC TIDE 63, arrived in Fourchon and boarded the vessel. During the hours he was docked in Fourchon, he took inventory of food in the galley, attended to crew member disputes and conducted an "abandon ship" drill. He did not review any of the Notices to Mariners or navigational charts. Capt. Bilich testified that he had been on his vessel for approximately 35 hours prior to departure. He thus had 35 hours to update his charts and review the Notices to Mariners, yet he failed to do so.
The MAC TIDE 63 departed from Fourchon at 8:30 p.m. Initially, Capt. Bilich chartered a course that would not take him through South Timbaher 96. About an hour into the trip, he altered his course when he detected fishing vessel traffic and a line of offshore oil rigs in the area.
Capt. Bilich entered way points into the vessel's Global Positioning System (GPS). The OPS tells whether the vessel is on course to get to its destination and is an aid to navigation. Capt. Bilich plotted his course on the chart every hour. He also constantly monitored his radar and kept a close lookout. Visibility was excellent, and the seas were two to three feet.
The purchased buoy stood approximately 30 inches above the water line without the light installed, so that in two to three foot seas the entire buoy could be submerged in a wave trough. While the buoy had a metal screen inserted in the light which apparently was intended to be a radar reflector, it was inadequate to reflect radar in any conditions other than very calm seas. Because of its height and the nature of the reflector, the buoy was not detectable by radar in two to three foot seas, which is relatively calm for the Gulf of Mexico.
Buoys, radar, Loran, charts, Notices to Mariners, and lookouts are all aids to navigation. None of these alone can be considered absolute indicators of sea conditions. Indeed, the charts state: "The prudent mariner will not rely solely on any aid to navigation, particularly floating aids."
The obstruction was listed on current navigation charts at the time of the incident. It is not known whether there were current charts aboard the MAC TIDE 63 because Capt. Bilich failed to inventory the charts on the vessel, in contravention of Tidewater policy. Capt. Bilich also violated Tidewater policy by failing to review and chart the Notices to Mariners. The obstruction had been the subject of five Notices to Mariners prior to the allision, including, most recently, the Notices to Mariners issued on December 19, 1995 and December 26, 1995.
At the time of the allision, Capt. Bilich was aware of the obstruction from the OCEAN STAR mat. He had actual knowledge of the obstruction because he had spotted the rental buoy six months earlier in August 1995. He also knew what it marked because he had been told about the obstruction a year prior to the allision by another Tidewater captain, unfortunately, Capt. Bilich was not aware that his new course was taking him through South Timbaher 96. If Capt. Bilich had consulted current or updated charts, he could have navigated around the area and avoided the accident.
Capt. Bilich violated responsibilities he held by virtue of his license, as well as Tidewater's own company policy requiring the use of updated charts.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The court has jurisdiction over this matter under its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
Under the law of the case doctrine, the court adopts the findings and legal analysis of Judge Vance in Tidewater Marine, Inc. v. Sanco International. Inc., No. CIV. A. 96-1258, 1997 WL 543108 (E.D. La. Sept. 3, 1997).
This case was originally assigned to Judge Vance of this district who issued written reasons on the parties' pre-trial motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in the cited opinion.
The Pennsylvania Rule of law presumes that any party to a maritime accident who violates a federal statute is at fault for the allision. The Rule shifts the burden of proof as to causation on the violator to prove that the violation could not have been a contributing cause of the allision. The Pennsylvania Rule applies in allision cases where those responsible for properly marking stationary objects in navigable waters, including underwater obstructions, failed to do so. Pennzoil Producing Co. v. Offshore Express. Inc., 943 F.2d 1465, 1472 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Sheridan Transp. Co. v. United States, 834 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir. 1987) (Sheridan I), appeal after remand, 897 F.2d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1990) (Sheridan II).
The rule of The Pennsylvania concerns only the burden of proof for showing causation; it does not determine ultimate liability for damages.United Overseas Export Lines, Inc. v. Medluck Compania Naviera, S.A., 785 F.2d 1320, 1325 (5th Cir. 1986); Otto Candies, Inc. v. M/V MADELINE D, 721 F.2d 1034, 1036 (5th Cir. 1983). All parties against whom the rule is applied may be liable if their negligence proximately caused the accident, and damages are to be assessed in accordance with the principles of comparative negligence. Sheridan Transp., 834 F.2d at 478 (citing United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 95 S.Ct. 1708, 1713, 1715-16, 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975); Otto Candies, 721 F.2d at 1036; Allied Chem. Corp. v. Hess Tankship Co., 661 F.2d 1044, 1057-59 (5th Cir. 1981); Alamo Chem. Transp. Co. v. M/V OVERSEAS VALDES, 398 F. Supp. 1094, 1104-07 (E.D. La. 1975)
A duty of care may be derived not only from statutory standards, but also from the dictates of reasonableness and prudence under the given circumstances of a case. See Coumou v. United States, 107 F.3d 290, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1997), withdrawn and superseded in part on reh'g by Coumou v. United States, 114 F.3d 64 (5th Cir. 1997) ("The fact that the government did not violate a statute, however, does not end our inquiry. The general maritime law of negligence recognizes a duty of reasonable care under existing circumstances. . . .")
