Opinion
No. 10-18-00068-CR
08-19-2020
RAYMOND GRELY THORNTON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 54th District Court McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2016-672-C2
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Appellant Raymond Grely Thornton of two counts of sexual assault of a child and assessed his punishment, enhanced by a prior conviction, at life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for each count. This appeal ensued. In his sole issue, Thornton contends that "[t]his Court should exercise its constitutionally-mandated duty to examine the factual sufficiency of the evidence and, after doing so, conclude that the evidence is factually insufficient."
Thornton concedes that the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review. See 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has abandoned the factual-sufficiency standard in criminal cases. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (concluding that there is "no meaningful distinction between the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard and the . . . factual-sufficiency standard, and these two standards have become indistinguishable" and holding the following: "As the Court with final appellate jurisdiction in this State, we decide that the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. All other cases to the contrary, including Clewis, are overruled."); see also Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). As an intermediate appellate court, we are required to follow binding precedent in cases decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals. See State v. DeLay, 208 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006) ("As an intermediate appellate court, we lack authority to overrule an opinion of the court of criminal appeals."), aff'd sub nom. State v. Colyandro, 233 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This Court has also repeatedly considered and rejected the arguments presented by Thornton. See, e.g., Wilkins v. State, No. 10-16-00233-CR, 2018 WL 1097367, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 28, 2018, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Thomas v. State, No. 10-17-00049-CR, 2017 WL 5662290, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Nov. 22, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Burns v. State, No. 10-16-00357-CR, 2017 WL 2819116, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Jun. 28, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); and Garcia v. State, No. 10-16-00045-CR, 2017 WL 124163, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 11, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication)).
We are therefore not persuaded to consider Thornton's factual-sufficiency argument in this proceeding. We overrule Thornton's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgments.
REX D. DAVIS
Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Neill
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed August 19, 2020
Do not publish
[CRPM]