Opinion
No. 14-16338
06-30-2015
DeWAYNE THOMPSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. M. P. HERNANDEZ; F. MUNOZ, Defendants - Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00625-AWI-BAM MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
California state prisoner DeWayne Thompson appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging procedural due process violations in connection with a disciplinary hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Thompson's action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success in Thompson's action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction and loss of time credits, and Thompson failed to allege facts sufficient to show their invalidation. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 80-82 (2005) (a prisoner's § 1983 action is barred if success "would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration[,]" unless "the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645-48 (1997) (Heck rule applies to § 1983 claims for damages alleging procedural defects with disciplinary hearing when based on the "deceit and bias" of the decisionmaker); see also McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The disclaimer in the complaint that [plaintiffs] do not seek relief that implicates the continuing validity of their confinement does not bring their claims outside the reach of Heck.").
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Thompson's motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) because Thompson failed to establish any ground warranting reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)).
AFFIRMED.