Opinion
A23-0448
12-19-2023
Desean Lamont Thomas, n/k/a Pharaoh El-Forever Left-I Amen El, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Dakota County District Court File No. 19HA-CR-14-2948
Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Susan L. Segal, Chief Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In December 2015, the Dakota County District Court convicted appellant of attempted second-degree murder, drive-by shooting, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced appellant to concurrent prison terms of 203 months for attempted murder and 60 months for unlawful possession of a firearm. Appellant filed a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, which this court affirmed. See State v. Thomas, No. A15-1542, 2017 WL 1375278, at *3 (Minn.App. Apr. 17, 2017), rev. denied (Minn. June 28, 2017). Following the Minnesota Supreme Court's denial of his petition for further review, appellant filed six separate petitions for postconviction relief over the ensuing five years, each of which the postconviction court denied. The current appeal arises from the most recent of these orders.
2. In his sixth petition for postconviction relief, appellant argues that he was improperly convicted of an offense with which he was never charged. According to appellant, he was initially charged with attempted second-degree murder while committing a drive-by shooting, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(2) (2014), but was instead convicted of attempted second-degree intentional murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2014). In a subsequent memorandum, appellant asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to challenge the state's mid-trial amendment of the second-degree murder charge. Appellant also argued that his claims are not procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976), by reason of mental illness.
3. In denying the petition without a hearing, the postconviction court determined that it was time-barred pursuant to the two-year limitation period imposed by Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2022), that it was procedurally barred under Knaffla, and that appellant failed to establish how his mental health actually precluded a timely assertion of the claims.
4. In his brief to this court, appellant argues that the postconviction court erred in denying his petition for postconviction relief without a hearing regarding his claim that his mental illness prevented him from raising his current challenges at an earlier time, and that the district court erred in concluding that he was not entitled to relief on the merits. Respondent State of Minnesota argues that the postconviction court properly denied the petition as untimely, Knaffla-barred, and meritless.
5. This court reviews the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for abuse of discretion. Hannon v. State, 957 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Minn. 2021). "A court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011).
6. Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4, provides that a petition for postconviction relief may not be filed more than two years following the final disposition of the petitioner's direct appeal. In appellant's case, the availability of postconviction relief expired on June 28, 2019-two years after the Minnesota Supreme Court's order denying further review of his direct appeal. Accordingly, appellant's petition was presumptively untimely and not properly before the postconviction court.
7. An otherwise untimely petition may, nevertheless, be considered by the postconviction court if the petitioner "establishes that a physical disability or mental disease precluded a timely assertion of the claim." Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(1). Here, while appellant does not dispute that his petition was filed more than two years beyond the disposition of his direct appeal, he argues generally that his mental illness prevented him from bringing these claims sooner and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the question.
8. "A district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the alleged facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to the petitioner, together with the arguments of the parties, conclusively show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Blanche v. State, 988 N.W.2d 486, 491 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted).
9. Appellant did not allege that his mental illness actually precluded the timely assertion of his claims; he alleged that it impacted his cognition and was "detrimental to his ability to be effective [and] judicious within this system." Moreover, the record itself "lacks any evidence suggesting the mental disease precluded a timely assertion of his claim." Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Minn. 2015). Between June 28, 2017, and June 28, 2019, appellant filed three separate petitions for postconviction relief, received separate orders denying each of them, and pursued an appeal of the third such order which this court affirmed. See State v. Thomas, No. A18-1508 (Minn.App. Feb. 6, 2019) (order op.), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2019).
10. Given appellant's demonstrated ability to pursue postconviction relief and raise colorable claims on his own behalf during the course of (and subsequent to) the two-year postconviction window, appellant cannot reasonably assert that he was unable to raise his current claims in any of the three other petitions filed during that time due to mental illness. Because "the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief," Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2022), the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that appellant's petition was time-barred, that he had failed to demonstrate the applicability of an exception to the time-bar, or by denying appellant an evidentiary hearing.
11. "[O]nce a direct appeal has been taken, all claims raised in that appeal, known at the time of appeal, or that should have been known at the time of appeal will not be considered in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief." Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 536 (Minn. 2023) (citing Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741). And any "claims asserted in a second or subsequent postconviction petition are procedurally barred if they could have been raised on direct appeal or in the first postconviction petition." Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 2006).
12. Minnesota recognizes two exceptions to the application of this rule, including when: "(1) a novel legal issue is presented that was unavailable at the time of the direct appeal; or (2) the interest of justice requires review." Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665, 673 (Minn. 2020). In this context, "the interests-of-justice exception applies only when the claim has substantive merit and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the [claim]" in previous proceedings. Thoresen v. State, 965 N.W.2d 295, 304 (Minn. 2021).
13. The postconviction court determined that appellant's claims are presumptively barred from consideration by the Knaffla rule and that appellant failed to satisfy either exception to its application. It found that appellant's claims were not novel because they were available at the time of the direct appeal, that he deliberately and inexcusably failed to raise them in his prior petitions for postconviction relief, and that he failed to establish that any mental condition prevented him from raising the claims in those proceedings. The record adequately supports the postconviction court's determinations.
14. Here, the claims raised by appellant in his petition for postconviction relief- that he was convicted for an uncharged offense and received ineffective assistance of counsel-are not novel and indisputably could have been raised either on direct appeal or in any one of the five subsequent petitions for postconviction relief. And, as previously discussed, the mere existence of the five prior petitions for relief conclusively establish both that appellant was not prevented from raising the current claims due to mental illness and that his failure to do so was deliberate and inexcusable. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellant's petition for postconviction relief was Knaffla-barred.
15. Because we conclude that appellant's sixth petition for postconviction relief was not properly before the postconviction court as both time-barred and Knaffla-barred, we decline to address the merits of appellant's claims.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The postconviction court's order denying postconviction relief is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.