Opinion
23A-MI-2488
05-31-2024
Brandon M. Thomas, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Amanda O. Blackketter Blackketter Law, LLC Shelbyville, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Shelby Superior Court The Honorable R. Kent Apsley, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 73D01-2307-MI-64
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Amanda O. Blackketter
Blackketter Law, LLC
Shelbyville, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges Bailey and Crone concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Brandon M. Thomas ("Thomas") appeals his 150-day sentence for indirect contempt Thomas argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it found him in indirect contempt; and (2) his sentence is unreasonable. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that Thomas' sentence is not unreasonable, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
The trial court's contempt order refers to Thomas' citation as both an indirect and direct contempt citation. However, based on the record before us, it is clear that the trial court intended Thomas' citation to be indirect contempt of court.
[¶2] We affirm.
Issue
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it found Thomas in indirect contempt.
2. Whether Thomas' indirect contempt sentence is unreasonable.
Facts
[¶3] In October 2022, Thomas pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony operating a motor vehicle with a Schedule I or II substance in his blood causing catastrophic injury in cause number 73D01-2110-F4-18. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report and set a sentencing hearing for November 23, 2022. The trial court allowed Thomas to be out on bond pending sentencing and ordered Thomas to appear at his sentencing hearing.
[¶4] The trial court held Thomas' sentencing hearing as scheduled. However, Thomas failed to appear. Attorneys for the State, Thomas' attorney, and members of the victim's family appeared for the sentencing hearing. Thomas did not notify his attorney or the trial court that he was not going to appear at sentencing. Because Thomas was not present at his sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered a warrant for Thomas' arrest. Seven months later, in June 2023, the police found and arrested Thomas.
[¶5] In July 2023, the trial court filed its own rule to show cause motion, wherein the trial court ordered Thomas to appear and explain why he had not been present at his sentencing hearing. In August 2023, the trial court held a contempt hearing. At the hearing, Thomas testified that he had not attended his sentencing hearing because of his grandmother's worsening health. Specifically, Thomas testified that his grandmother had "just gotten out of the hospital" after suffering a stroke. (Tr. 6). Thomas further testified that he had not appeared at his sentencing hearing due to his fear of not being with his grandmother while she was ill and losing her. Thomas also testified that he had been afraid of missing time with his six children. Thomas admitted that he had known that he had a sentencing hearing on November 23, 2022. Thomas testified that he did not have a phone and could not have contacted the trial court or his attorney to explain his absence.
[¶6] At the conclusion of the contempt hearing, the trial court found Thomas in contempt. Specifically, the trial court stated that it had found Thomas' explanation as to why he had failed to appear at sentencing to be "inadequate and unacceptable[.]" (Tr. 18). The trial court noted that Thomas had disrespected both the trial court and the "functioning of the judicial system." (Tr. 18). The trial court explained that "[o]ur system only works when courts can make orders and people follow those orders. The . . . system can only work when people appear in court to take care of the business of the people when they're ordered to be here." (Tr. 18). The trial court further stated:
The fact that you were in fear . . . does not excuse your not being here. You took the cowardly way out. Basically, you simply skipped out and decided to hide out for seven months. It's . . . I think significant . . . in this case not only did you fail to appear, but you failed to appear for seven months, and eventually you were picked up on the warrant in this case, you never turned yourself in, you never reached out to your attorney, tried to, to mitigate the situation or make it right in any way, shape, or form. . . . And in determining a sanction in this case, I am very mindful of, again, how you have interfered with the functioning of this court and importantly the impact that you have had on the other participants in this court. Not only the [c]ourt, but the attorneys, the witnesses, and also the victims in this case.(Tr. 18). At the conclusion of the contempt hearing, the trial court sentenced Thomas to serve 150 days in jail.
[¶7] Thomas now appeals.
Decision
[¶8] Thomas argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it found him in indirect contempt; and (2) his sentence is unreasonable. We address each of his arguments in turn.
1. Indirect Contempt
[¶9] Thomas first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found him in indirect contempt. The determination of whether a party is in contempt of court is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Williams v. State ex rel. Harris, 690 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997). We will reverse the trial court's determination only if the court has abused its discretion. Id. A court has abused its discretion when its decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or is contrary to law. Id.
