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rejecting challenge to confinement prior to revocation of supervised release; "Where there are no present collateral consequences stemming from an alleged illegal detention, a claim for habeas relief is moot."
Summary of this case from Greenidge v. U.S.Opinion
3:00-CV-1875-G.
February 27, 2001.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an order of the Court in implementation thereof, the subject cause has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as evidenced by his signature thereto, are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
Type Case: This is a petition for habeas corpus relief filed by a state inmate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Parties: Petitioner, James Earl Thornton, is an inmate presently incarcerated in the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID) in Iowa Park, Texas. Respondent is the Director of the TDCJ-ID.
Statement of the Case: On March 9, 1989, in the 40th Judicial District Court of Ellis County, Texas, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled substance in cause no. 16, 998. Petition ¶¶ 1-5; Ex Parte Thornton, App. No. 25,968-01 p. 1. On June 28, 1989, he entered a plea of guilty to a second charge of possession of a controlled substance in cause no. 17188. Id. at p. 2A. Thornton was found guilty on both charges and sentenced to ten-years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Id. at pp. 1 2A. However, his sentences were suspended and he was placed on probation for a period of ten-years in each case. Id. On May 20, 1993, Thornton's probation was revoked and he began serving his sentences with credit for time served prior to revocation. Id. at pp. 17-22.
The State's criminal docket sheet indicates that Petitioner pled "no contest" in cause no. 16, 998. Ex Parte Thornton, App. No. 25,968-01 p. 1. However, Petitioner and Respondent appear to be in agreement that Thornton entered a plea of guilty. Petition ¶ 5; Respondent's Answer p. 1.
On August 14, 1997, Petitioner was released on mandatory supervision. Ex Parte Thornton, App. No. 25,968-02 pp. 32-33. His parole was revoked on October 25, 1999. Petition ¶ 20.C; Respondent's Answer, Exhibit A. Thornton has filed two art. 11.07 state applications for habeas corpus relief. The first application, in which he sought credit for time served prior to the revocation of his probation, was dismissed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on May 4, 1994 as moot. See Ex Parte Thornton, App. No. 25,968-01 p. 6 at cover. In his second art. 11.07 application, Thornton challenged the revocation of his mandatory supervised release. Ex Parte Thornton, App. No. 25,968-02 pp. 7-27. The application was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on July 12, 2000 without written order on findings of the trial court without a hearing. Id. at cover. In the case at bar, Thornton challenges the revocation of his mandatory supervised release and the post-revocation computation of his sentence. See Petition A ¶¶ 20.A-D. In support of his petition, Thornton presents the following grounds for relief:
1. unlawful extension of sentence resulting in a breach of Petitioner's plea bargain agreement;
2. unauthorized release on mandatory supervision;
3. excessive delay between arrest and the revocation of parole, and;
4. unlawful denial of good-time and work-time credits.Petition ¶¶ 20.A-D. Findings and Conclusions: Petitioner filed this habeas action after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and, as such, the petition is subject to review under that Act. The AEDPA precludes habeas corpus relief unless the state court's adjudication on the merits:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or;
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 28, 2000) (No. 00-5947).
This court must defer to the state court unless its decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is contrary to clearly established Federal law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" language, a writ may issue "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. Factual findings are presumed to be correct, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and the court will give deference to the state court's decision unless it "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Williams, 529 U.S. at 386, 120 S.Ct. at 1509 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).
In his first ground for relief, Thornton claims that his sentence has unlawfully been extended 606 days by the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles and by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Petition ¶ 20.A. Specifically, Petitioner claims that his ten-year sentences do not stop running just because he is released on mandatory supervision. See Petitioner's Brief and Memorandum and Law with Authorities in Support of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pp. 3-4 (hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner's Brief in Support p. ___"). He reasons, therefore, that he is entitled to credit on his sentence for the 606 days spent on mandatory supervised release. Id. Thornton claims that the 606 day "extension" of his sentence violates the separation of powers doctrine and that the Board of Pardons and Paroles has breached his plea bargain agreement which called for a ten-year sentence.
Thornton's claim for credit on his sentence for time spent on supervised release is without merit. Clearly, the State of Texas has the authority to revoke mandatory supervision and reincarcerate an individual to serve the remainder of his sentence without credit for "street-time." See Tex. Gov't Code § 508.283 (Vernon Supp. 2000). The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles has such authority under state law and there is no indication from Petitioner that the Board's actions in exercising its legal authority violated any of his constitutional rights. Id. It does not violate the Constitution to withdraw credit for time served on supervised release from a person whose conditional release is revoked. See United States v. Newton, 698 F.2d 770, 772 (5th Cir. 1983). The statute under which Thornton was released to mandatory supervision provides in pertinent part:
When a person's parole, mandatory supervision, or conditional pardon is revoked, that person may be required to serve the portion remaining of the sentence on which he was released, such portion remaining to be calculated without credit for the time from the date of his release to the date of revocation.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.18 § 15(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The Texas statute did not create any constitutionally protected interest that would entitle Thornton to credit for his street time. Accordingly, this ground for relief must fail.
Petitioner next claims that his release on mandatory supervision was unlawful and occurred through no fault of his own because he refused to sign the release certificate as required under state law. Petition ¶ 20.B. He claims that, because he was erroneously released, he is entitled to credit on his sentence for the time spent on supervision. Petitioner's Brief in Support pp. 6-7.
