Opinion
23A-DN-2892
06-18-2024
Jeffrey A. Thompson, Appellant-Petitioner v. Michelle A. Thompson, Appellee-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Casandra L. Ringlespaugh Emswiller, Williams, Noland & Clarke, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Rodney T. Sarkovics Sarkovics Law Carmel, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hancock Circuit Court The Honorable R. Scott Sirk, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 30C01-2202-DN-148
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Casandra L. Ringlespaugh Emswiller, Williams, Noland & Clarke, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Rodney T. Sarkovics Sarkovics Law Carmel, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MATHIAS, JUDGE.
[¶1] Jeffrey A. Thompson ("Husband") appeals the Hancock Circuit Court's final decree dissolving his marriage to Michelle A. Thompson ("Wife"). Husband presents eight issues for our review:
1. Whether the title of the dissolution decree violates an unspecified rule of procedure.
2. Whether some of the trial court's findings are inconsistent and constitute clear error.
3. Whether the trial court erroneously omitted marital property from the marital estate.
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it reduced certain marital property by amounts Wife paid on the parties' business debts after the dissolution petition was filed.
5. Whether the trial court erroneously reduced the value of the marital estate by the amount of premarital assets owned by Wife.
6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it valued Wife's retirement and pension assets.
7. Whether the trial court adequately considered the statutory factors when it divided the marital estate unequally.
8. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded certain real property to Wife.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] Husband and Wife had each been married with children before they met, and they married in October 2017. At that time, Husband was employed as a "journeyman pipefitter," and Wife was employed at Raytheon Technology as the Director of Infrastructure. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 11. Wife's retirement portfolio, including a pension from Raytheon, was valued at almost $1 million at the time of the parties' marriage.
[¶4] Also, at the time of their marriage, Wife owned a business called On the Rail Farms ("OTRF") which boarded horses and provided horse riding instruction. OTRF operated on real property owned by Wife that later became the marital residence ("the Farm"). The parties bought additional real property during their marriage, including a rental property ("the rental") and a second residence known as "the Ranch." The parties used $69,000 from Wife's sale of her condo, which she owned before the marriage, as a down payment on the Ranch.
[¶5] Wife was the sole proprietor of OTRF until her marriage to Husband, and then the two of them ran the business together. Wife continued working full-time at Raytheon during most of the marriage, but Husband worked only at OTRF during the first couple of years of their marriage. In the fall of 2020, Husband began working for The Peterson Company as a commercial repair and installation technician.
[¶6] On February 9, 2022, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. During the pendency of the dissolution, Wife wound down OTRF. She sold off equipment and sold the Farm, and she used some of those proceeds to pay business debts. Husband lived at the Ranch. After she sold the Farm, Wife lived in an RV on her parents' property.
[¶7] Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court divided the marital estate unequally, awarding 80% to Wife and 20% to Husband. Husband filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[¶8] The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: first, whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings of fact support the judgment. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d 690, 694 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018), trans. denied. We will set aside findings only if they are clearly erroneous, which occurs if the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. Id. To determine that a trial court's findings or conclusions are clearly erroneous, this court's review of the evidence must leave it with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Campbell v. Campbell, 993 N.E.2d 205, 209 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied.
[¶9] Our review of family law matters is conducted with a preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges. Anselm v. Anselm, 146 N.E.3d 1042, 1046 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), trans. denied.
Appellate deference to the determinations of our trial court judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of their unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face, often over an extended period of time. Thus enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense....Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). "It is not enough on appeal that the evidence might support some other conclusion; rather, the evidence must positively require the result sought by the appellant." Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d at 694. "Accordingly, we will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment." Id.
Issue One: Title of Final Judgment
[¶10] Husband first contends that the trial court clearly erred when it did not include the term "judgment" in the final decree. In support, Husband cites "Ind. Rule of Procedure (A)(1)(c)." Appellant's Br. at 16. As Wife points out, that is not a proper citation, and we have no way of knowing what rule of procedure Husband purports to cite. In his reply brief, Husband did not correct this error. We know of no requirement that a dissolution decree include the word "judgment" in its title. Therefore, this issue is waived for lack of cogent argument.
