Opinion
CLAIM NOS. E901941, E911438, E911439
ORDER FILED JUNE 6, 2002
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by HONORABLE JAY TOLLEY, Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
Respondents represented by HONORABLE CHRIS BRADLEY, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Full Commission on the claimant's appeal of an Administrative Law Judge's opinion filed on November 5, 2001. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we vacate the Administrative Law Judge's decision and remand for additional findings.
The claimant was employed by the City of Bentonville as a firefighter from October of 1982 through June 25, 1999. During the relevant periods, the claimant also served as a volunteer firefighter for the City of Centerton. The Municipal League Workers' Compensation Trust is the workers' compensation insurance carrier for both cities.
The claimant was fighting a fire for the Bentonville Fire Department on September 1, 1998, when a ceiling tile fell on him, injuring his lower back. The claimant exacerbated his back problem again on October 15, 1998 while installing a pump for Bentonville. The claimant missed no time from work following these incidents.
After completing a 24-hour shift for Bentonville on January 27, 1999, the claimant was in the Centerton firehouse when he overheard a Bentonville emergency call. The claimant responded to the call and again hurt himself while lifting a patient in respiratory distress. The claimant has missed time from work after the January 27, 1999 incident. The Municipal League Workers' Compensation Trust paid the claimant's medical expenses for the January 27, 1999 event, and paid the claimant temporary total disability benefits at the rate of $20.00 per week for the period between January 27, 1999 and June 21, 2000. Thus, the Municipal League Workers' Compensation Trust has treated the claimant's January 27, 1999 injury as a new injury arising out of his work as a volunteer for Centerton, for which he would only be entitled to a compensation rate of $20 per week.
The claimant asserts that he is not only entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses, but also entitled to temporary disability compensation to be paid at the maximum rate allowed by law (i.e., based on his wage rate as a Bentonville firefighter) rather than at the $20 per week paid by the Municipal League Workers' Compensation Trust (i.e., based on his lack of wages as a Centerton volunteer). The claimant also asserts that he is entitled additional temporary total disability compensation from June 25, 2000 to a date yet to be determined.
The claimant puts forward two alternative legal theories as to why he should receive temporary total disability benefits at the maximum rate allowed by law, rather than the $20 per week paid by the Municipal League Workers' Compensation Trust.
First, the claimant asserts that his problems after the January 27, 1999 incident are a recurrence of his admittedly compensable 1998 neck and back injury sustained while working for Bentonville. Second, even if the claimant's problems after January 27, 1999 are considered a new injury, and not a recurrence of his 1998 injury, the claimant asserts that at the time of the January 27, 1999 incident, he was working on behalf of Bentonville, not Centerton, so that he is entitled to temporary disability compensation based on his rate of pay working for Bentonville.
With regard to these contentions, the parties stipulated before the hearing that the claimant sustained a compensable injury to his neck and back while working for the City of Bentonville. The parties stipulated that the medical expenses are also being paid for the January 27, 1999 "event," and that temporary total disability benefits were paid to the claimant on the January 27, 1999 "event" in the amount of $20 per week until June 21, 2000. The parties also stipulated that the claimant would be entitled to the maximum compensation rate based on his wages as a paid firefighter for the City of Bentonville.
Although not indicated in the Prehearing Order, we understand this stipulation to refer to injuries sustained in 1998, and not the injuries at issue sustained on January 27, 1999.
The respondents contended that two injuries (City of Bentonville) were accepted as medical only cases because the claimant lost no time from work until after January 27, 1999. The respondents asserted that the claimant sustained a new injury on January 27, 1999 while performing services as a volunteer firefighter for the City of Centerton. The respondents asserted that neither the claimant nor any medical providers have submitted medical bills as required by the Commission.
The respondents further asserted that they are willing to pay medical benefits once medical bills are submitted as required by the Commission rules. The respondents contended that the claimant is not entitled to any indemnity benefits from the two events in 1998. Finally, the respondents further contended the injury (City of Centerton) was accepted as compensable and that all appropriate benefits have been and are being paid.
The Administrative Law Judge's Pre-Hearing Order indicates that the relevant issue the parties agreed to litigate was whether the January 27, 1999 injury was a new injury or a recurrence of the old injury.
Disregarding the prehearing agreement of the parties that the claimant sustained admittedly compensable injuries in 1998 and on January 27, 1999, the Administrative Law Judge found that the claimant failed to establish that his January 27, 1999 injury was either a new injury or a recurrence of his 1998 injury. As we understand the Administrative Law Judge's decision, the Administrative Law Judge reached this result by finding that the claimant failed to establish compensable injuries in 1998 or 1999 with "objective" medical findings.
The claimant asserts on appeal that the Administrative Law Judge erred in (1) disregarding the stipulation of the parties that the claimant sustained admittedly compensable injuries in 1998 and on January 27, 1999, (2) finding that the claimant failed to establish the existence of compensable injuries in 1998 or on January 27, 1999, and (3) thereby avoiding the issue which the parties agreed to litigate, i.e., whether the admittedly compensable January 27, 1999 injury was a new injury or instead a recurrence of the admittedly compensable 1998 injury. For their part, the respondents acknowledge on appeal their prehearing stipulation that the claimant sustained admittedly compensable injuries. However, the respondents assert, without persuasive argument, that the parties' prehearing stipulation was not binding on the Administrative Law Judge.
A stipulation of fact equals undisputed proof, leaving nothing for the fact finder to decide as to the stipulated matter. Mayo v. Area Agency on Aging, Full Commission Opinion, filed February 18, 1998 ( E610215),citing Brown v. Keaton, 232 Ark. 12, 334 S.W.2d 676 (1960). The Commission encourages stipulations, for they reduce the time and expense involved with hearings by limiting the extent of formal proof required for a particular element of proof. As a general rule, parties are bound by their stipulations. Id., citing Dempsey v. Merchants National Bank of Fort Smith, 292 Ark. 207, 729 S.W.2d 150 (1987).
This Commission in Mayo also stated:
[T]he Commission should not rigidly enforce a stipulation where, due to special circumstances, enforcement would be unjust or produce a result contrary to established notions of justice and fair play. Adjudicative bodies such as this Commission have discretion to relieve parties from their stipulations where, due to special circumstances, enforcement would conflict with these basic notions. See Edgar Jackson v. Circle T Express, Full Commission Opinion, Filed February 9, 1994 ( E016465).
Mayo, supra.
In the present case, at no point either before or during the hearing did the respondents ever request to withdraw their stipulation as to the compensability of the injuries at issue. The Administrative Law Judge has likewise failed to indicate any rationale for disregarding the stipulations of the parties. We therefore vacate the Administrative Law Judge's findings that the claimant did not sustain compensable injuries in 1998 or on January 27, 1999. We remand to the Administrative Law Judge for findings on whether the admittedly compensable injury sustained on January 27, 1999 was a new injury, or whether that injury was instead a recurrence of the claimant's admittedly compensable 1998 injuries. The Administrative Law Judge is also directed to make findings as to whether the claimant is entitled to any period of additional temporary disability compensation after June 25, 2000.
All accrued benefits shall be paid in a lump sum without discount and with interest thereon at the lawful rate from the date of the Administrative Law Judge's decision in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-809 (Repl. 1996).
For prevailing on this appeal before the Full Commission, the claimant's attorney is hereby awarded an additional attorney's fee in the amount of $250.00 in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 (Repl. 1996).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________ ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman
______________________________ SHELBY W. TURNER, Commissioner
Commissioner Yates recuses.