Opinion
A-13634
07-14-2021
CARL THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Carl K. Thompson, in propria persona, Kenai, Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Clyde Sniffen Jr., Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Trial Court No. 4FA-18-02504 CI Paul R. Lyle and Brent E. Bennett, Judges.
Carl K. Thompson, in propria persona, Kenai, Appellant.
Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Clyde Sniffen Jr., Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Carl K. Thompson, representing himself, appeals the conversion of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus to an application for post-conviction relief, and the subsequent summary dismissal of that application. For the reasons explained in this decision, we affirm the judgment of the superior court.
The following facts are drawn from our decision in Thompson's case on direct appeal. In 1986, Thompson killed his former wife by stabbing her twenty-nine times. After wrapping her body in chains, a bedspread, and a tent fly, Thompson dumped her body in a water-filled gravel pit. Following a jury trial, Thompson was convicted of one count of first-degree murder and one count of tampering with physical evidence. He was sentenced to 99 years for the murder conviction and to a consecutive 5 years for the tampering with evidence conviction.
Thompson v. State, 768 P.2d 127, 128 (Alaska App. 1989).
Former AS 11.41.100 (1986) and AS 11.56.610, respectively.
Thompson appealed, claiming(among other things)that the troopers should have advised him of his Miranda rights, that his statement to the troopers investigating the murder had not been voluntary, and that his sentence was excessive. This Court affirmed Thompson's convictions but remanded the case and instructed the superior court to order the sentences to be served concurrently.
Thompson, 768 P.2d at 134.
After the superior court amended Thompson's sentence, Thompson began a series of collateral challenges to his convictions in state and federal courts. Thompson's current challenge began in 2018, when he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Alaska Civil Rule 86 and AS 12.75.010 in the superior court.
Thompson alleged two general justifications for a writ, both of which were based on his allegation that a "fraud upon the court" had occurred before and during trial. First, Thompson generally alleged that a fraud upon the court had occurred: (1) when the prosecutor had opposed Thompson's motion to suppress the statement Thompson had given to the state troopers, (2) when the prosecutor failed to take corrective action when a trooper made (according to Thompson) false statements in an affidavit that the prosecutor used as part of the State's opposition to that motion to suppress, and (3) when (according to Thompson) the prosecutor allowed a witness to commit perjury in her grand jury testimony and in her trial testimony. Second, Thompson generally alleged a "fraud upon the court" had occurred because his trial attorneys and his first post-conviction relief attorney were so incompetent that he was essentially not represented.
After reviewing Thompson's pleading, the superior court determined that Thompson was asserting claims in his habeas petition that could have been raised in an application for post-conviction relief under Alaska Criminal Rule 35.l. The court also rejected Thompson's argument that post-conviction relief was an inappropriate vehicle to resolve the alleged jurisdictional defects in the conviction, noting that paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(6) of Alaska Criminal Rule 35.1 specifically permit such challenges. Consequently, the superior court converted the petition for habeas into an application for post-conviction relief.
See Fisher v. State, 315 P.3d 686, 688 (Alaska App. 2013).
After his habeas petition was converted, Thompson filed an amended application for post-conviction relief, where he for the most part repeated the allegations he had made in his habeas petition. After allowing oral argument, the superior court ultimately dismissed the application on its pleadings, finding that Thompson's allegations were barred by one or more of the provisions of AS 12.72.020. We agree.
See AS 12.72.020(a)(1)-(3), (5)-(6) (explaining that a claim for post-conviction relief may not be brought if "the claim is based on the admission or exclusion of evidence at trial," "the claim was, or could have been but was not, raised in a direct appeal from the proceeding that resulted in the conviction," more than one year has passed since the court's decision on appeal was final, "the claim was decided on its merits or on procedural grounds in any previous proceeding," or "a previous application for post-conviction relief has been filed under [AS 12.72] or under the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure").
The allegations Thompson raised in his habeas action involved claims that he was wrongfully convicted because the prosecutor committed misconduct regarding testimony and statements from certain witnesses, because the trial court made evidentiary errors or erroneous rulings, or because his attorneys provided ineffective assistance. All of these claims could have been raised during the criminal trial, in the direct appeal from that trial, or in Thompson's prior post-conviction relief applications.
See Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(a); see also AS 12.72.010(1), (2), (6), and (9) (permitting a person to institute a proceeding for post-conviction relief if "the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state[, ]" "the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence," or "the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground or alleged error previously available under the common law, statutory law, or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy," or "the applicant was not afforded effective assistance of counsel at trial or on direct appeal").
Furthermore, the superior court properly determined that the evidence Thompson was presenting was not "newly discovered." The evidence Thompson presented was a partial transcript of a deposition taken from one of his trial attorneys in 2000, and a number of affidavits from 1995 and 1998. The record shows that Thompson was aware of this evidence long before he filed his habeas petition in 2018.
We therefore agree that the superior court properly dismissed Thompson's application.
Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.