Issue Two: Inconsistent Findings
[¶11] Husband contends that several of the trial court's findings are "internally conflicting" and constitute clear error. Id. We address each alleged error in turn.
A. Paragraph 113 and Paragraph N
[¶12] In paragraph 113, the trial court ordered Wife to pay $12,500 of Husband's attorney's fees. But in paragraph N, the trial court ordered each party to pay his/her own attorney's fees. Husband is correct that these paragraphs are in conflict, but he does not suggest a solution. This is a matter of interpretation rather than reversible error. Given the specificity in paragraph 113, it is obvious that the trial court meant that, other than the $12,500 Wife shall pay towards Husband's attorney's fees, the parties shall pay his/her own attorney's fees.
B. Paragraphs 64 and 66
[¶13] In paragraph 64, the trial court found that "Husband worked solely at OTRF during the first half of the marriage. Husband earned in-kind income from OTRF and had his personal horse expenses paid." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 19. In paragraph 66, the trial court found that "Husband's child support was paid by Wife's salary while Husband worked solely at OTRF." Id. On appeal, Husband argues that these findings are "internally conflicting and improper." Appellant's Br. at 17. We cannot agree. In any event, Husband does not show prejudice by this alleged inconsistency, and he does not make cogent argument to show reversible error on this issue.
C. Distributions
[¶14] Husband contends that three of the "distributions" listed in the trial court's division of the marital estate "were not received by Husband" and are, therefore, "false." Appellant's Br. at 17. To the extent Husband contends that those distributions had not yet been made at the time of the final decree, that is of no moment, as the decree is the order that the distributions be made. To the extent Husband has not received distributions per the decree, Husband can move the trial court to enforce the decree.
D. Financial Support from Husband's Mother
[¶15] Finally, Husband contends that the trial court erred when it found that "he has financial support from his mother. Husband's mother has paid for attorney fees and other expenses for his benefit." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 12. Husband argues that that finding is unsupported by the record. However, Husband ignores his testimony that his mother helped him pay for a water line that was installed at the Ranch, Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 119-20, and his further testimony that he borrowed money from his mother to pay his attorney's fees. Id. at 35-36.
Issue Three: Property Allegedly Omitted from Marital Estate
[¶16] Husband contends that the trial court clearly erred when it omitted from the marital estate certain marital assets and debts. We address each in turn.
A. Auction Proceeds
[¶17] Following an auction liquidating OTRF's assets, the parties received $117,000. Wife then paid all remaining debts owed by OTRF out of those proceeds, leaving a balance of $36,700. The trial court awarded that amount to Husband. To the extent Husband argues that the trial court should not have reduced the proceeds from the auction by the amount of the debts paid, we address that argument separately below.
B. 1973 Dodge Challenger
[¶18] Husband contends that the trial court erred when it excluded from the marital estate Wife's interest in a vintage car she allegedly owns with her brother. Wife testified that when she was sixteen years old, she bought a 1973 Challenger. She also testified that the car now belongs to her brother. Wife testified that she loaned her brother $10,000 and that she put her name on the title, along with her brother's name, just so she can recoup the $10,000 in the event that he sells the car one day. Husband has not shown reversible error on this issue.
C. Credit Card Debt
[¶19] Husband contends that the trial court erred when it omitted from the marital estate certain credit card debt. Husband does not cite to the record in support of his argument, and it is waived.
D. Personal Property
[¶20] Husband contends that the trial court failed to distribute certain personal property. Husband acknowledges that the trial court ordered that "Each party shall receive their personal property free and clear from the other." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 24. But he maintains that the court "failed to distribute the disputed personal property." Appellant's Br. at 21. To the extent Husband contends that the trial court should have adopted his valuations of certain personal property over Wife's valuations, he asks that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do on appeal. Husband has not shown reversible error on this issue.
Issue Four: Wife's Payment of Post-Filing Business Debts
[¶21] Husband contends that the trial court erred when it reduced the marital estate by the amount of business debts paid by Wife after the parties' separation. But Husband does not support his argument with evidence that those business debts did not already exist at the time he filed the dissolution petition. In any event, it is well settled that the trial court has discretion to value the marital assets at any date between the date of filing and the date of the final hearing. Trabucco v. Trabucco, 944 N.E.2d 544, 558 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011), trans. denied. And "'there is no requirement in [Indiana] law that the valuation date be the same for every asset.'" Dierckman v. Dierckman, 225 N.E.3d 185, 195 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (quoting Wilson v. Wilson, 732 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied), trans. denied. Husband has not shown reversible error on this issue.
