Opinion
A21-1305
03-07-2022
Rodney Thundercloud, Appellant, v. Paul Schnell, Commissioner of Minnesota Department of Corrections; in his individual capacity, Respondent.
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CV-20-4628
Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
ORDER OPINION
MICHELLE A. LARKIN, JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Self-represented appellant Rodney Thundercloud challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment on his claim of false imprisonment against respondent Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) Commissioner Paul Schnell, in his individual capacity.
2. Thundercloud is a former DOC inmate. In 2020, Thundercloud sued Commissioner Schnell for false imprisonment, alleging that Schnell kept him on conditional release after his criminal sentence had expired, as a result of the DOC's miscalculation of his conditional-release term. During the time between the expiration of Thundercloud's criminal sentence and the DOC's correct calculation of his conditional- release term, Thundercloud was not in prison; he was civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program.
3. The underlying legal and procedural history is complex and need not be repeated here because it is undisputed that the DOC miscalculated Thundercloud's conditional-release term, which resulted in him remaining on conditional release after his sentence had expired. See Thundercloud v. Harpstead, No. A19-0529, 2019 WL 5541493, at *2-3 (Minn.App. Oct. 28, 2019) (reversing and remanding for the district court to grant Thundercloud's writ of habeas corpus because the DOC had miscalculated his conditional-release term, which had already expired); Thundercloud v. State, No. A14-1680, 2015 WL 1609011, at *1 (Minn.App. Apr. 13, 2015) (upholding the district court's imposition of a conditional-release term for Thundercloud), rev. denied (Minn. June 16, 2015). It is also undisputed that Schnell was appointed as the commissioner of the DOC on January 7, 2019. He had not been a DOC employee before that date, and he was never personally involved in administering or calculating Thundercloud's sentence or conditional-release term.
4. Schnell moved for summary judgment on Thundercloud's claim. Thundercloud did not submit any affidavits in response. The district court granted summary judgment for Schnell, reasoning that Thundercloud did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding a necessary element of his false-imprisonment claim. Thundercloud appeals.
5. The district court must grant summary judgment if the moving party shows "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 2014). In doing so, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the law." Id. Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable people can draw different conclusions from the evidence presented. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997).
6. The party moving for summary judgment must support his assertion that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine issue for trial." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03(a). In response, the nonmoving party "must do more than rest on averments or denials of the adverse party's pleading." Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 754 (Minn. 2005). The nonmoving party must identify specific facts that establish the existence of a triable issue of fact. Papenhausen v. Schoen, 268 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 1978). "A defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law when the record reflects a complete lack of proof on an essential element of the plaintiff's claim." Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995).
7. Schnell moved for summary judgment on March 29, 2021, and he filed an amended motion on May 13. He submitted affidavits and records from Thundercloud's previous criminal proceedings as support for summary judgment. Discovery closed under the district court's order on May 14. Although Thundercloud filed a memorandum opposing Schnell's motion for summary judgment, he did not submit any documents to establish a genuine issue of material fact. On appeal, the only fact that Thundercloud appears to dispute is the precise date on which his sentence expired. Even if there is a factual dispute regarding that issue, it does not give rise to a genuine issue of material fact for the reasons that follow.
8. The elements of false imprisonment are as follows: "(1) words or acts intended to confine, (2) actual confinement, and (3) awareness by the plaintiff that he is confined." Blaz v. Molin Concrete Prods. Co., 244 N.W.2d 277, 279 (Minn. 1976). Blaz describes the first element of false imprisonment as "words or acts" intended to confine. Id. And the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35 (1965), which the Minnesota Supreme Court cited in Blaz, requires that a person "act[] intending to confine" the other person. Thus, we conclude that the intent to confine requires an affirmative act.
9. Here, the only affirmative act that Thundercloud points to in support of his claim is the DOC's recalculation of his conditional-release term in 2013. But Schnell did not become the commissioner until 2019, and he was not employed by the DOC before then. He therefore had no role in the DOC's recalculation of Thundercloud's conditional-release term. Any attempt to rely on Schnell's failure to conduct an audit of Thundercloud's sentence is unavailing because an affirmative act showing intent to confine is necessary.
10. Thundercloud argues that under Minn. R. Civ. P. 25.04, Schnell is liable for the DOC's actions before he became the commissioner in 2019. That rule provides:
When any public officer is a party to an action and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or
against the officer's successor if it is satisfactorily shown to the court that there is a substantial need for so continuing and maintaining it.Minn. R. Civ. P. 25.04. Thundercloud did not refer to that rule when opposing the motion for summary judgment in the district court. We generally will not consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Moreover, rule 25.04 applies only if a public official was originally a party to an action and was then replaced by another official. Thundercloud did not file suit against Schnell's predecessor and then seek to continue that suit against Schnell after he became the commissioner of the DOC. Instead, Thundercloud brought this action against Schnell in the first instance. Thus, rule 25.04 does not provide a basis for relief.
11. Thundercloud also argues that he did not have enough time to conduct discovery. If the nonmoving party "shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, [he] cannot present facts essential to justify [his] opposition [to summary judgment], the court may: (a) defer considering the motion or deny it; (b) allow time to obtain affidavits or to take discovery; or (c) issue any other appropriate order." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. There is a "presumption in favor of granting continuances to allow sufficient time for discovery" prior to summary-judgment determinations. Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 412 (Minn. 1982). When determining whether to grant a continuance to allow discovery prior to a determination of a summary-judgment motion, "the court considers first, whether the moving party has been diligent in obtaining or seeking discovery and, second, whether the moving party seeks further discovery with the good faith belief that material facts will be uncovered, or is merely engaging in a fishing expedition." Cargill Inc. v. Jorgenson Farms, 719 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Minn.App. 2006) (quotations omitted).
12. Thundercloud did not invoke rule 56.04 in district court in an attempt to obtain additional time to complete discovery. And on appeal, he does not assert that he was diligent in seeking discovery. Nor does he explain why he has a good-faith belief that material facts would have been uncovered with additional discovery. Thundercloud's attempt to obtain relief based on inadequate discovery is therefore unavailing.
13. In sum, Thundercloud failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding a necessary element of his false-imprisonment claim: that Schnell affirmatively acted with intent to confine him. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact on that element of the claim, Schnell was entitled to summary judgment. See Lubbers, 539 N.W.2d at 401. We therefore affirm without addressing Schnell's arguments that he is entitled to statutory and official immunity on Thundercloud's claim.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's judgment is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.