The law under which Petitioner was released required mandatory supervision when his calendar time served plus his accrued good conduct time equaled the maximum term to which he was sentenced. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.18 § 8(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The statute mandated that he was subject to conditions of supervision as determined by the Board of Pardons and Paroles. Id. An inmate released on "parole" was required to sign the contract relating to conditions of supervision as a precondition to release. Id. at § 8(g)(1). However, an individual released on "mandatory supervision" was not required to sign a conditions-of-supervision contract. Id. Mandatory supervision required only that the inmate "be furnished a written statement setting forth in clear and intelligible language the conditions and rules of mandatory supervision." Id. Thus, it is clear that Petitioner's claim is without merit. He was released pursuant to the law requiring his release and he makes no claim that he was not furnished with a copy of the conditions of supervision. The Texas statute created the right to release and also required that conditions of supervision be imposed. Both of these requirements were mandatory and Thornton's refusal to accept or sign the conditions of supervision is irrelevant. See Hicks v. Reid, 194 F.2d 327, 329 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that, under a federal mandatory release statute, the releasee could not avoid supervised release or the conditions of supervision by dissent), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 840, 73 S.Ct. 51 (1952); accord Howard v. United States, 274 F.2d 100, 102 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 832, 80 S.Ct. 1604 (1960).
Petitioner cites "Rule 145.20 — Parole Certificate" from the State Counsel for Offenders Legal Handbook as requiring his signature as a precondition to release. Petitioner's Brief in Support p. 7. The section of Rule 145.20 quoted by Petitioner involves "parole approval" and implements art. 42.18 § 8(g)(1) in requiring a parolee's signature as a precondition of release. However, this has no bearing on mandatory supervision. Because Petitioner was not erroneously released as he claims, he is clearly not entitled to credit on his sentence for street time.
Thornton next claims that he was denied due process of law because he was confined for 127 days prior to the revocation of his supervised release. Petition ¶ 20.C. Ha argues that this exceeds the maximum time limit of 91 days allowed for revocation under Texas law and that he is, therefore, entitled to immediate release. Id.; Petitioner's Brief in Support p. 13.
The relief sought by Petitioner is not available. Where there are no present collateral consequences stemming from an alleged illegal detention, a claim for habeas relief is moot. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 1559 (1968); Maggard v. Florida Parole Comm'n, 616 F.2d 890, 891 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960, 101 S.Ct. 372 (1980). Thornton presents no claim of collateral consequences arising out of the alleged unreasonable delay. See Petition ¶ 20. C; Petitioner's Brief in Support pp. 11-13. He does not challenge the validity of his conviction or sentence and he does not claim that he was denied credit on his sentence for the time during which he was detained prior to revocation. Id.
A hearing was conducted on August 16, 1999 and Thornton's supervised release was revoked on October 25, 1999. Petition ¶ 20. C; Respondent's Answer, Exhibit A. The fact that his supervised release was actually revoked renders Thorton's pre-revocation habeas claim moot. See Fassler v. United States, 858 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a habeas petition challenging the validity of pre-trial detention was rendered moot by the petitioner's subsequent conviction), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1099, 109 S.Ct. 2450 (1989).
Moreover, Thornton does not claim that the hearing delay was prejudicial. See Villarreal v. United States Parole Comm'n, 985 F.2d 835, 837 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a federal parolee claiming excessive delay in a revocation proceeding must show that the delay was unreasonable and that the delay resulted in actual prejudice); Frick v. Quinlin, 631 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1980) (denying habeas relief where a federal parolee failed to make an adequate showing of prejudice, despite the fact that his revocation hearing was held five-months after his arrest). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this ground.
In his final ground for habeas corpus relief, Thornton claims that, although he was given flat-time credit for his pre-revocation confinement, Respondent has failed to credit him with corresponding work-time and good-time credits.
In the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, good time credits are awarded to an inmate based upon his classification level. A claim regarding an inmate's classification level presents no issue of constitutional magnitude. Inmates do not have protected liberty interests in their classification status or in the opportunity to earn good-time credits, even if such privileges might increase their chances for earlier parole release. See Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that "[t]he loss of the opportunity to earn good-time credits, which might lead to earlier parole, is a collateral consequence of [an inmate's] custodial status" and, thus, does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1196, 116 S.Ct. 1690 (1996).
An inmate who is entitled to mandatory supervised release may have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in previously earned good-time credits such that due process attaches to any proceeding in which such credits are revoked. See Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the state may create a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring a higher level of due process where good-time credits are forfeited in a disciplinary action against an inmate eligible for mandatory supervised release). However, the inability to earn good-time credits is not constitutionally infirm, even for an inmate entitled to mandatory release. With regard to work-time credits, Thornton makes no claim that he ever earned such credits. He simply seeks an award of work credits to correspond with the number of days of pre-revocation confinement. Thus, it is clear that he cannot prevail on this ground for relief.
Absent a claim that Petitioner has been deprived of some right secured to him by the United States Constitution or laws, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Thomas v. Torres, 717 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1010, 104 S.Ct. 1008 (1984).
RECOMMENDATION:
For the foregoing reasons it is recommended that the petition for habeas corpus relief, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, be denied. A copy of this recommendation shall be transmitted to Petitioner and to Counsel for Respondent.
NOTICE
In the event that you wish to object to this recommendation, you are hereby notified that you must file your written objections within ten days after being served with a copy of this recommendation. Pursuant to Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) ( en banc), a party's failure to file written objections to these proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law within such ten-day period may bar a de novo determination by the district judge of any finding of fact or conclusion of law and shall bar such party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the district court.