Issue Five: Wife's Pre-Marital Assets
[¶22] Husband contends that the trial court erroneously "reduced the value of the net marital estate by $1,501,074.00 for Wife's alleged premarital assets, several of which were not in evidence, and/or were also not included as a marital asset." Appellant's Br. at 27. However, the final decree does not support Husband's contention. The trial court valued the net marital estate at $3,089,807; awarded $2,470,002 to Wife (80%); and awarded $619,805 to Husband (20%). In its Exhibit A, the trial court claimed an "offset of Wife's premarital assets" in the amount of $1,501,074. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 29. But none of those "assets" were included in the marital estate or distributed to Wife from the marital estate. And, as Wife points out, there is no evidence that any of the listed premarital assets even existed at the time of dissolution.
[¶23] While the trial court's inclusion of these premarital assets in a column entitled "Wife's Premarital" in Exhibit A is confusing, none of the disputed premarital assets listed in that exhibit were or should have been included in the marital estate, and none of them were distributed from the marital estate to Wife. Husband makes additional arguments regarding the division of the marital estate, but his arguments again lack necessary citations to the record on appeal. Husband has not shown reversible error on this issue.
Issue Six: Wife's Retirement and Pension
[¶24] Husband contends that the trial court "substantially reduced the value of the marital estate when it reduced Wife's retirement accounts improperly." Appellant's Br. at 33. Once again, Husband's argument does not include any citations to the record on appeal. Without any evidentiary support for his contention, Husband's argument fails.
Issue Seven: Statutory Factors
[¶25] Husband contends that the trial court considered only two of the five factors included in Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 when it divided the marital estate. Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 provides that the court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse: (A) before the marriage; or (B) through inheritance or gift.
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to: (A) a final division of property; and (B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.Id. The statutory factors are to be considered together in determining what is just and reasonable; any one factor is not entitled to special weight. Smith v. Smith, 136 N.E.3d 275, 282 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). The party seeking to rebut the presumption of equal division bears the burden of proof of doing so, and a party challenging the trial court's decision on appeal must overcome a strong presumption that the trial court acted correctly in applying the statute. Id.
[¶26] Here, in explaining the 80/20 division of marital assets, the trial court emphasized Wife's $1.5 million in assets she brought into the marriage and the short duration of the marriage. The trial court explicitly stated that it had considered each of the statutory factors. Husband's argument on appeal amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
[¶27] In sum, the evidence supports the trial court's findings. Husband has not satisfied his burden on appeal to overcome the strong presumption that the trial court acted correctly in applying the statutory factors. Smith, 136 N.E.3d at 282. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the trial court's division of the marital estate. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Marek, 47 N.E.3d 1283, 1292 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (holding that wife rebutted the presumption of an equal division where she had received an inheritance, she had been out of the workforce for fifteen years to raise children, and husband's income was significantly higher than wife's income), trans. denied; see also Boucher v. Doyle, ____ N.E.3d ____, 2024 WL 542023 (Ind.Ct.App. Feb. 12, 2024) (affirming trial court's award of 62% of marital estate to husband where marriage lasted less than five years, husband brought majority of assets into the marriage, and wife had a substantial earning ability).
Issue Eight: The Ranch
[¶28] Finally, Husband contends that the trial court erred when it awarded the Ranch to Wife. Again, Husband's argument is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do on appeal. Trial courts have broad discretion in the division of the marital estates. Just because Husband wanted to continue living at the Ranch does not require that the court award that marital asset to him.
Conclusion
[¶29] Husband contends that the trial court clearly erred when it divided the marital estate. Many of Husband's arguments are difficult to discern, and his arguments frequently lack support either with citations to the record on appeal or pinpoint citations to case law. Moreover, as noted, several of Husband's arguments ask that we reweigh the evidence. Husband has not shown that the trial court committed reversible error when it divided the marital estate.
[¶30] For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court's final decree of dissolution.
[¶31] Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.