[¶10] This Court has previously explained as follows:
Contempt is a "sui generis proceeding neither civil nor criminal in nature, although both of those labels are used to describe certain categories of contempt." Contempt proceedings may be generally categorized as civil or criminal, according to the nature and purpose of the sanction imposed. A civil contempt is a violation of a court order resulting in a proceeding for the benefit of the aggrieved party. As such, any type of penalty in a civil contempt proceeding must be coercive or remedial in nature. By contrast, a criminal contempt is an act directed against the dignity and authority of the court that obstructs the administration of justice and tends to bring the court into disrepute. Accordingly, a criminal contempt sanction is punitive
in nature because its purpose is to vindicate the authority of the court, and it benefits the State rather than the aggrieved party.
Contempt may also be direct or indirect. Direct contempt involves action in the presence of the court, such that the court has personal knowledge of it. Indirect contempt undermines the orders or activities of the court but involves action outside the trial court's personal knowledge.Wilson v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1211, 1218 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) (citations and footnotes omitted).
[¶11] INDIANA CODE § 34-47-3-1 provides:
A person who is guilty of any willful disobedience of any process, or any order lawfully issued:
(1) by any court of record, or by the proper officer of the court;
(2) under the authority of law, or the direction of the court; and
(3) after the process or order has been served upon the person;
is guilty of an indirect contempt of the court that issued the process or order.
Thus, the willful and intentional disobedience of the order of a trial court may constitute indirect criminal contempt. Jones v. State, 847 N.E.2d 190, 199 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
[¶12] Here, Thomas willfully disobeyed the trial court's order requiring him to appear for his own sentencing hearing. Thus, Thomas' act constituted indirect contempt. The trial court filed its own rule to show cause motion and held a contempt hearing. At the hearing, Thomas' only defense to his willful disobedience was to testify that he had been afraid to miss spending time with his ill grandmother and his children. Thomas also testified that he did not have a phone and, thus, could not have notified the trial court or his attorney of his absence. The trial court stated that it had found Thomas' defense as to why he failed to appear at sentencing to be "inadequate and unacceptable[.]" (Tr. 18). We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Thomas was in indirect contempt.
2. Reasonableness
[¶13] Thomas also argues that his sentence is unreasonable. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Grogg v. State, 156 N.E.3d 744, 750-51 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. at 751.
[¶14] "Contempt of court involves disobedience which undermines the court's authority, justice and dignity. The trial court has inherent power to maintain its dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, rebuke interference with the conduct of its business, and punish unseemly behavior." Wilson, 988 N.E.2d at 1218-19. Punishment for contempt is a matter reserved to the sound discretion of the trial court. Hopping v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1294, 1298 (Ind. 1994), cert. denied. The trial court's power to punish contempt is limited only by reasonableness. Jones, 847 N.E.2d at 202. However, a trial court may impose a maximum sentence of six months "for criminal contempt [] without guilt or innocence being determined by a jury." Holly v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1176, 1177 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997).
[¶15] Here, the trial court sentenced Thomas to 150 days for his indirect contempt citation, which is less than the 180-day maximum. As previously stated, a criminal contempt sanction is punitive in nature because its purpose is to vindicate the authority of the court. Wilson, 988 N.E.2d at 1218-19. In addition, a punishment for criminal contempt is meant "to act as a deterrent for [the defendant] and all others who might harbor the thought of defying an order of [the court]." In re Perrello, 291 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Ind. 1973). We conclude that Thomas' sentence effectuates both of these purposes. Thomas, after pleading guilty and being released on bond, failed to appear at his sentencing hearing. Thomas did not notify the trial court or his attorney about his absence. Seven months later, the police arrested Thomas, resulting in his contempt hearing. Thomas demonstrated his total disregard of the trial court's authority when he failed to appear at his sentencing hearing after being released on bond, failed to contact the trial court or his attorney, and was only brought before the trial court due to his arrest seven months later. We conclude that Thomas' 150- day sentence is not unreasonable in light of the given circumstances, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing it.
Thomas also argues that his sentence was inappropriate. However, at the contempt hearing, Thomas conceded that the standard for a contempt sentence is reasonableness. Even so, Thomas' sentence also "passes muster" under the inappropriateness test. See Jones, 847 N.E.2d at 202.
[¶16] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.