"Negligent conduct on the navigable waters that causes loss to another constitutes a maritime tort." United States v. M/V BIG SAN, 681 F.2d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132, 103 S.Ct. 3112, 77 L.Ed.2d 1367 (1983). A party's negligence is actionable under general maritime law only if it is a "legal cause" of the plaintiff's injuries.See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 648 (5th Cir. 1992); Chavez v. Noble Drilling Corp., 567 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1978). "Legal cause is something more than `but for' causation."Donaghey, 974 F.2d at 648 (quoting Thomas v. Express Boat Co., Inc., 759 F.2d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)). A defendant's negligence must be a "substantial factor" in causing the injury. Id. The term "substantial" is defined as "more than but for the negligence, the harm would not have resulted." Chavez, 567 F.2d at 289 (citing Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 222-23 (5th Cir. 1975).
When more than one party is at fault, the comparative negligence standard applies. It provides that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause property damage in a maritime collision, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault.
The "superseding cause" doctrine is similar and related to the principle of "proximate causation." See Exxon, 517 U.S. 830, 837, 116 S.Ct. 1813, 1818, 135 L.Ed.2d 113 (1996). The doctrine is applied when a defendant's negligence substantially contributes to the plaintiff's injury in fact, "but the injury was actually brought about by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable." Id. (quoting 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-3, at 165-66 (2d ed. 1994)). The doctrine essentially asks whether a defendant "is to be held liable for an injury to which he has in fact made a substantial contribution, when it is brought about by a later cause of independent origin, for which he is not responsible." Nunley v. M/V DAUNTLESS COLOCOTRONIS, 727 F.2d 455, 464 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832, 105 S.Ct. 120, 83 L.Ed.2d 63 (1984) (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed. 270) The Fifth Circuit has explained the operation of the doctrine of superseding causation as follows:
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if
(a) the actor at the time of the negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.Donaghey, 974 F.2d at 652 (citing Nunley, 727 F.2d at 464-65 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447)).
For the subsequent negligence of a third party to absolve the initial wrongdoer of liability for all of the damages suffered by the injured party, the subsequent negligence of the third party must be so extraordinary that a reasonably prudent person could not have foreseen its occurrence. Miss Janel, Inc. v. Elevating Boats, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1553, 1569 (S.D. Ala. 1989).
"A person who voluntarily assumes a duty owed by another and then breaches that duty becomes liable to one who is injured as a result of the breach." Miss Janel, Inc., 725 F. Supp. at 1567 (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955)). The "Good Samaritan" rule, as this principle is known, is applicable in maritime cases. The rule is set forth in section 324A of the Second Restatement of Torts:
One who undertakes gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 324A.
An actor's specific undertaking of the services allegedly performed without reasonable care is a threshold requirement to section 324A liability. See, e.g., Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707, 716 (3d Cir. 1982) ("The foundation of [324A] is that the defendant specifically has undertaken to perform the task that he or she is charged with having performed negligently"). The scope of this undertaking defines and limits an actor's duty under section 324A. See, e.g., Homer v. Pabst Brewing Co., 806 F.2d 119, 121 (7th Cir. 1986).
Where a person neglects to do what is obligated, he has committed a breach of contract. Ogea v. Loffland Bros. Co., Inc., 622 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1980). It is fundamental contract law that a party that breaches a contract is liable for the damages caused by its failure to satisfy its contractual obligations. Id. at 189.
The United States Supreme Court has recently held that the principles of legal or proximate causation in maritime tort also apply to harm resulting from a breach of contract. See Exxon Co. U.S.A., 517 U.S. at 839 ("Although the principles of legal causation sometimes receive labels in contract analysis different from the `proximate causation' label most frequently employed in tort analysis, these principles nevertheless exist to restrict liability in contract as well.").
A. Sanco Group
The Wreck Act provides that: